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to the Governor and the Legislature 
"All great changes are irksome to the human mind, especially those 
which are attended with great dangers and uncertain effects." 
John Adams 
April 22, 1776 
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CCRC 
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION 
1994 to 1996 
Dear Governor Wilson and 
Members of the California Legislature: 
Three years ago, the legislature and the governor agreed that a 
fundamental review of California government was imperative. 
The result was the creation of the 23-member California 
Constitution Revision Commission. 
The Commission, consisting of gubernatorial and legislative 
appointments and selected state officers, met for the first time in 
May 1994. The governor and legislative leaders addressed the 
Commission and urged it to be bold and creative and to consider 
all relevant issues-however controversial. The Commission's 
recommendations reflect those admonitions. Thirty public meetings 
were held including four formal public hearings, plus five 
workshops and, along with the League of Women Voters, 39 
community forums and video conferences. The Commission completed its work and went out of 
business on June 30, 1996. During the course of our work, it became very clear that we needed to 
change the way state and local governments operate. 
For reasons the Commission quickly figured out, the status quo is no longer acceptable. Principal 
among the reasons is that the state's population with its varied public service needs continues to 
grow while the resources needed to provide services do not grow as fast. Neither the voters nor state 
and local officeholders are anxious to raise taxes. 
The conclusion is obvious. We must find ways to provide needed services with existing resources. 
This means that government must operate more efficiently. The state's governmental system 
developed in the nineteenth century will not be adequate for the twenty-first century. 
It is well known to each of you that many voters do not believe that their taxes are being used wisely 
or efficiently. And, perhaps equally important, it is not clear to our citizens who is responsible for 
public decisionmaking. With 7,000 units of local government in the state and at least 15,000 elected 
officials, it seems clear that California has considerably more government than it needs. 
Accomplishing needed changes will mean upsetting public institutions, many of which were 
organized when the state's population was smaller and when public policy issues were far less 
complex. 
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Naturally, this is not an easy process. The Commission has made a series of recommendations that 
would begin this process of change. The advocates for the status quo are more numerous and better 
organized than those who will support these needed changes. As a consequence, it will be up to state 
and local political leaders to bring about a more workable and efficient system of government that 
will be appropriate for the next century. 
It is for these reasons that the Commission urges the legislature to begin the process of reviewing our 
governmental and finance system and placing these issues before the voters. It is critical that we 
begin to require our governmental organizations to work better and more effectively for the citizens 
of California. 
Sincerely, 
William Hauck 
Chairman 
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Introduction 
In a letter to James Warren on April 22, 1776, John Adams wrote, "All great changes are 
irksome to the human mind, especially those which are attended with great dangers and 
uncertain effects". Today, Californians are seeking change in the way their government 
operates. Voter-approved initiatives of the last 20 years show a citizenry frustrated with their 
government. Proposing a new way to do things is never easy. The reality we do not like often 
looks better than a new way that might bring a better, yet uncertain future. 
As we prepare for the next century, it is clear that the public agenda must include a review of 
the way our government works. Our current state and local government structure is the 
outgrowth of a constitution that was adopted in 1879. At that time, the state's population was 
about 800,000. Today, the population tops 32 million, and all of the forecasts show continued 
growth. As the state's population continues to grow and become more diverse, the private 
sector changes and adjusts to new environments and conditions. But our governmental 
structure has not changed. We have basically the same governmental structure we had in the 
nineteenth century and that government has grown significantly. Today, California has more 
than 7,000 units of government-including school districts, cities, counties and single 
purpose agencies-led by more than 15,000 local elected officials. 
The year 2000 is approaching quickly. We must prepare for the next millennium and begin 
reviewing and revising our governmental institutions to meet modern conditions. This will 
not be simple. But despite the uncertainty that change brings, it is clear that changes in 
California's system of state and local government are necessary. 
In 1994, in an effort to develop reasonable and workable ways to reform our government, the 
governor and legislature appointed the 23-member California Constitution Revision 
Commission. The Commission was asked to do the following: 
• Examine the structure of state government and propose modifications that will increase 
accountability. 
• Analyze the current configuration of state and local government duties and 
responsibilities and review the constraints that interfere with the allocation of state and 
local responsibilities. 
• Review the state budgetary process, including the appropriate balance of resources and 
spending; the fiscal relationship between federal, state, and local governments; and the 
constraints and impediments that interfere with an orderly and comprehensive 
consideration of fiscal issues. 
• Consider the feasibility of integrating community resources in order to reduce 
duplication and increase the productivity of local service delivery. 
Introduction - Page 1 
In May 1994, the California Constitution Revision Commission began holding meetings, 
hearings, and community forums across the state. The Commission received comments and 
proposals from both the general public and experts with knowledge of specific issues. Those 
comments focused on the problems with current government structures and procedures and 
possible solutions to alleviate those problems. After eighteen months of hearings and 
analysis, the Commission is proposing an agenda for changing the ways in which our state 
and local governments operate. The Commission's primary objectives in making these 
recommendations are as follows: 
• Improve accountability and responsiveness of government at all levels from the state to 
the smallest community. 
• Eliminate barriers to efficiency and increase flexibility. 
• Assure that the state keeps its fiscal house in order by maintaining a balanced budget. 
Indeed, change can be irksome, and we cannot completely predict the outcome. But we do 
know that the current system is in dire need of change. The Commission believes these 
recommendations represent an opportunity for positive change in California's governance 
system. Only through major changes can we hope to create a better system and a better state 
for all Californians. 
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Summary of Recommendations 
I. Improving Accountability in State Government: 
Knowing Who Is in Charge 
California's state government structure is often described as "divided"-split up among a 
dozen directly elected public officials with a mixture of authority and few direct lines of 
accountability. The primary objective of the organization of executive functions should be to 
promote efficiency and responsiveness in the implementation of state policy. California 
should review its legislative structure, including the length of legislative terms (which are 
too short) and the length of legislative sessions (which are too long). 
The authority of the executive and legislative branches is limited by the adoption of 
initiatives which are often enacted in response to legislative inaction. The initiative process, 
which was originally intended to break the grip of special interests on the legislative 
process, has been used in place of the legislature for major public policy decisions. Currently, 
there is a process for a public discussion of the legal and technical issues of proposed 
initiatives, but there is no formal process for revising qualified initiatives before they are 
placed on the ballot. 
1. The governor and lieutenant governor should run on 
the same ticket and work as a team. 
The governor and lieutenant governor should run on the 
same ticket at the general election, and the governor 
should be authorized to appoint the lieutenant governor 
to an executive branch responsibility. 
2. The superintendent of public instruction, treasurer, 
and insurance commissioner should be appointed by 
the governor instead of being elected. 
The offices of the superintendent of public instruction, the 
state treasurer, and the state insurance commissioner 
should be appointed by the governor, rather than being 
elective, and should be subject to legislative confirmation. 
3. Abolish the Board of Equalization, merge state tax 
administration functions, and appoint a tax appeals 
board. 
The Board of Equalization should be abolished. Its 
regulatory and executive functions, along with the 
functions of the Franchise Tax Board and other major 
revenue agencies should be combined into a Department 
of Revenue. Additionally, a state tax appeals body should 
The Executive 
Branch: Improving 
Responsiveness 
and Efficiency 
Summary of Recommendations - Page 3 
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The Legislative 
Branch: Improving 
Efficiency and 
Effectiveness 
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be established, appointed by the governor and subject to 
senate confirmation. 
4. Shorten the terms of the University of California Board 
of Regents. 
The term of office for members appointed to the 
University of California Board of Regents should be 
reduced from 12 years to 10 years. Reappointment should 
be prohibited unless the appointee has served less than a 
full term. The number of appointed members should be 
reduced from 18 to 15, and the superintendent of public 
instruction should be removed as a member of the board. 
5. Shorten the terms and limit the functions of the State 
Personnel Board. 
The probationary and classification functions of the State 
Personnel Board (SPB) should be transferred to the 
Department of Personnel Administration (DPA). 
Additionally, the terms of SPB members should be 
shortened from ten years to six years. 
6. Lengthen the limit on legislative terms of office to 
three four-year terms. 
Legislative terms should be extended so that members can 
serve three four-year terms in each house. The terms 
would be staggered so that one-half of each house would 
be elected every two years. This provision would be 
implemented so that no current member of the legislature 
would benefit. 
7. Shorten legislative session to six months. 
The length of legislative sessions for considering and 
acting on bills should be reduced from eight months to six 
months per year. Additionally, the legislature should be 
able to begin work on a bill ten days after the bill is 
introduced. 
8. Give the legislature the power to veto administrative 
regulations. 
The legislature should be given constitutional authority to 
review and reject administrative regulations. 
-----------------------------------6 -----------------------------------
9. Provide limited retirement benefits to legislators. 
Under the revised term limits, legislators would be able to 
participate in the regular Public Employee Retirement 
System. 
10. To provide fuller public review, place constitutional 
amendments on the November ballot, except in special 
circumstances. 
All proposed initiative constitutional amendments should 
be placed on the November ballot. Constitutional 
amendments proposed by the legislature may be placed 
on primary or special election ballots with a two-thirds 
vote of the legislature and the approval of the governor. 
11. Allow amendment of statutory initiatives after six 
years. 
Allow the legislature, with gubernatorial approval, to 
amend statutory initiatives after they have been in effect 
for six years. 
12. Allow the legislature to add technical and clarifying 
changes to initiatives that have qualified for the ballot. 
After an initiative has qualified for the ballot, the 
legislature would have a short period of time to hold 
hearings on the initiative and to adopt technical or 
clarifying amendments. If the proponents of the initiative 
agree, the measure would be submitted to the voters as 
revised by the legislature. 
The Initiative 
Process: Improving 
Public Review 
Summary of Recommendations- Page 5 
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II. Improving the State Budget and Fiscal Process: 
Developing a Long-term Vision with 
Increased Fiscal Discipline 
The state's budget process contains few constitutional standards. For example, there is no 
constitutional requirement that the state enact or maintain a balanced budget. Once a budget 
becomes unbalanced, there is no formal system for rebalancing the budget. An annual budget 
provides limited opportunities for establishing and implementing long-term strategic plans. 
Such plans would provide more direction for overall spending, facilitate the systematic 
evaluation of programs by the public, and increase accountability. 
Adopt a Long-term 
Vision and Have 
the Flexibility to 
Respond to 
Changing 
Conditions 
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13. Require the governor to submit, and the legislature to 
adopt, long-term goals for the state and performance 
measures for the budgetary process. 
The governor should be required to submit a four-year 
strategic plan to the legislature for deliberation and 
adoption. The plan would include: 
• Policy and fiscal priorities. 
• Performance standards to gauge the productivity of 
state expenditures. 
• A capital facilities and financing plan. 
• A description of the programmatic relationship 
between the state and local governments. 
14. Require a four-year capital outlay plan. 
A four-year capital outlay plan should be included in the 
state's long-range strategic plan proposed by the governor 
and approved by the legislature. 
15. Change the fiscal year from one to two years. 
The current annual budget process should be replaced 
with the enactment of a two-year budget. 
16. Provide a budget rebalancing mechanism. 
The constitution should provide a rebalancing process for 
the state budget. Midway through the fiscal period, the 
governor would be required to provide an update on the 
state's fiscal condition and recommend budgetary 
adjustments to accommodate any changes in revenue or 
expenditures. 
17. Require the state's budget to be balanced. 
For each fiscal period, expenditures must not exceed 
revenue and reserves. After the enactment of the budget 
bill, no other bill could be enacted that caused 
expenditures to exceed estimated revenue and reserves. 
18. Require a three percent general fund reserve. 
The state budget should include a three percent reserve. 
Initially, the reserve would be phased in over several 
budget periods. 
19. Prohibit borrowing to finance a deficit. 
In order to prevent the state from borrowing to finance 
deficits, the state should be prohibited from borrowing 
from non-governmental resources across fiscal periods. 
20. Require a majority vote to enact the budget and 
budget-related legislation. 
A majority vote should be required for the adoption of the 
state budget, the budget implementation bill, and any bill 
enacted to rebalance the budget. 
21. Allow for multiple subject budget implementation 
legislation. 
Authorize the legislature to include in a single 
implementation bill, any statutory changes needed to 
implement the budget bill. 
22. Link budget passage to salaries. 
The constitution should require the budget to be passed 
by the prescribed deadline or the governor and the 
legislature forfeit their pay. 
Increase Fiscal 
Discipline 
Summary of Recommendations- Page 7 
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Ill. Changing K-12 Education: 
Focusing Accountability at the State and Local Levels 
The governance structure of elementary and secondary education is divided among several 
state, county, and local authorities. Lines of accountability are blurred. Although elementary 
and secondary education are a shared local and state responsibility, local K-12 districts have 
little authority to raise taxes to provide additional funds for education. Additionally, cities, 
counties, and many special districts provide services that affect a child's education and 
health, yet there are few formal incentives for the collaborative delivery of services that 
might lead to more efficiency and cost savings. 
Identifying Who 
Is in Charge 
I , < .• 
Page 8-Summary of Recommendations 
23. Make the governor responsible for K-12 education. 
The governor should appoint the superintendent of public 
instruction. The existence, roles, and responsibilities of the 
superintendent of public instruction should be outlined in 
statute rather than in the constitution. The governor 
should be responsible for the state's role in the elementary 
and secondary public school system. The office of the 
superintendent of public instruction should be made 
appointive, rather than elective and subject to senate 
confirmation. 
24. The role of the state Board of Education should be 
determined by statute. 
Constitutional references to the state Board of Education 
should be deleted. Its roles and responsibilities should be 
determined by statute. 
25. The role of county superintendents of schools and 
county boards of education should be determined 
locally or by statute. 
Constitutional references to county superintendents of 
schools and county boards of education should be deleted. 
School districts could organize areawide services in a 
manner that most effectively and efficiently meets local 
and areawide needs. 
26. Establish an accountability system for public schools. 
An accountability system including standards for public 
schools should be adopted by the legislature. 
--------------------------------~ -------------------------------
27. Maintain Proposition 98 and provide additional 
flexibility to the legislature and the governor. 
The statewide funding guarantee for K-12 education 
should be maintained. Additionally, the legislature and 
governor should be given greater flexibility in 
determining how to appropriate additional funds to K-12 
education in excess of the minimum funding guarantee. 
Specifically, education spending in excess of the guarantee 
would be for one-time purposes, unless the legislature and 
the governor chose to increase the base for the funding 
guarantee. 
28. Increase local control and authority. 
Local control and the authority of local school boards 
should be increased. 
29. Give communities the power to supplement revenue to 
local schools. 
Communities should have the power to raise revenue in 
addition to the state guarantee. Unified K-12 districts 
could increase the property tax with a two-thirds vote of 
approval by the voters. All districts within a county could 
raise additional revenue by increasing the sales tax with a 
majority vote. 
30. Capital outlay planning and development should 
involve all local agencies. 
School districts should participate with other public 
agencies that provide services and infrastructure in the 
territory served by the school district. A multi-agency 
capital facilities planning process would be established as 
part of the Community Charter (see Recommendation 33). 
If a proposed project is consistent with a multi-agency 
plan, the vote required for general obligation bonds is a 
majority of voters. 
31. Community colleges should be part of higher 
education. 
Community colleges should be removed from the 
Proposition 98 funding guarantee and be part of the 
funding of higher education. 
Enhancing Local 
Control in the 
Management and 
Financing of 
K-12 Education 
Summary of Recommendations- Page 9 
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IV. State-Local Relations: 
Straightening Out the Responsibilities of 
State and Local Government 
The assignment of governmental responsibilities between the state and various local 
governments, particularly counties, is fragmented and confused. The absence of clearly 
assigned responsibilities for operating and financing government services has weakened the 
accountability of government officials to the public. Functions that are clearly state (e.g., 
higher education) or clearly local (e.g., library services) are not the problem. Rather, functions 
shared by state and local government produce the most confusion. Counties play a dual role: 
they are considered local government for providing municipal services outside of cities, and 
they are treated as agents of the state for state purposes. Often, a county must use the local 
tax base intended to support local services to fund programs over which the county has little 
programmatic or operational control. Finding the right mix of program responsibilities and 
financing for shared programs must be a high priority for the legislature and the governor. 
Changing the State-
Local Relationship: 
Knowing Who Is in 
Charge 
Page 10-Summary of Recommendations 
32. Develop and adopt a state-local realignment plan. 
The governor would be required to submit a State-Local 
Realignment Plan proposing the alignment of state and 
local services. A plan must be adopted by the legislature. 
The state-local relationship, along with the strategic plan, 
would be reviewed and updated at least every four years. 
The plan should provide assignment of responsibilities for 
program policy authority, administration, and finance. 
----------------------------------d ---------------------------------
V. Strengthening Local Government 
The present structure of 7,000 local government bodies (counties, cities, special districts, and 
school districts) has resulted in a confusing array of governmental entities. Many of these 
entities have overlapping-if not conflicting-duties and responsibilities. While there is a 
general public policy interest in improving and streamlining local governance and service 
delivery and increasing local accountability, local agencies have few tangible incentives for 
reform. The existing local government structure and division of governmental responsibilities 
were conceived during a time in the state's history when there were fewer people and fewer 
demands for services. Moreover, the current diversity of California's regions makes it difficult 
for a uniform approach to local governance to be responsive to every area's needs. 
33. Evaluate local governance structures and develop a 
community charter. 
Each county (or multi-county area) would be required to 
initiate a process to examine their current governance 
structure, methods of service delivery, and assignment of 
responsibilities and powers. From this examination, each 
area would develop a Government Services Plan for the 
area covered by the charter. The plan could also include 
subcounty areas. A Home Rule Community Charter would 
then be developed to implement the Government Services 
Plan. Citizens in each area would vote on the Home Rule 
Community Charter. The countywide charter and/or 
sub-county charters would include the following 
components: 
• Identify the territory to be covered by the charter. 
• Provide methods for reducing the number and cost of 
local government. 
• Allocate local services and regulatory responsibilities. 
• Provide for the organization and reorganization, as 
well as the boundaries, of local agencies. 
• Develop a collaborative capital improvement program 
process for all of the agencies covered by the 
community charter. 
• Establish a process for the allocation of general 
purpose state-authorized local revenue. 
The provisions of the Home Rule Community Charter 
could not abrogate or interfere with the power provided to 
charter cities by the constitution. All local government 
agencies will be required to disclose their revenue and 
expenditures in a uniform manner as required by statute. 
Strengthening 
Local Government: 
Clarifying Roles 
and Enhancing 
Collaboration 
Summary of Recommendations- Page 11 
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Page 12-Summary of Recommendations 
34. Vote requirements for local taxes and general 
obligation bonds. 
The authority to raise taxes would be subject to a majority 
vote of the governing board and a majority of the voters 
unless the charter provided for a higher threshold. This 
would apply to all locally levied taxes except the ad 
valorem property tax which would continue to be limited 
by Proposition 13. Additionally, general obligation bonds 
for projects consistent with a multi-agency capital outlay 
plan for the area covered by the charter could be 
approved by a majority of the voters. 
35. Strengthening home rule. 
The home rule provisions of the constitution should be 
strengthened. One of the benefits for general law cities, 
counties, and other local entities to participate in the 
Home Rule Community Charter is that home rule powers, 
previously limited to charter cities would be extended to 
agencies covered by the new charter. This provision will 
strengthen local governments' ability to govern local 
affairs. Additionally, once the charter for a given area is 
adopted, the state would be prohibited from reallocating 
the non-school share of the property tax or other general 
purpose local taxes allocated by the charter. 
I 
Improving Accountability 
in State Government: 
Knowing Who Is in Charge 
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I. Improving Accountability in State Government: 
Knowing Who Is in Charge 
California's state government structure is often described as "divided"-split up among a dozen 
directly elected public officials with a mixture of authority and few direct lines of accountability. 
Executive branch functions should be better organized to promote responsiveness and efficiency in 
the implementation of state policy. California should review its legislative structure, including the 
length of legislative terms; which are too short, and the length of legislative sessions; which are too 
long. The authority of the executive and legislative branches is limited by the adoption of initiatives 
which are often enacted in response to legislative inaction. The initiative process should be reformed 
to improve public review. 
The current organization of the state's executive branch does not 
promote responsiveness or efficiency in the execution of state policy. 
The executive branch is divided among a dozen directly elected 
public officials with few direct lines of accountability. This dispersion 
of power creates i11flexibility and fragmentation and reduces 
responsiveness and efficiency. There are few lines of 
responsibility-limiting the ability of the public to hold officials 
accountable for policy decisions. Officials blame each other for public 
policy failures. The state's problems go unresolved, and the 
electorate cannot determine whom to hold accountable. 
Fragmentation exists in every policy area in which an official is 
directly elected and his or her role is policymaking in nature rather 
than providing a check on the exercise of executive power. 
Fragmentation also occurs when executive branch agencies have 
overlapping responsibilities. In addition to creating accountability 
problems, such fragmentation leads to inefficient operation of the 
agencies.1 
The state needs a clearer definition of who is in charge of state 
policies and the overall direction of state government. Reform of the 
executive branch should reduce fragmentation and provide a balance 
between responsiveness and efficiency. Responsiveness and 
accountability can be increased by focusing more responsibility for 
the state's policy direction with the governor. Efficiency can be 
increased by eliminating overlapping and duplicative responsibilities 
between executive branch agencies. 
Only one state-North Dakota-has as many state-level elected 
officials as California. Five other states-Georgia, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington have more than nine 
elected officials. The trend across the nation is to move away from 
electing state regulators and chief education officers. For example, 
since 1992, four states have eliminated elected superintendents of 
public instruction. Only fifteen states now have elected school 
superintendents. 2 
The Executive 
Branch: 
Improving 
Responsiveness 
and Efficiency 
What is the Problem? 
• California State Govern-
ment is divided into too 
many parts. 
• Administrative, policy 
and quasi-judicial 
functions are mixed 
together. 
What Change is 
Needed? 
• Decrease fragmentation 
• Increase responsiveness 
• Maintain checks and 
balances 
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What Does the 
Commission 
Recommend? 
• Elect officials who have 
an independent or check 
and balance function. 
• Appoint officials who are 
part of executive branch 
policymaking. 
OFFICES OFFICES 
HAVING AN HAVING A 
INDEPENDENT POLICY OR 
OR ADMINISTRATIVE 
CHECK AND FUNCTION 
BALANCE 
FUNCTION 
Governor Treasurer 
Lieutenant Superintendent of 
Governor Public Instruction 
Attorney Insurance 
General Commissioner 
Secretary Board of 
of State Equalization 
Controller (4 members) 
In proposing reforms to the Executive Branch, the Commission 
sought to achieve the following objectives: 
• Decrease fragmentation and duplication of responsibilities. 
• Increase responsiveness, accountability, and efficiency. 
• Maintain an appropriate level of checks and balances within the 
executive branch. 
California currently has 12 elected officials responsible for state 
government functions: 
• Governor 
• Lieutenant Governor 
• Attorney General 
• Secretary of State 
• Controller 
• Treasurer 
• Superintendent of Public Instruction 
• Insurance Commissioner 
• Four members of the Board of Equalization, elected by district 
All of these officials are elected constitutional officers, with the 
exception of the insurance commissioner, who is designated by 
initiative statute (Proposition 103, November 1988). The lieutenant 
governor is elected independently of the governor, and assumes the 
duties of the chief executive when the governor is absent from the 
state. 
The Commission determined that an executive branch position 
should be directly elected if it either: 
• Has clearly independent responsibilities, which for policy 
reasons should be separate from the general executive functions 
of the governor; or, 
• Performs independent oversight of the actions of elected 
officials and provides a check and balance function to limit the 
excessive use of power. 
For example, the secretary of state oversees the elections process, 
which as a matter of policy should be independent of other executive 
functions. The state controller performs financial audits that are a 
check on executive power. The attorney general is the chief law 
enforcement officer of the state. 
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On the other hand, an executive branch position should be a 
gubernatorial appointment if the primary responsibility involves 
regulatory oversight or policy implementation as set by the 
legislature, the governor, and/ or the voters. Additionally, placing 
executive authority with the governor will allow more flexibility in 
the implementation of policies because the governor-with the 
consent of the legislature-will be able to determine the best method 
for implementation. 
Thus, the Commission concluded that of the state's 12 elective 
officers, five should continue to be elected. The remaining officials 
should be appointed by the governor, subject to senate confirmation. 
Under current law, Article V of the California Constitution vests 
executive power in the governor of the State of California and 
requires the governor to see that the law is faithfully executed. The 
governor is authorized by statute to assign and reorganize functions 
among executive officers (except elective officers) and agencies. 
Currently, the lieutenant governor assumes the responsibilities of 
chief executive when the governor is absent from the state, serves as 
the presiding officer of the senate, voting only in the case of a tie 
vote, serves on the three-member State Lands Commission, and 
serves on the Board of Regents of the University of California and on 
the Board of Trustees of the California State University System. 
California's voters have frequently elected a governor and lieutenant 
governor from different political parties. At times, the governor and 
lieutenant governor have been visibly at odds over various issues. As 
now designed, the office of the lieutenant governor lacks substantial 
responsibility. In the case of incapacitation or death of a sitting 
governor, succession by a lieutenant governor of a different political 
party could result in sudden and dramatic changes and 
inconsistencies in public policy. Five times in California's history, the 
lieutenant governor has succeeded the governor due to the death or 
resignation of the governor. In each case, the governor and the 
lieutenant governor were of the same political party.3 
The people of California would be better served by a governor and 
lieutenant governor who run as, and are elected as, a ticket. Having 
a governor and lieutenant governor of the same political party 
would improve managerial effectiveness and political legitimacy in 
the event that succession is necessary. If the lieutenant governor is of 
the same political party as the governor, the governor might be more 
willing to appoint the lieutenant governor to an executive branch 
function. This would give the lieutenant governor a significantly 
greater role in policymaking. 
What Does the 
Commission 
Recommend? 
1. The governor and 
lieutenant governor 
should run on the same 
ticket and work as a 
team. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the governor 
aiJdfi~t.~tenal"!t gf:!ve~nc:JI' 
run on the same ticket at 
the general election; that 
the·gt>vernor be authorized 
toappoint the lieutf~nanl 
governor to executive 
branch responsibility; and. 
that tbe governor,$ ex.ecu. 
five [XIWers nt>t pass to th.e · 
lieutenant governor when 
the goVernor leaves .the 
state. 
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2. The superintendent of 
public instruction, 
treasurer, and insurance 
commissioner should 
be appointed by the 
governor instead of 
being elected. 
a. Superintendent of 
Public Instruction 
The Commission recom-
mends that the existence, 
roles, and responsibilities 
of the superintendent of 
public instruction be 
outlined in statutes rather 
than in the constitution. 
The office of the superin-
tendent of public instruc-
tion should be appointive, 
rather than elective and 
subject to senate confirma-
tion. The governor should 
be responsible for the 
state's role in the elemen-
tary and secondary public 
school system. 
Forty-three states have a lieutenant governor. Only nineteen states 
elect governors and lieutenant governors separately. The current 
trend is to elect the two officers on the same ticket. Since the 1950s 
when only New York elected the governor and lieutenant governor 
jointly, the number of states with joint elections has increased to 24.4 
Section 10 of Article V transfers the governor's powers to the 
lieutenant governor when the governor leaves the state. The 
Commission found that this provision was useful in the nineteenth 
century, but it is no longer necessary due to modern transportation 
and communications technology. The governor should be able to 
retain his or her powers when absent from the state. 
Executive branch officials should be elected if they have either 
clearly independent responsibilities which should be separate from 
the general executive functions of the governor or if they perform 
independent oversight, providing a check and balance function to 
limit the excessive use of power. The Commission concluded that the 
functions of the superintendent of public instruction, state treasurer, 
and state insurance commissioner are administrative and 
policymaking and should be the responsibility of the governor. 
Therefore, these officials should no longer be elected but should be 
appointed by the governor, subject to senate confirmation. 
The position of the superintendent of public instruction is vitally 
important, but as currently defined, it is organizationally untenable. 
Since the duties of the superintendent of public instruction are 
policymaking in nature, the office should be part of the executive 
branch administrative structure. Only 15 states separately elect a 
chief education officer.5 By giving the responsibilities of the 
superintendent to the governor's appointee to head the Department 
of Education, the governor will become more accountable for the 
public education agenda. Education policy cannot be separated from 
education finance. Giving the governor responsibility for education 
policy will force him or her to pay more attention to education 
policy when making budget decisions. This will clarify for the public 
that state-level executive branch authority and responsibility to 
change or improve public elementary and secondary education rest 
with the governor. This issue is discussed in more detail in the 
section dealing with K-12 education. 
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The state treasurer provides banking services for the state 
government with the goals of minimizing interest and service costs 
and maximizing yields on investments. The principal functions of 
the treasurer are: 
• The custody of all monies and securities belonging to or held in 
trust by the state. 
• Investing temporarily idle state monies. 
• Preparing, selling, and redeeming the state's general obligation 
and revenue bonds. 
The principal job of the treasurer is to manage state debt and 
investments. This requires expert knowledge rather than political 
responsiveness. All citizens can agree that the state should pay as 
little as possible for debt, and earn as much as possible on financial 
investments. Making this position appointive will clarify for the 
public that the governor bears ultimate responsibility for 
management of state debts and investments. 
The insurance commissioner is California's most recently created 
elected official. Proposition 103, a 1988 initiative statute, provided for 
the popular election of an insurance commissioner at gubernatorial 
elections. Proposition 103 cites accountability as the principal reason 
for having an elected insurance commissioner. Specifically, the 
purpose of Proposition 103 is, "to protect consumers from arbitrary 
insurance rates and practices, to encourage a competitive insurance 
marketplace, to provide for an accountable insurance commissioner, 
and to ensure that insurance is fair, available, and affordable for all 
Californians." 6 
The insurance commissioner oversees the Department of Insurance. 
In addition to the activities mandated by Proposition 103, the 
department performs traditional responsibilities that include: 1) 
examining and regulating insurance companies and producers to 
ensure that operations are consistent with the requirements of the 
Insurance Code; 2) reducing insurance fraud; 3) collecting and 
transmitting the annual gross premiums tax and retaliatory taxes on 
insurers; and, 4) collecting fees, reimbursements, fines, and penalties. 
The insurance commissioner differs from other statewide elective 
officials who either develop policy or independently review the 
activities of other elective officials. The office is primarily regulatory 
in nature. The insurance commissioner is most analogous to the 
appointed heads of other regulatory bodies such as the Public 
Utilities Commission or the State Water Resources Control Board. 
These agencies enforce the policies developed by the legislature and 
governor rather than acting independently of overall state policy. 
Returning the insurance commissioner to an appointed position 
b. Treasurer 
The Commission recom-
mends that the state 
treasurer be appointed by 
the governor, rather than 
being elected, subject to 
senate confirmation. 
c. Insurance 
Commissioner 
The Commission recom-
mends that the insurance 
commissioner be 
appointed by the governor, 
rather than being elected, 
subject to senate 
confirmation. 
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3. Abolish the Board of 
Equalization, merge tax 
administration func-
tions, and appoint a tax 
appeals board. 
The Commission recom-
mends abolishing the 
Board of Equalization and 
the Franchise Tax Board 
and combining their 
regulatory and executive 
functions and those of 
other major revenue 
agencies into a new 
Department of Revenue. 
Additionally, a'state tax 
appeals body should be 
established, appointed by 
the governor and subject 
to senate confirmation. 
makes for more consistent government. Only eleven states currently 
elect an insurance commissioner. 
The existence of an elective insurance commissioner blurs 
responsibility for policymaking. Voters have difficulty determining 
who is accountable for state insurance policies. The primary benefit 
of Proposition 103 is that it provided new rules for the regulation of 
insurance rates. There do not appear to be any particular benefits 
derived from electing an insurance commissioner. Changing the 
status of the insurance commissioner from elective to appointive will 
not have an impact on insurance legislation and policies, which will 
continue to be set by the legislature and governor through statute or 
initiative. 
The Board of Equalization was established in the 1879 constitution. 
The BOE is comprised of five board members, including the state 
controller and four members who are elected geographically. The 
BOE essentially acts as a regulatory and appellate body for a variety 
of state tax policies. 
In the late 1920s, the state began to examine the growing number of 
agencies-including the Board of Equalization-that had a 
responsibility for the administration of the tax system. In 1929, the 
California Tax Commission recommended: "that the elective State 
Board of Equalization be abolished and that in its place a permanent 
professional tax commission be established consisting of three 
members appointed by the Governor for terms of six years." 7 Since 
then, eleven additional studies under six governors have concluded 
that the state's tax administration system should be revised. Eight of 
these studies called for the elimination of the Board of Equalization. 
The Board of Equalization (BOE) and the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) 
perform a variety of functions related to collecting major state 
and/ or local taxes, including: 1) the quasi-administrative functions 
required to operate a program; 2) the quasi-legislative functions 
needed to set administrative policies to govern the programs; and, 
3) the quasi-judicial functions involved in settling disputes that arise 
from carrying out assigned functions. 
The board's administrative functions include collecting state and 
local sales and use taxes, and business and excise taxes and fees. This 
includes taxes and fees levied on gasoline and diesel fuel, insurance, 
cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, electricity, and hazardous and solid 
wastes. The board also administers taxes on behalf of other agencies, 
such as cities, counties, and transit agencies, which are authorized to 
levy sales and use taxes. Other administrative duties of the BOE 
include assessing public utility property in order to allocate value to 
each taxing jurisdiction. The BOE also adopts rules and regulations 
for administering business programs and for guiding and directing 
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the board's property tax staff, county assessors, boards of super-
visors, and local assessment appeals boards in valuing property. 
The board's quasi-legislative functions include adopting rules and 
regulations the taxes it administers. Its quasi-judicial functions 
include acting as an appellate body for the review of property, 
business, and income tax determinations. The BOE also hears 
appeals of decisions made by the Franchise Tax Board and resolves 
disputes concerning the assessment of property that a city or county 
owns outside its boundaries. 
The Franchise Tax Board (FIB) has an oversight function that is 
primarily administrative. The FIB consists of the Director of Finance, 
the Chair of the BOE, and the state controller. The FIB administers 
the state's personal income tax, the bank and corporation taxes, the 
Homeowners' and Renters' Assistance programs, and the Political 
Reform Act audit program. Over the past several years, the FIB has 
been given additional tax enforcement and revenue collection duties. 
These duties include collecting overdue motor vehicle license in-lieu 
taxes, child support payments, and delinquent fines, penalties, and 
forfeitures on behalf of any superior, municipal, or justice court. 
The Employment Development Department (EDD) is a third agency 
that has tax-related responsibilities. The EDD administers the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Disability Insurance Fund. 
Employers remit insurance premiums to the Department. In 1972, 
personal income tax withholding was assigned to EDD since it was 
more efficient to have a central place for employers to make 
payments of both their insurance premiums and employee 
withholding. Much of the work of EDD is tied to federal 
requirements associated with unemployment and job training 
benefits. The feasibility of including the EDD's revenue functions in 
a consolidated revenue agency should be carefully examined. 
The existence of the BOE raises two questions. First, should such a 
body exist? Certainly the functions of the board are necessary: 
regulations describing how to calculate tax liability must be written, 
property must be assessed, county property tax assessments must be 
reviewed to ensure that assessment practices are consistent 
throughout the state, and tax disputes must be adjudicated. The 
second question is: Who should perform these functions? In the 
federal government and most state governments, a treasury 
department is responsible for defining and assessing tax liability, and 
a quasi-judicial body and the courts are responsible for resolving 
disputes. Only three other states elect any tax official. 
California's current system blurs the responsibility of the governor 
and legislature for maintaining equity and efficiency in the tax 
collection system. Implementation of tax policy is diffused through 
several agencies with different governing structures. Moreover, 
elections for the BOE are relatively invisible because members are 
elected from very large districts and because the office is so 
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4. Shorten the terms of the 
University of California 
Board of Regents. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the term of 
office for members 
appointed to the University 
of California Board of 
Regents be reduced from 
12 years to 10 years; that 
reappointment be prohib-
ited unless the appointee 
has served less than a full 
term; that the number of 
appointed members be 
reduced from 18 to 15; and, 
that the superintendent of 
public instruction be 
removed as a member of 
the board. 
specialized. As a result, tax implementation matters are removed as 
election issues. 
An additional problem is that the current tax administration system 
is fragmented and lacks accountability. Responsibilities are divided 
between the BOE and the FTB. Efficiency and accountability will be 
improved by combining the current regulatory and executive 
functions of both offices and assigning those functions to a new 
Department of Revenue. In addition to the economies of scale 
brought about by a consolidation of the administration of the tax 
system, private businesses will benefit by the consolidation of audits. 
The board's adjudication functions should be assigned to an 
independent quasi-judicial body, with members appointed by the 
governor and subject to senate confirmation. 
The Regents of the University of California is the existing 
corporation established in the late 1800s by Article IX Section 9 and 
constitutes a public trust to administer the University of California. 
Since March 1, 1976, the term of office for an appointed regent has 
been 12 years; prior to that time, the term of office was 16 years. The 
terms of two regents expire each March 1, except in the first year of a 
four-year gubernatorial term. The regents include seven ex officio 
members and eighteen members appointed by the governor and 
confirmed by the senate. In addition, the regents may appoint one 
faculty representative and one student representative to serve as 
regents for a period of not less than one year, with full member 
status and powers. The seven ex officio members are: the governor, 
the lieutenant governor, the speaker of the assembly, the 
superintendent of public instruction, the president and vice president 
of the alumni association of the university, and the president of the 
university. Each ex officio member serves with full member status 
and power. 
Reducing the term of office from 12 years to 10 years will increase 
the accountability of the regents to meet the executive policies of the 
governor and the legislature. By reducing the number of regents 
from 18 to 15, three regents will be appointed every even-numbered 
year, and a one-term governor would be able to appoint six regents. 
Three regents would be appointed in the even-numbered year 
following a governor's assumption of office, and three more would 
be appointed during a governor's last year of a four-year term. A 
two-term governor would be able to appoint 12 of the 15 members. 
Since a two-term governor could appoint 80 percent of the regents, 
during the campaign for the second term, the governor would be 
held accountable for policies concerning the university. 
The prohibition against reappointment will increase the 
independence of regents. Once they are no longer concerned with 
being reappointed, regents will make decisions regarding university 
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policies more independently and objectively. Removing the SPI as a 
member of the regents will maintain the current ratio of ex officio to 
appointive members. 
The State Personnel Board (SPB) was created by Proposition 7 in 
1934. The board consists of five members appointed by the governor, 
with the consent of the state senate, for staggered ten-year terms. 
Members can be removed only by a two-thirds vote of each house. 
The role of the SPB is to administer the civil service system and to 
"enforce the civil service statutes ... prescribe probationary periods 
and classifications, adopt rules authorized by statute, and review 
disciplinary actions." 8 
The advent of collective bargaining in the early 1980s redefined the 
employer I employee relationship by requiring personnel rules and 
policies to be bilaterally developed. Collective bargaining also 
required splitting personnel management duties between the State 
Personnel Board and the Department of Personnel Administration. 
Framers of the new strategy believed that splitting the duties would 
minimize conflict. The DPA would represent the executive branch on 
matters such as salaries and benefits and in negotiations with 
employee organizations. The SPB would administer classification 
proposals, selection programs, probationary periods, and disciplinary 
appeals. 
An overlap of personnel functions currently exists between the 
quasi-judicial State Personnel Board and the Department of 
Personnel Administration. The principal redundancy in the 
personnel system is in the public employment issues of classifying, 
selecting, and disciplining employees. Transferring the 
responsibilities for prescribing probationary periods and performing 
classification functions from the SPB to the DPA would eliminate 
redundancies, and make state government more efficient. The SPB, 
acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, would retain its enforcement 
powers and its authority to review disciplinary actions. 
The Commission also found that the ten-year terms for SPB members 
are too long. Shortening the terms of SPB members from ten years to 
six years would provide stability for the civil service system and the 
state's civil servants, while making it easier for the legislature and 
governor to hold SPB members accountable for their actions. 
5. Shorten the terms and 
limit the functions of the 
state personnel board. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the probation-
ary and classification 
functions of the State 
Personnel Board (SPB) be 
transferred to the Depart-
ment of Personnel Admin-
istration (DPA). Addition-
ally, the terms of SPB 
members should be 
shortened from ten years 
to six years. 
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The legislative 
Branch: 
Improving 
Efficiency and 
Effectiveness 
What is the Problem? 
• Legislative terms of 
office are too short. 
• Legislative sessions are 
too long. 
• There is not enough 
legislative oversight of 
the operations of state 
government. 
What Change is 
Needed? 
• Increase stability of the 
legislature by lengthen-
ing terms of office. 
• Enhance the role of the 
legislature's investigative 
and oversight function. 
The California legislature is comprised of 120 members. The 
assembly has 80 members who currently serve a maximum of three 
two-year terms. The senate has 40 members who serve a maximum 
of two four-year terms. The legislature meets in a two-year session 
beginning in December of the year of the statewide general election. 
During that time, the legislature is in session for nearly 15 months. 
Additionally, the governor can call the legislature into special session 
to deal with a specific issue. A special session can run concurrently 
with the regular session. 
Under the state's current legislative system, each member of the 
senate represents about 820,000 people, and each member of the 
assembly represents about 410,000. The Commission considered the 
problems of ensuring adequate representation for California voters in 
light of the state's increasing population and diversity. 
The Commission determined that California's legislature does not 
operate as effectively or efficiently as it might. Term limits have 
created instability within the legislature. Rapid turnover has resulted 
in large numbers of freshmen legislators who are not knowledgeable 
about the complexities of the legislative process. This lack of 
experience often results in an inability to deal with complex and 
difficult policy issues that involve some amount of history. Addi-
tionally, the schedule for legislative sessions is archaic. Although the 
legislative session begins in January, the legislature accomplishes 
little of consequence until March when budget discussions begin. 
This delay occurs because of current laws that dictate the time frame 
under which a bill is introduced, printed, and debated. 
In its preliminary recommendation, the Commission proposed 
converting the state's two-house legislature to a single-house 
(unicameral) legislature. However, during the public hearings and 
Commission discussions, a number of questions were raised as to 
how a single-house system would operate. The answers to many of 
those questions were not forthcoming. The Commission determined 
that establishing a unicameral legislature simply does not have 
sufficient public and legislative support. Most people believe that the 
current two-house system is necessary to provide adequate checks 
and balances. Each house is seen as preventing inappropriate use of 
power by the other. The current system is also deemed necessary to 
provide sufficient deliberation to ensure that-on any given 
issue-the views of all concerned citizens are heard. Many also 
believe that the current two-house system protects the views of 
minorities. For these reasons, the Commission decided not to 
forward this recommendation to the legislature. If these are valid 
reasons for retaining a two-house system, the problem of overly 
large districts still remains. 
Page 24 - Improving Accountability in State Government: Knowing Who Is in Charge 
----------------------------------~ ----------------------------------
Legislative branch reforms should create a process in which the 
legislature operates more effectively and does its work in a shorter 
time period. In keeping with the wishes of California voters, term 
limits should be maintained. However, the intent of the voters in 
establishing term limits can be honored while extending those limits. 
A change in term limits will significantly improve the stability and 
effectiveness of the legislature, but will continue to assure voters that 
legislators cannot make careers out of service in either house. 
Additionally, certain rules governing the introduction and debate on 
legislation and the time frame in which the legislature works should 
be changed to allow the legislature to work more efficiently. 
In evaluating needed reforms to the state's legislative system, the 
Commission sought to achieve the following goals: 
• Increase the stability of the legislature so that work is done 
more effectively. 
• Improve the legislative process so that the legislature uses its 
time more efficiently and does its work within a shorter period 
of time. 
• Improve the accountability and productivity of the legislature. 
In 1990, California voters enacted Proposition 140, which amended 
the state's constitution to limit the number of terms that legislators 
can serve. Under the provisions of Proposition 140, members of the 
assembly serve three two-year terms, and members of the senate 
serve two four-year terms. 
In the past decade, establishing legislative term limits has been a 
nationwide phenomenon. Since 1990, 22 states have enacted 
measures to limit the terms of state representatives. The tenure of 
California's legislators is among the shortest in the nation.9 
The Commission acknowledges the concerns expressed by 
proponents of term limits. But the Commission determined that the 
extremely stringent term limits in California have resulted in 
significant instability within the legislature and the inability of the 
legislature to operate with any consistency. Since senators serve 
four-year terms and terms are staggered so that only half of the 
senate is elected at any time, senate term limits do not create as 
severe a problem. The Commission recommends retaining term 
limits, but extending them to provide more stability. 
When a legislator first begins a term in office, he or she requires a 
certain amount of time to "learn the ropes." The processes and 
operations of the legislature are complex. Members need experience 
to develop legislation and develop the coalitions necessary to meet 
the state's long-term needs. The state's current term limits do not 
provide sufficient time for legislators to develop the expertise 
What Does the 
Commission 
Recommend? 
6. Lengthen the limit on 
legislative terms of office 
to three four-year terms. 
The Commission recom-
mends that legislative 
terms be extended so that 
members can serve three 
four-year terms in each 
house. The terms would be 
staggered so that one-half 
of each house would be 
elected every two years. 
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7. Shorten legislative 
sessions to six months. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the constitution 
limit the length of legisla-
tive sessions to six months 
per year and provide for an 
expanded "oversight" 
function during the remain-
der of the year. The 
Commission also recom-
mends shortening the time 
period (from the current 30 
days to 10 days) during 
which bills must be in print 
prior to being considered. 
necessary to effectively perform their responsibilities. Moreover, 
under present term limits, the assembly will always have one-third 
to one-half of its members serving in their first term. While some 
voters may believe this will bring a fresh perspective to the 
legislature, the lack of experience and knowledge of the system 
impairs the efficient operation of the legislature. 
The Commission recommends extending term limits to 12 years in 
each house. The recommendation takes advantage of the important 
feature of staggered terms. Extending the length of assembly terms 
from two years to four years allows for staggered elections that will 
alleviate the problems created when a large number of members are 
serving their first term. The Commission determined that this 
proposal will maintain the intent of Proposition 140 to provide for 
frequent turnover and to prevent career politicians from becoming 
entrenched in the legislature. 
In its discussion of the proposal to lengthen legislative terms, the 
Commission considered the positive effect longer terms would have 
on both the cost of election campaigns and the amount of time spent 
running for office. Under the current system, assembly elections are 
held every two years. This means that incumbents seeking reelection 
are constantly thinking about the next election and raising funds for 
that election. Allowing for assembly elections every four years will 
reduce the frequency of elections and the amount of money raised 
and spent for this purpose. 
Under this proposat the legislature maintains its two-year session. 
However, the session schedule is limited to six months (from January 
to July 1). All legislative business is conducted during that six-month 
period. Additional session time is available to consider measures 
vetoed by the governor. If the need arose, the governor could call a 
special session of the legislature to deal with a particular issue. 
During the remaining six months, members could be in their districts 
staying in touch with constituents. 
One of the basic roles of the legislative branch is to provide a public 
forum for the oversight and evaluation of state programs. The 
second half of the year Ouly to December) will allow time for 
legislative policy committees to conduct oversight hearings necessary 
to review the effectiveness of statutes or programs to determine if 
they are meeting their intended objectives. 
The second part of this recommendation is to shorten the length of 
time a bill must be in print before it can be debated by the 
legislature. Currently, after a bill has been introduced, it may not be 
considered, amended, or heard until it has been in print for 30 days. 
This requirement was placed in the constitution prior to the advent 
of modern transportation and communication systems. The 
availability of those systems now permits a bill to be considered 
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sooner, while retaining the critical protection that its contents be 
available to the public prior to action. The Commission found that 10 
days is sufficient for this purpose. The Commission recommends 
permitting the house that originates a bill to consider it 10 days after 
it has been introduced. This provision only allows a bill to be 
considered-not enacted. The bill must be in print for at least 31 
days prior to enactment. This recommendation makes it easier for 
the legislature to hear and debate issues early in the session. 
In 1979, the legislature enacted AB 1111 which created the Office of 
Administrative Law (OAL). The OAL provides executive branch 
review of all regulations promulgated by state agencies. OAL has 
four functions: 1) new regulations; 2) review informal 
regulations as guidelines, rules, orders, and 
standards; publication of the California Regulatory Notice 
Register; and, 4) maintenance of the California Code of Regulations. 
review 
inconsistent with the authorizing legislation. 
the legislature increases public awareness over 
administrative activities. The Commission determined 
a greater role for the legislature in reviewing regulations will provide 
for a legislative remedy in instances where an executive branch 
agency oversteps its authority. 
With regard to retirement benefits, legislators elected after November 
1, 1990 may participate only in the federal Social Security system. 
The Commission concluded that since the length of terms being 
proposed would allow members of the legislature to be in office for 
12 years, some provision for retirement is justified. Under this 
proposal, members of the legislature would be eligible to participate 
in the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS). 
8. Give the legislature the 
power to veto adminis-
trative regulations. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the legislature 
be given constitutional 
authority to review and 
reject administrative 
regulations. 
9. Provide limited retire-
ment benefits to legisla-
tors. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the constitution 
allow legislators to partici-
pate in the regular Public 
Employee Retirement 
System. 
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The Initiative 
Process: 
Improving Public 
Review 
What is the 
Problem? 
• The legislative and 
initiative processes 
are too separate. 
• The initiative process 
excuses the legisla-
ture from not acting 
on issues qualified 
for the ballot. 
The California constitution grants to the people the power to enact 
and constitution by initiative. Proponents 
statutory must obtain signatures equal to percent 
votes cast in the last gubernatorial election. constitutional 
initiatives, signatures must be equal to eight percent of the votes cast 
in the last gubernatorial election. Once a measure qualifies, it must 
be placed on the next general election ballot. 
The Commission identified multiple problems with the current 
initiative process. First, the initiative process reduces legislative 
accountability because it is designed to be independent of the 
legislative process. One of the consequences of the initiative process 
is the legislature's reluctance to act if there are initiative measures on 
the ballot. Legislators can be held accountable only if they are 
involved in the process of developing and enacting state laws and 
policies. 
The initiative process also reduces the opportunity and incentive for 
legislators to participate in the development of initiatives or to enact 
laws when a particular issue begins to receive attention from 
initiative sponsors. Legislators may find it easier not to take a firm 
position on such issues and risk alienating important constituencies. 
Instead, they let the public decide. Sometimes legislators sincerely 
believe that the public is better suited to decide issues. But in other 
instances, legislators may embrace direct democracy out of personal 
self-interest or a desire to cultivate multiple constituencies that may 
be in opposition on an issue. As a result, some issues are framed in 
starker terms as initiatives, and may be more contentious and 
divisive in the electorate than in the legislature. In such situations, 
the legislature fails to provide a moderating influence and fails to 
help find points of agreement and compromise. 
Another problem with the initiative process is that it reduces the 
flexibility of government laws and programs. Flexibility is the ability 
of policymakers to alter legislation that has unintended 
consequences, that is poorly written, that ceases to attract popular 
support, or that is no longer needed. 
Initiative laws often have unintended consequences. The current 
initiative process has no mechanism for evaluating the effects of 
initiatives and revising them if they are not accomplishing their 
intended purpose. Initiative statutes can be amended only by the 
legislature placing a proposed change before the voters, by another 
initiative, or by courts as they rule on the constitutionality of the 
measure. Of the 27 states that provide for some form of initiative 
system, California is the only state with no provision for some type 
of legislative amendment.10 
Many initiatives are written by citizens' groups with little or no 
legislative experience. Unlike other states that provide pre-election 
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administrative or judicial 
not 
in court 
reasons, or stripped of some important-but poorly 
written-provisions. When this occurs the voters are denied 
outcome they tried to achieve at the polls. 
A final problem with the initiative process is that when a 
constitutional initiative is considered at a primary election, typically 
only a small percentage of the state's voters participate. 
Constitutional initiatives usually have significant implications for 
Californians, and a larger percentage of the state's voters should 
decide whether they should be enacted. 
From 1912 until 1966, California had two initiative processes 
available: the direct and the indirect initiative. The direct initiative 
allows the proponents of a policy to bypass the legislature and have 
an initiative placed directly on the ballot for voter approval or 
rejection. Under the indirect initiative, an initiative statute that 
qualified for the ballot could be submitted to the legislature for 
action. The legislature had 40 days to enact the proposal without 
change or amendment. If the legislature rejected the proposed law, 
the secretary of state had to submit it to the voters at the next 
general election. If the legislature accepted the measure without 
change or amendment, it became law and was not placed on the 
ballot. 
Since 1912, 798 initiatives have been approved for circulation. Of 
these, 779 were direct initiatives and 19 were indirect initiatives. A 
total of 242 initiatives qualified for the ballot. Only four were indirect 
initiatives, and of those, only one was enacted into law and never 
appeared on the ballot. Of the measures that made it to the ballot, 
only 75 were approved by the voters; 31 were constitutional 
amendments, and 44 were statutory enactments. Since the indirect 
initiative was seldom used, the 1962 Constitution Revision 
Commission recommended deleting the provision and the voters 
agreed, ending the practice in 1966. Although the constitution has 
been amended 494 times, all but 33 of the amendments were placed 
on the ballot by the legislature.U 
The frequent use of initiatives is a relatively new phenomenon. From 
the early years of the initiative until1974, the number of measures 
that qualified for the ballot was relatively smalL From 1912 to 1974 
(with the exception of a nine year period), the number of measures 
that qualified was under 10, and the number making it to the ballot 
was under three. In some years, no measures qualified. Since 1974, 
the average number of initiative measures approved for circulation 
has been 25. The number actually making it to the ballot averaged 
about four. Of the 76 that have been approved over the last 84 years, 
32 or about one-half have been approved in the last 15 years. 12 
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What Change is 
Needed? 
• Improve accountability 
of the voters and the 
legislature. 
• Improve the writing of 
statutory initiatives. 
During this period, most of the issues placed on the ballot promoted 
particular interests, and often involved a battle between opposing 
interests. Examples include insurance interests vs. trial lawyers, 
insurance industry vs. insurance industry, business vs. labor, and 
local government vs. tobacco industry. Table 1 illustrates the growing 
use of the initiative process to make public policy choices. 
More than eight decades of experience has provided Californians 
with ample .opportunity to evaluate the effects of the initiative 
process. Initiatives provide the public a way to apply pressure for 
solutions to major public problems when the legislature and 
governor are unresponsive. Two significant examples include the 
coastal protection programs stalled in the legislature during the 
late-1960s, which led to Proposition 20 the Coastal Zone Protection 
Act; and the need for property tax reform in the mid-1970s, which 
led to Proposition 13. 
The Growing Use of the Initiative Process 
Qualified 
• Approved 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-96 
L1 L1 L1 
The initiative process should not exclude the legislature from the 
lawmaking process. The legislature is a lawmaking body, and it has 
expertise in making laws and considering their outcomes. The 
legislature should-at a minimum-have a role in the initiative 
process to ensure that initiatives are well-written and meet the 
purposes for which they are designed. Additionally, once an 
initiative statute is enacted, there should be a mechanism for 
evaluating its impact. If an initiative statute is not meeting its 
intended purpose, or if it is having unexpected consequences, the 
legislature and the governor should be able to revise the law. 
In other states, the initiative has been used to enhance, rather than to 
undermine, the legislative process. Many states allow or require the 
state legislature to hold formal hearings on issues that have qualified 
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for the ballot. The legislature may pass amendments to the initiative, 
recommend amendments to the initiatives' sponsors, or pass the 
measure itself. This review and amendment procedure provides an 
opportunity for the legislature to assess public support, research the 
issue, listen to interested parties, and enact legislation. Some states 
have provisions for the indirect initiative, in which citizens petition 
the legislature to consider a proposition. Others allow the legislature 
to amend initiatives after they have passed. All of these provisions 
allow state legislatures-which have the staff, resources, and 
expertise to analyze complex issues-the opportunity to make laws 
that reflect both broad public sentiment and the concerns of 
interested parties. California is one of ten states that provides for 
pre-election legislative review of initiatives, although it is unique in 
not allowing pre-election legislative amendments. 
The Commission determined that three reforms to the initiative 
process will result in a system that more effectively serves the needs 
of California's people. In reviewing the initiative process, the 
Commission pursued three basic goals: 
• Improve accountability and efficiency by providing for greater 
voter participation in the process of amending the constitution. 
• Increase the accountability of the legislature by involving them 
in the initiative process to ensure that initiatives are 
well-written. 
• Increase the flexibility of the statutory initiative by providing a 
mechanism for evaluating effectiveness and changing the laws if 
necessary. 
One of the objectives of the Commission is to increase voter 
participation in the process of amending the constitution. Over the 
last 25 years, voter participation in primary and special elections has 
declined. Most special and primary elections have less than a 
"plurality" participating in the election. The 1993 special election had 
a turnout of only 36 percent of registered voters. Since 1984, the 
turnout for primary elections has not exceeded 48 percent. 
Participation in November elections has remained consistently above 
50 percent of registered voters. This proposal will help ensure that a 
"public quorum" is present for the consideration of amendments to 
the constitution. If the governor and the legislature agree that a 
measure is of sufficient significance to warrant placement on a 
primary or special election ballot, they could do so by a two-thirds 
vote of the legislature and approval of the governor. 
What Does the 
Commission 
Recommend? 
10. To provide fuller public 
review, place constitu-
tional amendments on 
the November ballot 
except in special 
circumstances. 
The Commission recom-
mends that all proposed 
initiative constitutional 
amendments be placed on 
the November ballot. 
Constitutional amendments 
proposed by the legislature 
may be placed on primary 
or special election ballots 
with a two-thirds vote of 
the legislature and the 
approval of the governor. 
Improving Accountability in State Government: Knowing Who Is in Charge- Page 31 
--------------- ~ 
11. Allow amendment of 
statutory initiatives 
after six years. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the constitution 
allow the legislature, with 
gubernatorial approval, to 
amend statutory initiatives 
after they have been in 
effect for six years. 
12. Allow the legislature to 
add technical and 
clarifying changes to 
initiatives that have 
qualified for the ballot. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the constitution 
establish a process for the 
legislature to review and 
make clarifying and 
technical amendments to 
initiatives that have 
qualified for the ballot. 
Most initiatives establish a state priority or place a limitation on the 
actions of government or citizens. One of the major responsibilities 
of the legislature is to evaluate such programs. Under the current 
system, once a statutory initiative is enacted, the legislature may not 
change it, unless the initiative contains a provision allowing such 
modification. 
The Commission determined that the constitution should provide for 
legislative evaluation of statutory initiatives and the programs they 
establish to determine whether they are achieving their intended 
result. A constitutional provision permitting the legislature and the 
governor to evaluate and amend initiatives would allow the state to 
change laws and programs in response to changing circumstances 
within the state. It also would provide an opportunity to correct any 
unintended consequences caused by an initiative. 
Under the current system, the legislature is required to hold 
informational hearings on proposed initiatives. But the legislature 
has no role in evaluating initiatives to determine if they are written 
correctly and to ensure that they will not have any unanticipated 
consequences. Moreover, the legislature has no ability to modify a 
measure that has qualified for the ballot. 
Initiatives are often poorly written by citizens' groups and others 
who are not regularly involved in the governing process. Initiatives 
frequently contain confusing legal requirements. The Commission 
found that more legislative involvement in the initiative process 
would alleviate the problem of poorly written initiatives. 
The Commission recommends that the legislature be given the 
constitutional authority to hold public hearings to discuss the 
technical and programmatic aspects of initiatives that have qualified 
for the ballot. The legislature can then identify the problem the 
initiative is designed to remedy and determine whether the initiative 
serves its intended purpose. If necessary, the legislature can amend 
the initiative to make technical and clarifying changes consistent 
with the purpose of the initiative. In order for the legislature's 
changes to be included in the initiative, a majority of the proponents 
of the initiative must agree to the changes. If a majority of the 
proponents do not agree, the initiative would be placed on the ballot 
in its original form. 
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and Fiscal Process: 
Developing a Long-term Vision 
with Increased Fiscal Discipline 
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II. Improving the State Budget and Fiscal Process: 
Developing a Long-term Vision with Increased 
Fiscal Discipline 
The state's budget process contains few constitutional standards such as a requirement that the state 
enact or maintain a balanced budget. Once a budget becomes unbalanced there is no formal system 
for rebalancing the budget. An annual budget provides limited opportunities for establishing and 
implementing long-term strategic plans. Such plans would provide more direction for overall 
spending, facilitate the systematic evaluation of programs by the public, and increase accountability. 
California's budget and the implementing legislation that 
accompanies it contain the most important decisions made each year 
by the governor and the legislature. Although there are a variety of 
constraints imposed by the constitution and statute, the budget 
determines spending and program priorities for critical state 
services. Yet, as noted by the California Citizens Budget Commission, 
"the process by which the state makes these annual ... decisions is 
encumbered with unnecessary procedural obstacles and serious 
informational inadequacies."13 
The California Business-Higher Education Forum, a group of 
business and higher education leaders has called for a different 
approach to making fiscal choices. In "California Fiscal Reform: A 
Plan for Action" they found that there must be a process for 
establishing clear goals for the state's future. "California needs to 
recognize that its past success, measured both economically and by 
the level of public confidence in its institutions, depended on a 
shared vision and coordinated action between government and 
private institutions .... No shared vision exists today. It is time for 
a change."14 The California Council on Environmental and Economic 
Balance a group of environmental, business, and labor leaders and 
many other groups have come to similar conclusions: The state is 
likely to experience continued pressure on its resources due to 
demands for higher levels of public investment and public services. 
Dealing with this dilemma will mean changing the budget process. 
The process for considering the budget and its associated decisions 
has not changed in more than 30 years. For at least the last six to 
seven years each house of the legislature annually spends endless 
days over a four-month period crafting separate budgets, joining 
together in a conference committee to resolve differences between 
them, only to surrender their role at the last moment to the governor 
and the legislative leadership. All of this happens because the 
legislature's budget process is not designed to make the critical 
decisions that are necessary to meet the needs of the state within 
What is the Problem? 
• There is a lack of long-
term vision. 
• There is a lack of per-
formance measures to 
guide budget decisions. 
• There are few constitu-
tional standards for 
improving fiscal 
discipline. 
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Page 
available resources. It is widely agreed that the result of this process 
is not satisfactory to the participants or to the people 
California. 
The budget process begins with executive, judicial, and legislative 
branches of state government developing expenditure plans as 
overseen by the Department of Finance. The Department of Finance 
submits the total expenditure plan to the governor based on an 
estimate of state revenue and property tax revenue since a portion of 
the property tax is used to finance K-12 education and community 
colleges. The governor is constitutionally required to submit an 
itemized budget proposal to the legislature by January 10 of each 
year. The governor is also required to suggest additional revenue 
sources in the event that estimated expenditures exceed revenue 
when the budget is introduced. Once the budget bill is introduced, 
the Legislative Analyst's Office evaluates the budget and provides 
the legislature with recommendations. Legislative committees then 
begin discussing the budget in early March. During May, the 
governor submits an updated budget proposal. By the end of May, 
the budget bill arrives on the floor of both houses for a vote. A 
two-house conference committee is organized to resolve the 
differences and to take into account the proposals made by the 
governor. 
The state constitution requires the legislature to enact the budget bill 
by a two-thirds vote of each house, no later than June 15. The 
governor may veto the entire bill, or strike out or reduce individual 
items of expenditure in the budget using the "line-item veto." The 
legislature can overturn a line-item veto by a two-thirds vote in each 
house. Once the governor signs the budget bill, it becomes law. Even 
prior to the enactment of the budget, the budget process for the next 
year begins. 
The Commission concluded that the current budget process has three 
shortcomings. First, there is no organized way to develop and adopt 
a long-term vision for the investment of public resources and also be 
able to have a budget that can be adjusted to meet changing 
economic and social conditions. A sense of shared vision or strategic 
direction is missing from the budget process. As Casey Stengel once 
observed, "If you don't know where you are going you're sure to 
end up somewhere else." The state lacks any process for establishing 
a strategic direction to guide programs and funding priorities. Any 
such process must not be so rigid that it becomes a barrier to change. 
Once the long-term direction is established, the implementation 
process must be flexible enough to respond to changing conditions. 
Second, the current process is organized and operated to protect the 
status quo and, as such, is insulated from change. One of the 
primary features of the budget process is that each budget is based 
on the programs and activities contained in the last adopted budget. 
For members of legislative budget committees or citizens frustrated 
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with the operation of state government, making changes to the status 
quo is extremely difficult. Try as one might, the natural law that 
budget "You get what you got the prior 
growth." Although attention is given to changing caseload 
requirements for many programs, limited attention is given to 
program evaluation, improving the performance of a program, or 
eliminating a program that is no longer needed. 
There are a few changes on the budget process horizon that seemed 
promising to the Commission. The state has begun several 
experiments with the integration of performance measures into the 
budget process. Four state departments are involved in a new 
budget process that will tie performance to their budget request. 
Third, fiscal discipline is not one of the values that governs the 
budget process. Fiscal discipline has less political support than 
maintaining the status quo. Throughout much of the state's history, 
fiscal prudence has been less of a standard than maintaining the 
level of state interest in a particular program. In the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and the recent recession of the early 1990s, 
flexibility in meeting the needs of the state was seen as a higher 
value than fiscal discipline. As the state lived through the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the level of spending steadily increased. 
Although the state's revenue base was reformed in 1933, producing a 
growth in resources, the steady growth in revenue was not sufficient 
to keep up with increasing rates of spending. To cover growing 
deficits, the state borrowed money and secured the loans with future 
years' resources. 15 A similar condition existed during the recession of 
1990. The state had major obligations for state and local spending, 
particularly K-12 education. The state kept spending flat and 
financed year-end deficits with resources from the next fiscal year. 
On several occasions external borrowing was used to finance 
year-end deficits. 16 
The Commission reviewed the current process and concluded that 
two basic changes are necessary. First, the budget process must have 
a long-term vision and not simply be guided by the status quo. At 
the same time, the process needs to be more responsive to changing 
economic and social conditions. The state should develop a 
long-term vision by: 
• Adopting a long-term strategic plan to guide the state. 
• Adopting a formal performance-based budgeting system. 
• Adopting a two-year budget. 
• Providing for a budget "rebalancing" process to meet changing 
conditions. 
What Change is 
Needed? 
• Develop a long-term 
vision for California. 
• Measure the perform-
ance of the state budget. 
• Balance the state's 
checkbook. 
--------------------------------~ 
What Does the 
Commission 
Recommend? 
Adopt a Long-term 
Vision and Have 
the Flexibility to 
Respond to 
Changing Conditions 
13. Require the governor 
to submit, and the 
legislature to adopt, 
long-term goals for the 
state and performance 
measures for the 
budgetary process. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the governor 
be required to submit a 
four-year strategic plan to 
the legislature for delibera· 
tion and adoption. 
Second, the governor and the legislature have a basic duty to balance 
the state's finances and to ensure that the state's resources are spent 
efficiently. Ultimately, the state must return to its traditional role of 
organizing and financing state operations and ensuring that 
statewide programs are meeting the state's needs. The state should 
enhance fiscal integrity by: 
• Adopting and maintaining a balanced budget. 
• Requiring a reserve to deal with unanticipated emergencies. 
• Prohibiting external borrowing to finance deficits. 
• Providing for a majority vote for the budget which will limit 
special interest groups from leveraging budget negotiations. 
The state currently has a number of long-range plans that address a 
variety of single purpose program areas. Some argue that they 
conflict and need resolution. Additionally, California's current 
budget process consists of short-term incremental decisions often 
made without regard to long-term program objectives and fiscal 
trends. Annual solutions to the state's fiscal imperatives have 
resulted in long-term budget-balancing problems. The long-term has 
simply become a series of short-term decisions laid end to end. The 
investments that are needed to meet future state objectives are 
debated within the narrow perspective of individual programs, 
rather than as part of an overall priority-setting process. 
The state needs a strategic plan to have a better sense of where it is 
going and how resources should be spent. The existence of a plan is 
particularly important when resources are scarce. The planning 
process would provide policymakers with projections of future 
program costs associated with policy and demographic changes. The 
process also would provide a way to focus public policy decisions, 
alternatives, and tradeoffs that the governor and legislature need to 
make. Once in place, the plan would provide an overall strategy for 
providing state services. As part of the strategiC planning process, 
performance measures should be established to allow the legislature 
to measure program outcomes against concrete standards to 
determine if state programs are effective. By focusing on program 
outcomes, policymakers can determine what works and redefine 
priorities and funding as necessary. The strategic plan should also 
establish the program and fiscal relationship between state and local 
governments. Once adopted the strategic plan should guide both the 
operating budget and the longer term capital outlay budget. 
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The strategic plan would include: 
• Policy and fiscal priorities. 
• Performance standards to gauge the productivity of state 
expenditures. 
• A capital facilities and financing plan. 
• A description of the programmatic relationship between the 
state and local governments. 
The enactment of the budget is the expression of the public policy 
priorities identified in the plan. When the budget is considered, the 
legislature can evaluate how each item relates to priorities and 
objectives and determine whether a particular spending proposal is 
consistent with the strategic plan. Additionally, the legislature can 
use the performance measures to determine if programs are effective 
and are meeting the goals outlined in the strategic plan. 
The Commission's objective in making this recommendation is to 
increase the accountability of elected officials by clearly identifying 
expectations. These expectations take the form of measurable policy 
goals to which officials can be held accountable. 
Adequate investment in public facilities is fundamental to the state's 
economic productivity and prosperity. One of the hallmarks of 
California history is the successful series of long-term investments 
that were made during the state's two decades of growth after World 
War II. At that time, the state invested in building our infrastructure, 
which today provides significant quality-of-life benefits to our 
citizens. Examples include: the state's transportation, water, parks, 
higher education, and elementary and secondary school system. 
Californians have a long tradition of investing for the future. Today, 
we take pride in the systems and facilities that were developed in 
earlier decades. 
In recent years, infrastructure investments that are necessary for the 
future have been a secondary priority behind meeting the current 
needs of the people. But in an era of scarce resources, a capital plan 
is critical so that the state can maintain and enhance its premier 
public facilities. Adequate investment in public facilities is basic to 
the state's economic productivity. Most of the state's capital facility 
planning programs are directed toward specific functions such as 
transportation, water, higher education, and prisons. However, the 
state lacks an integrated, multipurpose capital facilities budgeting 
system that will address long-term public facility needs. 
The Commission recommends that the governor propose, and the 
legislature adopt, a four-year capital outlay plan. The plan would 
evaluate state objectives and economic growth to determine the 
14. Require a four-year 
capital outlay plan. 
The Commission recom-
mends that a four-year 
capital outlay plan be 
included in the state's 
long-range strategic plan 
proposed by the governor 
and approved by the 
legislature. 
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15. Change the fiscal year 
from one year to two 
years. 
The Commission recom· 
mends that the current 
annual budget process be 
replaced with the enact· 
ment of a two-year budget. 
16. Provide a budget 
rebalancing mecha-
nism. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the constitution 
specify a "rebalancing" 
process for the state 
budget. Midway through 
the fiscal period, the 
governor would be re-
quired to provide an 
update on the state's fiscal 
condition and recommend 
budgetary adjustments to 
accommodate any changes 
in revenue or expenditures. 
overall priorities for building the state's infrastructure. The plan 
would: 1) define investment priorities for building public facility 
infrastructure; 2) assign responsibilities between levels of 
government for implementing the capital outlay plan; and, 3) 
determine the financing methods to be used. The plan would 
provide the state a framework to build for the future, while also 
providing a means for reviewing annual state spending in relation to 
current and future needs. 
Under current law, the governor and legislature consider the state's 
fiscal choices on an annual basis. California is one of 31 states that 
operates on an annual budget cycle. The remaining 19 operate with a 
two-year budget.17 
Major state responsibilities, such as education and criminal justice, 
require a long planning horizon and a greater level of certainty to 
provide for program stability. The current budgetary timetable does 
not provide sufficient time for program review, evaluation, and 
change, nor does it allow for long-term planning. With a two-year 
budget, the legislature will be able to spend more time evaluating 
program outcomes and effectiveness. A two-year budget will also 
provide the governor and legislature the ability to take a longer view 
of the state's financial needs and to adjust to economic and caseload 
changes in a more organized manner. As a result, cities, counties, 
and schools will be able to do a better job of planning and using 
state funds. 
Failure to maintain a balance of revenue and expenditures often has 
led to year-end deficits. Adopting a balanced budget is an important 
step in stabilizing financial planning for state services and living 
within our means. With the two-year budget period the Commission 
recommends, it is vital to have a provision for making mid-course 
corrections. Such corrections might be required if caseloads change. 
For example, the budget forecast of the number of children estimated 
to attend school in the year the budget is adopted is often different 
than the actual number who attend. The same is true for the budget 
forecast of the economy. Fluctuations in the economy may have an 
effect on projected revenue. Under this proposal, if the governor 
believes it is necessary to change the budget to keep it in balance, he 
or she will submit a rebalancing bill to change appropriations. A 
budget implementation bill will also be submitted to make any 
statutory changes necessary in the rebalancing bill. As noted in the 
section on the vote requirement, the budget rebalancing bill would 
require a majority vote of the legislature. 
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Most states have some form of balanced budget requirement. In 44 
states, the governor must submit a balanced budget proposal to the 
legislature. In 37 states, the budget adopted by the legislature and 
signed by the governor must be balanced. Thirteen states, including 
California, do not require an adopted budget to be in balance or be 
maintained in balance.18 
For most of the state's history, California has relied on fiscal 
flexibility to maintain the state's expenditure priorities during 
difficult times. For example, from 1932 to 1942-when the budget 
was on a two-year schedule-California consistently closed its books 
with deficits. Contemporary history is similar. Since 1981, the state 
has ended eight out of fifteen fiscal years with operating deficits. In 
most cases the deficits were not anticipated. The state has used four 
methods to deal with fiscal imbalances; 1) reduce expenditures; 2) 
raise taxes; 3) use resources of the following year to bring the budget 
into balance; and, 4) shift the cost of a service to some other 
agency-either to the federal government or to counties-or shift 
resources between entities in order to save resources for other state 
programs. As Table 2 illustrates, it is not a simple task to keep the 
state's books balanced through changing economic conditions. 
A critical issue for the Commission was the need for fiscal integrity. 
The Commission's objective is to prohibit spending in any fiscal 
period that will exceed the revenue that will be received. Adopting a 
balanced budget requirement will enhance the state's fiscal integrity 
and accountability and impede carrying over deficits to the next 
fiscal period. 
General Fund Condition 
(In Billions) (Source: Legislative Analyst's Office) 
Increase Fiscal 
Discipline 
17. Require the state's 
budget to be balanced. 
The Commission recom-
mends that for each 
two-year fiscal period, 
expenditures must not 
exceed revenue and 
reserves. After the enact-
ment of the budget bill, no 
other bill could be enacted 
that cause expenditures to 
exceed estimated revenues 
and reserves. 
Operating 
Surplus/Deficit 
Year-End Budget 
Surplus/Deficit 
74-75 79-80 84-85 89-90 93-94 
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18. Require a three percent 
general fund reserve. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the state begin 
each two-year budget 
period with a three percent 
reserve. Initially, the 
reserve would be phased in 
over several budget 
periods. 
19. Prohibit borrowing to 
finance a deficit. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the state be 
prohibited from borrowing 
from non-governmental 
resources across fiscal 
periods. 
The Commission's recommendation regarding a balanced budget 
applies only to General Fund expenditures, not to Special Funds or 
bond funds used for capital projects. General Funds are raised 
primarily by the state income tax, sales tax, and bank and 
corporations taxes. The state has greater discretion over the use of 
these funds. Special Funds are those funds that are earmarked by 
law to be used for specific purposes such as gas taxes for 
transportation projects. Bond funds finance capital projects such as 
school construction, university facilities, prisons, and park 
acquisitions. 
In 1988, California voters enacted a constitutional requirement to 
establish a "reasonable and necessary" prudent reserve. However, it 
did not specify the amount of the reserve. Failure to provide a 
reserve leaves the state vulnerable to small-scale emergencies, 
natural disasters, or unexpected economic shocks. The purpose of a 
reserve is to have the resources available to respond to normal but 
unforeseen changes in the economy, caseloads, or small-scale 
emergencies. 
The Commission determined that the legislature must set aside a 
reserve and that a three percent reserve within each two-year period 
is a reasonable amount. Initially, the reserve will be phased in at a 
rate of one percent each year. The rules governing the reserve and its 
use will be specified in statute. A two-thirds vote of both houses 
would be required to spend funds from the reserve. As the reserve is 
expended, it must be replenished within two fiscal periods. 
Due to the cyclical nature of tax receipts and expenditure allocations 
during a fiscal year, the state may have legal spending obligations 
that exceed the amount of cash in the treasury at any given time. To 
meet these obligations, the state borrows money. Borrowing can be in 
two forms; internal and external. Internal borrowing involves using 
the money of one state spending area to temporarily pay for another. 
Such borrowing is often necessary to deal with fluctuations in when 
certain areas of the state receive their revenue. External borrowing 
uses the private capital markets to obtain needed funds. 
California is one of only 14 states that allow actual deficits to be 
carried over into the next fiscal year. It has also been argued that 
California has one of the least restrictive provisions protecting the 
state from deficit financing.19 
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The constitution does not directly address the state's ability to 
borrow money from capital markets to finance deficits. To be 
consistent with the requirement for a balanced budget, the 
Commission recommends specific language in the constitution to 
prohibit the state from borrowing externally to finance a deficit 
across a fiscal period. This recommendation does not limit the state's 
ability to borrow to meet cash flow needs within a fiscal period. 
Currently, all General Fund appropriations, except those for public 
schools, must be approved by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the 
legislature. This requirement dates back to a 1933 amendment that 
required a two-thirds vote on the budget bill if General Fund 
appropriations grew by more than five percent. Since budget growth 
after 1933 almost always exceeded five percent, the practical effect 
was to routinely require a two-thirds vote for passage of budget bills. 
A 1962 amendment removed the five percent formula, and simply 
required a two-thirds vote on the budget. 
Only seven states require some form of a supermajority voting 
requirement for legislative passage of revenue or budget bills. Four 
states require a supermajority vote for budget approval if the budget 
contains emergency clauses or if the final budget exceeds the 
governor's original proposal. In Illinois, a majority vote is required 
to pass the budget unless the state's budget has not been enacted by 
June 30, then the budget bill requires a three-fifths vote.20 
In theory a two-thirds vote should force a compromise between the 
majority and minority parties. For a number of years, the system 
worked in this manner. Recently, however, it has permitted those 
who have specific interests, which may or may not be related to the 
budget, to delay passage of the budget by leveraging their issue into 
the budget debate. The Citizens Budget Commission found that long 
budget delays, where a small group of legislators were able to stall 
budget adoption, caused higher levels of spending.21 The 
Commission agreed with that finding. Although conventional wis-
dom indicates otherwise, the two-thirds vote requirement does not 
seem to limit higher levels of spending. In practice, it encourages it. 
The Commission concluded that requiring a majority vote is the 
most equitable way to deal with increasing demand in an era of 
scarce resources. The Commission believes that with its 
recommendations related to balancing the budget, restricting 
borrowing, and requiring a reserve built in to the budget process to 
provide more fiscal discipline, a majority vote for enactment of the 
budget is appropriate. The majority vote recommendation applies to 
enactment of the budget, budget implementation bill, and 
rebalancing bill. The Commission recommends maintaining the 
20. Require a majority vote 
to enact the budget 
and budget-related 
legislation. 
The Commission recom-
mends that a majority vote 
be required for the adop-
tion of the state budget, 
the budget implementation 
bill, and any bill enacted to 
"rebalance" the budget. 
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21. Allow for multiple 
subject budget imple-
mentation legislation. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the legislature 
be authorized to include. in 
a single implementation 
bill, any statutory changes 
needed to implement the 
budget bill. 
22. Link budget passage to 
salaries of legislators 
and the governor. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the constitution 
require the budget to be 
passed by the deadline or 
the governor and the 
legislature forfeit their pay. 
requirement for a two-thirds vote for any tax increase. Therefore, 
program expenditures may be adjusted by a majority vote and the 
taxpayers maintain their protection of a two-thirds vote on the 
imposition of new taxes. 
The budget bill often requires changes in state law in order for the 
provisions of the budget to take effect. Legislation needed for those 
changes is included in budget trailer bills or budget implementation 
bills. But the constitution contains a provision that limits legislation 
to a "single subject." All bills, other than the budget bill itself, may 
deal with only one subject. Because of the "single subject" rule, the 
budget-related changes cannot be combined into one bill. 
Consequently, the budget implementation bills must be submitted 
and voted on as separate pieces of legislation. To implement changes 
in law required by the budget, the legislature frequently must 
consider 20 to 30 different bills. Inevitably, one or more of these bills 
fails to pass the legislature, and thus throws the budget out of 
balance soon after enactment. 
In order for the state to have an effective spending plan, the budget 
and all the provisions in the budget implementation bills must be 
enacted together. Without the implementation bills, the budget bill 
cannot operate, and the state does not have an effective spending 
plan. This recommendation authorizes multiple subject budget 
implementation bills, but does not require them. Allowing the 
legislature to pass a single budget implementation bill will protect 
the fiscal integrity of the budget by making it easier to pass 
legislation essential to keeping the budget balanced. If the budget 
implementation bill includes a tax increase, a two-thirds vote would 
be required for enactment. 
Currently, the legislature and the governor are paid even if the 
budget is not enacted on time. This is not true for those who rely on 
the state for the timely payment of its obligations, including nursing 
homes, some state employees, and suppliers who provide services to 
the state. The Commission recommends that the governor and 
legislators forfeit their pay during any period that the budget is not 
enacted following the June 30 deadline. 
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Ill. Changing K-12 Education: 
Focusing Accountability at the State and Local Levels 
The governance structure of elementary and secondary education is divided among several state, 
county, and local authorities. Lines of accountability are blurred. Although elementary and secondary 
education are a shared local and state responsibility, local K-12 districts have little authority to raise 
taxes to provide additional funds for education. Additionally, cities, counties, and many special 
districts provide services that affect a child's education and health, yet there are few formal incentives 
for the collaborative delivery of services that might lead to more efficiency and cost savings. 
Perceptions of how the K-12 education system operates do not 
coincide with reality. In fact, several myths exist as to just how 
California's education system operates and who bears ultimate 
responsibility for K-12 education policies. First, there is a myth that 
the superintendent of public instruction is responsible for the state's 
education system. The reality is many officials make decisions 
concerning the state's education system. The current system provides 
education roles for the governor, superintendent, state Board of 
Education, county offices and local school district boards, 
administrators, and teachers. Citizens have difficulty knowing whom 
they should hold accountable for educational quality and results. 
As described in the section on executive branch organization, at the 
state level California's public education system is administered by 
the Department of Education under the direction of the state Board 
of Education and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. Presently, 
the superintendent has three roles: 1) Director of the State 
Department of Education; 2) Executive Secretary to the State Board 
of Education; and, 3) Superintendent of Schools. The primary 
responsibilities of the superintendent and the department are to 
provide education policy direction to local school districts and to 
work with the educational community to improve academic 
performance. Any governing or administrative authority over the 
schools is derived from state laws and not the constitution. 
Conflicts frequently occur over who has jurisdiction in a particular 
educational policy area. For example, the 1993 court decision State 
Board of Education v. Honig involved a number of issues relating to 
the roles and responsibilities of the board and the superintendent. 
The California Appellate Court ruled in favor of the board, and the 
California Supreme Court let the decision stand. The decision states: 
". . . the constitution allows the Legislature to specify roles and 
responsibilities for both the board and the superintendent." 
Therefore, any lack of clarity of authority rests in legislation. 
"The Legislature has delegated certain powers to the board and the 
What is the Problem? 
• At the state level, no one 
is in charge. 
• There are few standards 
to measure performance. 
• Local policy and financ-
ing authority is limited. 
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superintendent. The board shall determine all questions of policy 
within its power. The Legislature has delegated to the 
superintendent the power to execute, under direction of the state 
board, the policies which have been decided upon by the board." 
Therefore, each has regulatory authority dependent upon the 
assignment of that authority by the Legislature for a particular 
program or education function. "Although the superintendent is a 
constitutional officer whose office cannot be extinguished by the 
Legislature, the powers and duties of that office may, and have been, 
increased and diminished by the Legislature under its authority."22 
Another myth concerning California's educational system is that 
local communities fund their own schools and that local school 
boards operate their schools as they choose. The reality is that the 
state provides well over half of all funding for K-12 education (the 
remainder of the funds are local property tax revenue) and 
prescribes how certain funds must be spent. For the 1996-97 fiscal 
year an estimated $28.1 billion will be spent educating 5.4 million 
school children. Seventeen billion dollars comes from the state 
General Fund, $8.6 billion comes from the local property tax, and the 
remaining $2.5 billion comes from the federal government. The state 
controls the allocation of state funds as well as the local property tax. 
Local school boards make decisions about how to spend their 
general purpose state funds and property tax revenue. However, the 
state also provides categorical funds and dictates how those funds 
must be spent. The Commission concluded that the current K-12 
financing system and the lack of opportunity for communities to 
raise revenue locally for schools has resulted in people being 
disconnected from their local schools. 
The Commission found that California has an educational system 
that provides no real focal point for responsibility, no flexibility for 
local districts, and has widely scattered responsibilities, resulting in 
no single official or entity being accountable for the state's education 
system either at the state or local level. The system has no organized 
method for ensuring that California's pupils are well-educated or 
that education funds are spent in the best way for each local area. 
STATE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 
WHO IS IN CHARGE? 
COUNTY BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 
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The Commission found that several reforms are needed to resolve 
problems with the state's education system. First, the state must stop 
micro-managing local school districts, and must delegate to local 
districts responsibility for meeting state education objectives. The 
state should ensure access to-and equity of-education and it 
should establish academic standards for local districts to meet. Local 
school boards should then be empowered to meet those standards 
using the methods that work best for their communities. Second, the 
state must clarify education roles and define which state official 
bears ultimate responsibility for California's educational policies. 
In the area of school finance, the Commission concluded that the 
current education funding system is too centralized at the state level. 
This has fostered a disconnect between citizens and their local 
education system. The Commission's recommendations for a shared 
state-local school finance system have two basic underpinnings. 
Local school boards should be empowered to operate in a manner 
that will meet both the state's interest in education and the needs of 
their pupils on a local level. School districts should have the 
option-with local voter approval-to supplement the funds they 
receive from the state and the basic allocation of property tax 
revenue. This authority will provide local boards with greater control 
and flexibility in meeting the education needs of each community. 
Education has been a vital state interest since the first constitution 
was adopted in 1849. The 1849 constitution provided that the 
legislature should "encourage by all suitable means the promotion of 
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvements," and 
should maintain a system of free common schools. During the 1879 
convention, considerable debate occurred about education issues. 
The general attitude at the convention was one of distrust of the 
state government. The delegates gave local governments 
considerably more control over the schools than had been previously 
enjoyed. Now, 117 years later, it's once again time to shift more 
power, authority, and revenue control from the state to local school 
districts. 
In evaluating needed reforms to the state's elementary and 
secondary education system, the Commission established the 
following goaJs: 
• The state must provide the public with a clear system of 
accountability. 
• The responsibility for providing elementary and secondary 
education services should be shared between the state and local 
communities. 
• The focus of control of education should be as close to the pupil 
as possible. 
What Change is 
Needed? 
• Clarify responsibility. 
• Focus control of educa-
tion locally. 
• Eliminate barriers to 
efficient operation. 
• Give communities power 
to supplement the state 
funding guarantee. 
What Does the 
Commission 
Recommend? 
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Identifying Who 
Is in Charge 
23. Make the governor 
responsible for K-12 
education. 
The Commission recom-
mends that the governor 
should be responsible for 
the state's role in the 
elementary and secondary 
public school system. The 
roles and responsibilities 
of the superintendent of 
public instruction should 
be outlined in statute 
rather than in the constitu-
tion. The superintendent of 
public instruction should 
be appointed by the 
governor, subject to senate 
confirmation. 
• Reforms should eliminate barriers to the efficient operation of 
the elementary and secondary school system. 
• Communities should have the ability to supplement the 
statewide K-12 funding guarantee. 
This requirement was discussed in the section on Executive Branch 
reform, and the information bears repeating here. The general public 
and many in the education community perceive that the 
superintendent of public instruction has more authority over the 
schools than actually exists. Although the superintendent has 
policymaking authority, the position lacks fiscal and managerial 
control. Personnel and practice decisions are made by local boards. 
Overall budget control lies with the governor and the legislature, or 
often is mandated by initiatives. Decisions about textbooks, testing, 
and standards rest with a state board appointed by the governor, of 
which the superintendent is the executive secretary, not a voting 
member. 
Responsibility for the state's education system is further complicated 
by the lackof constitutional reference to the authority of the 
governor for elementary and secondary education. Despite that, the 
historical prominence of the governor in education policy and 
budget decisions leads the public to presume a certain level of 
gubernatorial responsibility. The dispersion of responsibility within 
the education system means that no one has the authority to 
implement reforms, and citizens don't know whom to hold 
accountable for educational quality and results. 
The Commission's goal is to establish efficient and effective 
governance for elementary and secondary public education by 
clearly defining the power and authority of the governor and locally 
elected school boards. To attain this goal, it is necessary to remove 
the constitutional status of some offices and boards. If a function is 
truly necessary, statutes can establish any offices and entities that are 
required to meet specific needs. 
Deleting the constitutional status of the superintendent and giving 
responsibility for education policy to the governor, would remove a 
perceived layer of authority between local school boards and the 
governor. It would also clarify that the governor is ultimately 
responsible for the state's education policies. 
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Currently, the state Board of Education has two constitutional 
responsibilities: approval of textbooks for use by pupils through the 
eighth grade, and approval of four executive appointments made by 
the superintendent of public instruction to the state Department of 
Education. All other policy development and regulatory 
responsibilities are based in statutes. 
The Commission recommends that the governor be given clear 
constitutional responsibility for elementary and secondary education. 
The governor and the legislature should have the authority to 
determine whether a state board is necessary and-if it is 
necessary-whether its functions should be advisory or regulatory. If 
such a board is needed, its establishment, roles, and responsibilities 
should be outlined in statute rather than in the constitution. 
Establishing the board in statute will allow for more flexibility in its 
duties and will better allow for changes in those duties to meet 
current needs. If the constitutional reference is removed, the board's 
existing structure and duties could remain or change. 
This proposal, coupled with the recommendation to delete the 
superintendent of public instruction from the constitution, will 
remove yet another perceived-and sometimes real-layer of 
governance between local school boards and the governor. 
County superintendents of schools and county boards of education 
are provided for in the constitution but their roles and 
responsibilities are spelled out in statute. According to statute, 
counties provide many educational programs for pupils. The nature 
of these programs is such that they are often better organized and 
provided on a regional or areawide basis. This includes programs 
such as special education for disabled pupils, vocational/ occupa-
tional skills training, and juvenile court schools. In addition to these 
programs, statutes require the counties to perform fiscal, 
organizational, and attendance functions for school districts. 
Existing statutes permit local units of government-in this case 
school boards-to form county, regional, or areawide administrative 
units and joint powers authorities. Under the Commission's 
recommendation, these units could continue existing practices or 
cooperative services, or they could establish new arrangements, if 
local school boards need such an entity. 
If school districts had more local control, they could use their 
authority to organize regional or areawide services in a manner that 
most effectively and efficiently meets their needs. If the state requires 
an intermediate unit to carry out a specific state function, a regional 
or county unit could be authorized in statute, or the function could 
be performed by an entity created as a unit in the state Department 
of Education. 
24. The role of the state 
Board of Education 
should be determined 
by statute. 
The Commission recom-
mends deleting constitu-
tional references to the 
state Board of Education. 
25. The role of county 
superintendents of 
schools and county 
boards of education 
should be determined 
locally or by statute. 
The Commission recom-
mends that constitutional 
references to county 
superintendents of schools 
and county boards of 
education be deleted. 
School districts could 
organize areawide services 
in a manner that most 
effectively and efficiently 
meets their needs. 
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26. Establish an account-
ability system for 
public schools. 
The Commission recom-
mends establishing an 
accountability system and 
standards for public 
schools. 
This recommendation is not a negative reflection on the programs 
and provided by counties, rather/ it is intended to improve 
organization and accountability. The recommendation meets a 
Commission goal of placing program operations closest to the local 
community and allowing maximum local flexibility for program 
governance. Additionally, it removes a layer of bureaucracy-both 
perceived and real-between local school boards and the governor. 
The constitution mentions education accountability only in section 
8.5 of Article XVI (added by Proposition 98), and the reference is 
very brief. The provision requires school districts to issue 
accountability report cards for each school. However/ there is little 
statewide uniformity of design for ease of public understanding, and 
there are no consequences imbedded in the system. In 1995, the state 
enacted a new statute that establishes new pupil testing and 
education standards. The legislation created the Commission for the 
Establishment of Academic Content and Performance Standards to 
develop educational standards and create a testing program for 
certain elementary and secondary gradesY The goal is to determine 
and describe what pupils should know and be able to do. Local 
school districts should then be given authority to decide how to 
educate children to accomplish those goals. 
Current state law requires school districts to adhere to particular 
fiscal controls, but there is no accountability process or requirement 
that focuses on pupil achievement or the non-fiscal aspects of school 
district operations. State laws hold school districts accountable for 
fiscal operations, particularly if a district has fiscal difficulties. 
Districts are required to have a fund reserve, account for 
expenditures in a specified manner, subject financial transactions to 
an annual audit, and have fiscal documents reviewed by county 
offices of education and the state Department of Education. Lack of 
adherence to required forms, procedures, and standards can result in 
a state "takeover" of the fiscal affairs of a school district. 
The Commission recommends that the constitution be amended to 
require the state to adopt a statute outlining an accountability system 
for education content, pupil performance, and financial and 
managerial responsibilities. Under such a provision, the state could 
enact fiscal accountability and pupil testing provisions that are 
similar to those contained in current statutes. A constitutionally 
required system developed in statute will maintain the state's 
interest in K-12 education, while permitting periodic statutory 
changes to allow for new conditions. Of equal importance, such a 
system would provide a clear statement to the public regarding the 
degree to which pupils are learning and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of local districts. 
Accountability at the State 
--------------------------------8 
Proposition 98 is a constitutional amendment approved by voters in 
1988 and revised in 1990, that established a minimum school funding 
guarantee--calculated on an annual basis-for elementary and 
secondary education and the community colleges. The guarantee is a 
state level aggregate commitment of funds; the proposition does not 
spell out the process or prescribe how much of the total guarantee 
dollars will go to elementary and secondary education or community 
colleges. All distribution decisions are made each year by the 
governor and legislature. As is true in the educational governance 
area, the system for financing local schools has become so complex 
that it is understood only by a limited number of experts. A frequent 
question is: Why has financing our elementary and secondary 
schools become so complex? 
Over the past 25 years, court cases, constitutional initiatives passed 
by the electorate, and numerous bills have changed the method and 
amount of school funds a district receives each fiscal year. This 
complexity relating to school funding began with the 1968 Serrano v. 
Priest court case, which was not completely settled until the 
rnid-1980s. When the Serrano case began, funding for elementary 
and secondary schools was a shared state-local arrangement. The 
state basically assured each school district a foundation or base level 
of general purpose funds for each pupil, and local districts used their 
control of property taxes to raise per pupil funding to the amount 
the district wanted to spend. 
In the original Serrano decision, the court held that the school 
finance system that existed at the time was unconstitutional because 
a community with high property values could raise a lot of local 
money with a low tax rate. Conversely, a community with low 
property values needed a high tax rate to raise the same amount of 
money. This violated the equal opportunity and equal protection 
provisions of the California Constitution. The original Serrano 
decision permitted a different amount of funds to be spent on pupils, 
but ruled that property tax revenue based on property wealth could 
not be the reason for the difference. 
After 15 years of court discussions, decisions, and new laws, the final 
Serrano judgment determined that the early-1980s version of school 
finance was in compliance with the constitution. However, that 
decision didn't simplify matters. In 1978, prior to the final Serrano 
judgment, the passage of Proposition 13 modified all school finance 
formulas relative to local property taxes for elementary and 
secondary education. Specifically, Proposition 13 removed the power 
of local communities to control the amount of property tax revenue 
they wanted for their schools. A limited number of school districts 
have been able to obtain voter approval of a parcel tax generating 
additional revenue, but the amount of money generated is quite 
small. For all practical purposes, school finance has been centralized 
with the governor and legislature. As a result, the state's General 
Fund is now the primary source of any new dollars for schools. 
21. Maintain PropOsition 
98 and provide addi· 
tional flexibility to. the 
legislature and the 
governor. .. 
The Commission recom-
mends maintaining the 
statewide funding guaran· 
tee for K-12 education. The 
Commission alsorect~m­
mends that the legislature 
and governor be given 
greater flexibility in deter-. 
mining. how to appropriate 
additional funds to K-12 
education In excess of.the 
minimum funding guaran-
tee. Specifically, education 
spending In excess of the 
guarantee would be for. 
one-time purposes unle~~S ·. 
the legislature and the 
governor chose to Increase 
the guarantee. 
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Enhancing Local 
Control in the 
Management and 
Financing of K-12 
Education 
28. Increase local control 
and authority. 
The Commission recom-
mends increasing local 
control and the authority of 
local school boards. 
In any fiscal year, the governor and the legislature have the authority 
to augment the minimum Proposition 98 funding guarantee by 
appropriating funds above the minimum for schools. When the 
legislature appropriates funds for schools above the minimum 
guarantee, the current Proposition 98 language requires that any 
appropriation made during one year will become part of the base 
level of funding for the subsequent fiscal year. This provision can 
have a "chilling effect" on any consideration to provide funds above 
the minimum in a given year because such an increase will result in 
that new amount setting a new minimum for the following year. 
Future augmentations might be considered more favorably if any 
augmentation "over the minimum" Proposition 98 funding 
guarantee could be a one-time practice rather than being built into 
the future minimum base. 
The Commission concluded that the legislature and the governor 
should have greater flexibility to determine how to appropriate 
funds to K-12 education in excess of the funding guarantee. 
Therefore, the Commission recommends that Proposition 98 be 
revised so that, unless the legislature specifies otherwise, additional 
funding over the guarantee would be for one-time purposes and 
would not be built into the base funding for the subsequent year's 
guarantee. 
The state's constitution provides that the legislature may "authorize 
the governing boards of all school districts to initiate and carry on 
any programs, activities, or to otherwise act in any manner which is 
not in conflict with the laws and purposes for which school districts 
are established." The legislature enacted the authorization in 1976, 
but subsequent statutes, federal and state court decisions, and voter 
initiatives have constrained the prerogatives of local school boards 
and shifted more power than necessary to the state. 
The Commission acknowledges that the state is ultimately 
responsible for elementary and secondary education. But the 
Commission also determined that locally elected board members 
should be given as much authority as possible. The Commission 
recommends that school districts be given the constitutional power 
to make decisions that do not conflict with state law. Providing local 
school boards with direct constitutional authority gives them the 
power to act unless a statute prevents them from taking a particular 
action or requires them to do something else. This may decrease the 
state's role and its tendency to micro-manage school districts. The 
state would continue to have ultimate educational authority, and the 
legislature could enact a statute to assert a state interest that 
overrides local authority. 
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Perhaps the most notable example of the disconnection between the 
local taxes paid and the services received is the relationship between 
the local taxpayer and the school district. As mentioned earlier, the 
state has centralized the financing of K-12 education to the extent 
that there is little opportunity to supplement the statewide funding 
guarantee with local resources that communities may wish to 
provide to their schools. Many people believe that lottery revenue 
has solved the state's education funding problem. In reality, lottery 
revenue account for about three percent of the funds for elementary 
and secondary education. School districts are often forced to resort to 
begging, borrowing, and badgering to increase their financial 
resources. Some districts have received corporate and foundation 
support, while others have gone to their local electorate for approval 
of parcel taxes. These efforts have helped many districts, but they are 
not long-term solutions, and they have not generated significant 
amounts of money. 
The Commission recommends that if local communities want to 
supplement the state guarantee, they should be permitted to raise 
additional local funds by either or both of the following methods: 
• An increase in the property tax with approval of two-thirds of 
the voters within the district. This authority would apply only 
to unified districts, and there would be limitations on the 
amount of the increase to comply with the Serrano decision. 
• An increase of up to one-half cent on the sales tax on a 
countywide basis with majority approval of the voters. These 
funds would be allocated to all districts in the county on an 
equal per pupil basis. 
The Commission recommends that any funds raised by these 
methods should be constitutionally protected from any "take-away" 
or supplanting by state law. The revenue would be supplemental, 
.locally derived revenue that remain in the community. This 
recommendation is based on the premise that the combination of the 
state General Fund expenditures and the regular property tax 
allocated to schools will satisfy the state's funding interest in public 
elementary and secondary education. If communities want to 
provide additional funds over the amount provided by the basic 
guarantee, they should have the authority to seek voter approval for 
such funding. The Commission determined that local communities 
will be better connected with their schools if they are able to raise 
and retain some revenue for education above the level of funding 
provided by the state and general property tax revenue. This action 
would shift the source of the additional funding over the state 
guarantee for schools from the state General Fund to local 
communities. 
29. Allow supplementary 
local voter-approved 
taxes .for education. 
The Commission recom-
mends allowing supple-
mentary local voter-
approved taxes for K-12 
education. 
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30. Capital outlay planning 
and development 
should involve all local 
agencies. 
The Commission recom-
mends that school districts 
participate with other 
public agencies in a capital 
outlay planning program. 
For a proposed project that 
is consistent with a 
multi-agency plan, the vote 
required for general 
obligation bonds should be 
a majority of voters. 
School districts have a backlog of capital construction projects 
totaling more than seven billion dollars. These projects include new 
school construction and the renovation and remodeling of existing 
facilities. Both are necessary to meet enrollment increases and 
program requirements into the twenty-first century. The most 
common methods of financing capital projects for school districts are 
general obligation bonds passed statewide by the electorate and local 
general obligation bonds passed by a two-thirds majority vote of the 
local electorate. 
At the state level, school general obligation bond issues compete 
with other state capital outlay needs such as colleges and 
universities, prisons, and other infrastructure projects. State bonds 
currently provide less than one billion dollars per year to meet local 
needs, and it is not practical to expect every school's needs to be met 
by state bonds. Some communities charge a construction fee which 
provides a portion of the needed capital. Other districts have been 
successful in obtaining gifts of land or other capital assets. These 
methods do not meet all the local capital outlay needs. School 
districts often place bond requests before their local communities, 
but the two-thirds vote threshold for local bonds has proven to be an 
insurmountable barrier in some communities. Despite this, the need 
for capital outlay persists. 
The need for capital investment in education facilities does not exist 
in a vacuum. As communities grow, long-term capital investment is 
needed in other community facilities including waste water 
treatment, water and transportation systems, and other facilities that 
make up the infrastructure of a community. Under our current local 
government structure, these activities are undertaken by individual 
agencies each asking the voters to approve particular projects. The 
Commission determined that it would improve the efficiency of all 
local agencies that invest in community facilities if they plan and 
develop the community's capital facility needs on a collaborative 
basis and then offer the voters a clear choice for the community's 
future. 
Under this new collaborative model, the Commission recommends 
that the vote threshold for local general obligation bonds should be 
changed from the current two-thirds requirement to a majority vote. 
The majority vote authorization would be conditioned on all units of 
local government corning together to design a community-wide 
capital outlay plan and presenting it to the local electorate. If a 
school district participates with other public agencies in a capital 
outlay planning program implemented using a plan developed 
through the Commission's proposed "Home Rule Community 
Charter" and the proposed project is consistent with the plan, the 
vote requirement for general obligation bonds would be a majority 
vote of the voters. If the school district does not wish to be part of a 
local areawide plan, they can still seek local voter approval for 
bonds, but the vote·requirement would remain at two-thirds. 
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Currently, California has 70 community college districts 
encompassing 106 campuses. Community college districts are 
governed by locally elected boards of trustees. According to Article 
IX, community colleges have the same constitutional status as state 
universities; both are authorized to exist as statutory entities. The 
state university system is financed by the state budget. Community 
colleges are part of the state's Master Plan for Higher Education and 
are funded similarly to elementary and secondary education. 
Through statutory changes made after the Master Plan's review in 
the mid-1980s, community college funding was changed from an 
average daily attendance system, which mirrored elementary and 
secondary education, to a full-time equivalent student basis that is 
somewhat similar to the state universities. 
For the last ten years, the funding system for community colleges 
has been a combination of local property tax revenue and 
appropriations from the state's General Fund, plus a student 
enrollment fee. The state annually appropriates a specific amount of 
General Funds for community colleges from the statewide aggregate 
Proposition 98 minimum guarantee. The constitution has no required 
split of Proposition 98 funds between elementary and secondary 
education and the community colleges. Usually, community colleges 
receive 10 to 11 percent of each year's total. The community colleges 
share of local property tax revenue are estimated each year, but if the 
estimate is below actual receipts, the colleges are short of revenue. 
Unlike K-12 education, the state does not automatically make-up for 
funds not received because of lower property tax revenue. Therefore, 
community college districts seldom know their total revenue picture 
during a fiscal year. 
The Commission determined that community colleges and state 
universities should have similar fiscal systems, and the community 
colleges should be clearly identified as institutions of higher 
education. The Commission recommends that Article XVI 
(Proposition 98) be amended to remove the community colleges. The 
Commission does not recommend any changes to the Article IX 
provision authorizing both the community colleges and the state 
university systems to continue as public statutory entities. The 
Commission also has no recommendation concerning whether the 
community colleges should become a state system or should remain 
locally governed. Decisions regarding implementation and other 
changes to the community colleges are left to further legislative 
deliberations. 
31. Community colleges 
should be part of 
higher education. 
The Commission recom-
mends that community 
colleges be removed from 
the Proposition 98 funding 
guarantee and be given the 
same funding status as the 
California State University. 
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The adoption of the Commission's recommendation by the electorate 
will result in all other aspects of the community colleges remaining 
the same. However, the constitutional change could open at least the 
following issues and questions for discussion: 
• Should community colleges continue to be governed by locally 
elected boards of trustees, should the system move to a 
statewide governance entity similar to the state university, or 
should a combination of the two forms of governance be used? 
• Should community colleges continue to be jointly funded by 
local property tax revenue and the state's General Fund, or 
should the system be 100 percent funded by the General Fund? 
The latter choice would result in the transfer of property tax 
revenue to elementary and secondary education (K-12) and/or 
other units of local government. If community colleges are 100 
percent state funded, how will existing per student funding 
disparities be addressed, since no Serrano-type equalization is 
required for community colleges? 
• Should community colleges be permitted to continue to seek 
approval by the local electorate for construction bonds or 
should they be part of a statewide construction system that 
includes the state university and the University of California? 
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Changing the State-Local Relationship: Knowing Who Is in Charge- Page 59 

IV. State-Local Relations: Straightening out the 
Relationship of State and Local Government 
It is widely agreed by every group that has studied California state and local governments that they 
are not serving the people as effectively as they should. In evaluating the structure and responsi-
bilities of state and local governments, the Commission identified a number of problems that impede 
state and local agencies from meeting the needs of Californians. 
A key problem in the state-local relationship is that there is no 
overarching goal or principle guiding the relationship. The resulting 
assignment of responsibilities between state and local governments, 
particularly counties, is confused and follows no objective path. As a 
consequence, there is no accountability for each program. In 1992, 
the Legislative Analyst published a report on this subject, entitled 
"Making Government Make Sense." The report concluded that 
". . . California's existing 'system' of government is dysfunctional," 
and that ". . . fundamental reorganization of state and local 
government responsibilities is required."24 The California 
Business-Higher Education Forum issued a 1993 report entitled, 
"California Fiscal Reform: A Plan for Action," concluded that 
". . . government barely works in California." 25 
The absence of clearly defined responsibilities for operating and 
financing government services has weakened the accountability of 
government officials to the public. In many instances, the state 
controls the program requirements and dictates how a program 
operates, but often leaves little room for local flexibility and 
creativity. As a result, local communities have limited ability to 
respond to local needs and to develop innovative approaches to 
solving community problems. 
The tension between state government's desire for statewide policy 
authority and the desire for local autonomy is not new. It has existed 
since the Bear Flag Rebellion in 1846 when a group of citizens in 
Sonoma expressed their frustration with the Mexican government by 
declaring independence. From the first days of the legislature in 1849 
to the present, legislators, governors, and local officials have argued 
over taxation, home rule, special legislation, and the respective roles 
of each group. The first 30 years of statehood were marked with 
mistrust and meddling in the affairs of local communities by the 
California legislature. The Constitution of 1879 introduced the 
principle of "home rule."26 Simply stated, home rule is the authority 
of a local government to act independent of state intervention in the 
control of local affairs. The extent of this authority ends where the 
state expresses a statewide interest. And therein lies the 
dilemma-who draws the line and where is it drawn? 
What is the Problem? 
• There is an absence of 
clearly defined responsi-
bilities of state and local 
government. 
• Since 1978 the state has 
played a significant role 
in local government 
finance. 
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There was a time when the roles of state and local government were 
clearer and more understandable. The state's responsibilities were 
well-defined and were supported by the income, sales, and bank and 
corporation taxes. These responsibilities included a higher education 
system, a share of K-12 education, a prison system, and a health and 
human services system. The latter was shared with county 
governments which acted as agents of the state in the delivery of 
certain services. Local governments, along with the schools, had the 
property tax as their primary source of revenue for financing local 
services. The framers of the 1879 constitution wanted to protect local 
services from what had become an intrusive state government. A 
prohibition was placed in the constitution providing that the 
legislature may not impose taxes for local purposes but may 
authorize local governments to impose them. This provision has 
remained unchanged from its original version. Its purpose was to 
prohibit legislative interference with local taxation and 
expenditures. 27 
How did such a long tradition of a strong local government change 
in such a short period of time? The trend toward state control began 
in the early 1970s and increased substantially after the passage of 
Proposition 13 in 1978. The landmark law placed limitations on the 
amount of property tax that could be levied and gave control of its 
distribution to the state. Without a clear understanding of the 
situation, voters accepted the need to limit the power of state and 
local government to levy taxes and handed control of the primary 
source of financing local services to the state. 
The property tax revolt of 1978 did not occur overnight. For most of 
the 1970s the legislature, two governors, and tax reform groups had 
argued over ways to reform the property tax. During the high 
inflationary period of the mid- to late-1970s, rapidly increasing 
property values allowed the property tax burden to grow. 
Additionally, as the state became more involved in health and 
human services, the county property tax was increasingly used for 
nonproperty-related services. The state income tax-not adjusted for 
inflation-was causing the state coffers to fill to overflowing. 
Government income was growing faster than personal income. The 
legislature and the governor, in no particular hurry to solve this 
problem, were faced with angry voters who had their own solution. 
The voters took property tax reform into their own hands. Between 
1965 and 1978, 29 initiatives were filed with the Secretary of State to 
reform the property tax. Over this 13 year period, four measures 
qualified for the ballot and only one passed-Proposition 13.28 
Proposition 13 was a classic example of why the voters placed the 
initiative process in the constitution in 1911. It was a release valve for 
inaction by the state. Proposition 13 limited the property tax rate to 
1% of the full value of the property and capped the amount that the 
property value could grow for tax purposes to 2% per year. The 
practical effect was to reduce the property taxes of homeowners and 
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businesses by 60%. Local governments lost a major portion of the 
revenue used to support local services. They asked the state to 
replace the lost revenue in order to maintain the level of local 
services. The significant reduction of the local revenue base resulted 
in the transfer of power from local communities to state government. 
The outcome was predictable. With reduced resources for local 
services and a state surplus of over $4 billion, a fiscal relief plan was 
adopted that replaced about two-thirds of the property tax lost by 
local governments including schools. This cushioned the effect of the 
initiative. In effect, the state replaced local revenue used for local 
services with state funds. Approximately $1 billion went to cities, 
counties, and special districts to prevent major local government 
service reductions, particularly, police and fire protection services. 
An additional $1.3 billion was used to "buy out" the county share of 
a variety of health and welfare programs, and $2.8 billion was used 
to replace the property tax lost to the schools.29 
By this one act, the state undertook a new obligation-a significantly 
larger share of funding for local services, including schools. At the 
time, this approach was viewed as the long-term solution to the 
impact of Proposition 13. The effect of the involvement of the state in 
financing local services was not unforeseen. In January of 1980, in a 
report written by Senator Albert S. Rodda, Chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee, the state was warned of the obligation it was 
assuming. 
"Fortunately, the state through this action (Proposition 13 
fiscal relief) replaced about two-thirds of the Proposition 13 
property tax loss and, as a result, local governments, 
including schools, were spared the economic and social 
disruptions which normally would have accompanied such a 
dramatic change in their finances. State government, however, 
paid a price for coming to the aid of local government 
because the state committed itself to spend a substantial 
portion of its revenue for the support of local government 
and the public schools and, as a consequence, diminished its 
ability to finance areas of public service traditionally 
recognized as the responsibility of the state. The response to 
Proposition 13 resulted, therefore, in a fundamental change in 
state finance." 30 
The seeds of destruction were planted, and a locally-controlled 
finance system independent of the state was at an end. According to 
the Legislative Analyst, by 1984 the cost of the fiscal relief program 
had grown to over $7 billion.31 By the time the 1990 recession hit, the 
cost of local fiscal relief had topped $9 billion. Since the state had 
• The state replaced most 
of the property tax lost 
due to Proposition 13, 
thereby. using statewide 
resources to finance 
local services. 
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• When the 1990 recession 
hit California, the state 
was no longer able to 
continue the level of 
assistance to local 
government. 
• The property tax, once a 
local tax for local pur-
poses, is now treated as 
a tax for state purposes. 
complete control of the distribution of the property tax, it was no 
surprise that when the fiscal effects of the 1990 recession continued 
into the mid-1990s, the state would want "its" money back. 
To solve the state's fiscal problem, the legislature and the governor 
partially reversed the fiscal relief program enacted in 1979 and 
transferred $3.6 billion in property tax from local governments back 
to the schools, thereby saving the state the equivalent amount of 
money. State financial assistance has continued to erode the ability of 
local governments to make choices about how tax dollars for local 
services will be spent. An example of using state resources to replace 
lost property taxes came in 1994. At the time, the voters approved 
Proposition 172 which provided additional resources to local 
government by continuing the state's temporary half-cent sales tax 
levied in 1991 to help the state through the recession. The funds 
raised were targeted only for local public safety purposes. 
Additionally, the state established a "maintenance of effort" 
requirement, which had the effect of placing future controls on local 
spending. In effect, local discretionary revenue, in the form of the 
property tax, was taken by the state and a portion replaced with a 
statewide tax targeted for a specific purpose. 
The voters, by giving the state the power over the distribution of the 
property tax, disconnected themselves from the act of determining 
the level of service desired and payment for the services received. 
Now the state determines how much local property tax a particular 
local agency will receive. It can be argued that the property tax is no 
longer a local tax use<l exclusively for local services. 
In 1979, an amendment was added to the constitution that required 
the state to reimburse local government for "costs incurred" when 
carrying out a state-mandated local program. Such a program was 
defined as a new program or an increased level of service required 
by the state. The purpose of this requirement was to provide for 
some level of discipline in the state-local relationship by requiring 
the state to pay for those activities in which it had an interest. Since 
that time, the number of state-mandated local programs covered by 
this provision has been reduced dramatically. Rather than pay for 
particular services, the state has simply repealed the mandate. 
Although local officials, particularly those representing counties, 
urged the Commission to strengthen the mandate reimbursement 
provisions, the Commission concluded that the central issue was the 
programmatic relationship between the state and local governments 
and not simply the mandate provisions. If the programmatic 
relationship is straightened out, the issue of which level of 
government finances a program will follow. 
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The most deficient aspect of the state-local relationship centers on 
the relationship between the state and counties. Since 1849, counties 
have been recognized as providing a dual role-they act as agents of 
the state as well as providing municipal services outside of cities. 
The issue does not involve those functions that are either clearly 
state, such as higher education, or those that are clearly local, such as 
library services. Rather, the problem involves: 1) shared services that 
have both a local and a statewide element; such as mental health and 
transportation; and, 2) services that are statewide in nature, but are 
administered on behalf of the state by another entity, such as a 
county. In administering these programs, counties are treated as 
agents of the state. Examples include indigent health care and 
general assistance. 
The Commission found that there is no magic template that will 
neatly divide state and local programs. If there was one-someone 
would have found it long ago. What can and should be done is the 
initiation of a "realignment" process (governed by a set of 
constitutional principles) to straighten out the relationship between 
the state and local governments. This process must be an open 
one-involving the governor, legislature, local governments, public 
and private organizations involved in providing public services, and 
the people who use the services. Additionally, this process must be 
continuous. As noted in the budget section, the review and update of 
the state strategic plan that occurs every four years must include a 
review of the state-local relationship to keep it current with state and 
local needs and changing conditions. 
• The most difficult 
relationship is the one 
between the state and 
counties. The counties 
play two roles: first, they 
are agents of the state 
for state programs; 
second, they are local 
agencies. 
What Change is 
Needed? 
• The governor and the 
legislature must develop 
and adopt a state-local 
realignment plan. 
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What Does the 
Commission 
Recommend? 
32. Develop and adopt a 
state-local realignment 
plan. 
The governor would be 
required to submit a 
State-Local Realignment 
Plan proposing the align-
ment of state and local 
services. A plan must be 
adopted by the legislature. 
Following adoption, the 
plan would be incorporated 
into the state's Strategic 
Plan which would be 
submitted by the governor 
and adopted by the 
legislature. The Strategic 
Plan and the state-local 
relationship would be 
reviewed and updated at 
least every four years. 
As noted above, shared services have been financed by both state 
and county governments under the assumption that there was a 
local component to a particular activity and that the level of local 
financial responsibility was generally provided by statute. 
Throughout most of the state's history, counties had sufficient 
resources to participate in shared programs. Limitations on local 
resources and the advent of "maintenance-of-effort" requirements 
(where the state requires a particular level of local financial 
contribution) for shared services has blurred the distinction between 
a shared service and a locally-administered state program. This has 
meant that a local agency, usually a county, must use the tax base 
intended to support local services to fund programs over which the 
county may have limited programmatic or operational control. 
The constitution is not the place to tightly define the duties and 
obligations of each level of government. Shared program 
responsibilities will vary over time, and state and local governments 
must have the flexibility to change them. However, the Commission 
determined that rules for the relationship between state and local 
governments should be spelled out. The legislature and the governor 
have a basic responsibility to develop a system for providing state 
services that are locally-administered. Finding the right mix of 
program responsibilities and financing for shared programs is 
essential to straightening out the state-local relationship. 
The realignment plan should provide for the assignment of program 
responsibilities at the state and local levels. To assist in developing 
the plan, the governor should establish an advisory committee 
comprised of local representatives. Local officials working on the 
development of community charters should also be involved in 
developing the realignment plan. The objectives of the State-Local 
Realignment Plan are as follows: 
• Ensure that the roles and responsibilities for providing services 
and exercising regulatory authority are clear. 
• Ensure that the entity responsible for a service or regulation has 
the resources to finance it. 
• Ensure that the entity assigned to conduct an activity has the 
ability to organize and administer the activity. 
• Ensure that program responsibilities that are shared between 
state and local agencies are identified and that local 
administrative flexibility is given priority over state 
administration. 
The State-Local Realignment Plan should provide assignment of 
responsibilities for program policy authority, administration, and 
finance. Each program category (e.g., health, welfare, criminal justice, 
judiciary, transportation, and environmental regulation) should be 
defined as having one of the following categories of responsibility: 
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• State Responsibility: This includes programs where the role of 
the state is policymaking, standards-setting, administrative, and 
financial. Examples of current programs include higher 
education, vehicle registration, and environmental regulation. 
• Shared Responsibility: This includes programs where state ;md 
local agencies share policymaking, administration, and 
financing. Also included are programs for which the state sets 
standards, (such as maintenance-of-effort requirements) for a 
specific level of local financial involvement. Examples of current 
programs include mental health and transportation. 
• State Responsibility-Locally Administered: This includes 
programs where a local agency-usually a county-is acting as 
an agent of the state or on behalf of the state. Current programs 
include-but are not limited to-indigent health care, general 
assistance, and the judicial system. 
• Local Responsibility: This includes programs where a local 
agency has the responsibility, authority, and financial control for 
a program. Current programs include law enforcement, 
libraries, recreation and cultural activities, and other traditional 
municipal services such as utilities. 
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V. Strengthening Local Government: 
Clarifying Roles, Enhancing Collaboration 
and Strengthening Home Rule 
Within California, a fragmented and confusing array of local agencies provide a myriad of services. 
There are few incentives for collaboration. Recognizing that resources for local services remain 
limited, California needs to review and revise its local governments to make them more efficient and 
effective while reconnecting them with the people they serve. 
In evaluating local government roles, the Commission identified 
two key problems. First, the organization and provision of local 
government services is far too complex. On the local level, there are 
a multitude of governmental agencies providing services and 
regulatory activities. As is the case with state-local responsibilities, 
the confusing array of local government entities makes it difficult for 
citizens to understand which agency is responsible for providing a 
particular service and whom they should hold accountable. 
Additionally, with so many local entities involved in providing 
government services, redundancies often exist. A service may be 
provided on an areawide basis by one agency, while a similar service 
is also provided locally within each community. For example, in 
many areas of the state, both municipal water agencies and 
independent water districts exist side-by-side servicing the same 
urban area with an arbitrary boundary separating them. Other 
examples of overlap include fire, library, and park and recreation 
services. Such overlap often is inefficient and results in greater costs 
to taxpayers. 
California has 7,000 local government agencies, including counties, 
cities, special districts, and school districts. California voters elect 
about 15,000 people to oversee these governmental agencies. Many 
of these entities have overlapping-if not conflicting-duties and 
responsibilities. The fabric that makes up the quilt of California's 
local government and education system includes: 
• 470 cities that are general purpose governments providing 
municipal services. 
• 58 counties providing municipal services to unincorporated 
areas, countywide services, and selected areawide services 
primarily as agents of the state. 
What is the Problem? 
• Local government has 
become far too complex. 
There are 7,000 units 
overseen by over 15,000 
elected officials. 
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• The power to make 
decisions about local 
problems has been 
eroded over the last 
20 years. 
• 5,000 special districts. These entities provide specific services 
within a county or across several counties. There are about 55 
types of activities performed by special districts ranging from 
operating airports to managing zoos. Approximately 2,200 are 
"independent" districts. That is, they have elected or appointed 
boards and are independent of the cities or counties in which 
they provide services. 
• 1,062 school districts and county offices of education. 
• 70 community college districts. 
The Commission concluded that the current structure of local 
government is confusing and fragmented. The problem is more than 
one of numbers. Within most counties, whether urban or rurat 
observers will find a multitude of agencies with separate boards 
operating programs and providing services. It is hard to accept that 
services provided through this structure are cost-effective. Although 
many opportunities exist for collaboration among local governments, 
long-established parochial interests or institutional rigidity prevent 
such activity. Additionally, it is often difficult for citizens to gather or 
make sense of information about the cost of local services. It is 
difficult, if not impossible to find understandable fiscal information 
about the cost of services from local agencies with responsibilities 
that overlap. Clarity in the local budgeting and taxation process 
could improve accountability and better connect citizens and their 
local governments. These problems exist within the context of an 
increasing state population and the limited availability of resources 
to meet people's needs. State and local governments must develop 
more efficient and effective ways of meeting public needs using 
existing resources. 
The second problem identified by the Commission is that the power 
of local governments and schools to make choices about the level 
and quality of local services has eroded over the last 20 years. 
California has lost its long tradition of home rule. The home rule 
tradition involves the ability of a community to adopt a home rule 
charter. There are two aspects to this authority. The first is the power 
to exercise all authority with respect to local matters, without being 
granted such authority by state law. Thus local entities with home 
rule authority start out with broad powers over local matters, which 
are then subject to self-imposed limits as provided in their charters. 
The second element of home rule authority concerns the resolution 
of conflicts between state and local laws. Charter cities, which have 
home rule authority, may enact laws that are inconsistent with state 
law with respect to "municipal affairs." In other words, subject to 
any restrictions local citizens placed in their charter, these entities 
and their citizens have plenary authority over matters of local 
concern. 
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Currently, there is no clear dividing line for activities that constitute 
a "municipal affair" or activities that are of statewide concern. The 
courts have been the arbiters of disputes between the exercise of 
local and state power. However, they have no standard or 
constitutional principle to help resolve such disputes but have been 
left to drift in a sea of "ad hoc intuition informed by pragmatic 
common sense." 32 
Clearly, there is a need to reevaluate our local governments. The 
Commission examined several models for local government 
organization. One model provided that the municipal services 
function of counties be eliminated and that counties act only as 
agents of the state. Under this plan, all local services would be 
delivered by cities. A second model called for the elimination of 
counties as agents of the state and required the state to determine 
how locally-administered state programs would be handled. The 
Commission concluded that the diversity of California's regions 
makes it impossible for any uniform approach to local governance to 
be responsive to the needs of every area. The solutions that work in 
a rural, sparsely populated area may not be effective in an urban, 
more densely populated area. Local areas are best suited to 
determine the most efficient and effective way to serve local needs. 
Consequently, the Commission believes that the best solution is a 
flexible approach that allows communities to adapt government 
structures to their own needs and desired level of public services. 
In conjunction with realigning the state-local relationship and 
providing local entities with more responsibilities, the entities within 
each county or multi-county area should reevaluate their 
organization and functions to ensure that local services are being 
provided in an effective and efficient manner. In conducting this 
evaluation, consideration should be given to which services are 
areawide in nature and which are more local (community-based). 
Wherever possible, duplication of responsibilities among local 
entities, including cities, counties, special districts, and schools, 
should be eliminated. To the extent that responsibilities are to be 
shared, each entity's responsibilities should be clearly known. This 
will also provide an opportunity to increase collaboration between 
governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in 
providing public services. Finally, once the citizens of a community 
evaluate, reconnect, and reorganize their governments, their ability 
to control local affairs should be strengthened. 
What Change is 
Needed? 
• Local comunities should 
review their govern-
mental structures and 
develop local govern-
ment service plans. 
• Local communities 
should be given more 
control over locally 
levied taxes including 
the property tax. 
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What Does the 
Commission 
Recommend? 
33. Evaluate local govern-
ment structures and 
develop a community 
charter. 
The local government 
agencies within each 
county (or multi-county 
area) would be required to 
initiate a process to 
examine their current 
governance structure, 
methods of service deliv-
ery, and assignment of 
responsibilities and 
powers. From this exami-
nation, each area would 
develop a local Govern-
ment Services Plan. 
Following the development 
of the local Government 
Services Plan, each local 
area would develop a 
"Home Rule Community 
Charter" to implement the 
local Government Serv-
ices Plan. The charter 
would be placed before the 
voters in each area for 
approval. 
As mentioned previously, over the past two decades, local control 
over service delivery and financing has eroded. The weakening of 
the local revenue base has transferred program regulatory and fiscal 
responsibilities from local communities to the state. This is 
particularly true for counties. A key goal of the Commission is to 
move authority for program administration and service delivery 
back to the local level. The Commission believes that local 
governments are best suited to respond to local needs and to 
organize service delivery in an efficient manner. In conjunction with 
being given more responsibility, local governments must reevaluate 
the ways in which they provide such services and ensure clarity as 
to which local entity is accountable for providing a service. 
Although improving service delivery and clarifying accountability 
are important objectives, constitutional barriers and the lack of 
tangible incentives have discouraged, if not prevented, local 
governments from initiating reform efforts. The state constitution 
imposes a number of barriers to reform, including: 1) local 
governments have no control over the allocation of property taxes 
raised in their communities-the constitution requires the state to 
allocate these revenue; and, 2) the constitution makes it difficult for 
local entities to work collaboratively by prohibiting the pooling of 
resources to address problems that overlap jurisdictions. 
Clearly, a constitutionally mandated reform effort is needed, and the 
barriers to reform must be removed. Meaningful incentives must be 
provided to encourage the adoption of bold and innovative 
approaches to addressing community problems and improving 
government efficiency, accountability, and service delivery. Change 
must be initiated and evaluated at all levels of government, and 
proposals for local change must be submitted to local voters. As 
noted earlier, since the diversity of California's regions makes it 
difficult for a uniform approach to local governance to be responsive 
to each area's needs, the flexible approach proposed by the 
Commission allows local governments to adapt their structure to the 
needs of their communities. 
The Commission notes that this recommendation does not require 
local areas to change their current governance structure. The 
recommendation does require citizens within each county to 
undertake the evaluation. If it is determined, upon completion of the 
evaluation, that existing government structures and entities are 
meeting current needs, a Community Charter could be established 
that leaves those structures unchanged. The steps involved in this 
recommendation are as follows: 
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Each county (or multi-county area) would establish an appointed 
body known as the Citizens Charter Commission on Local 
Government Efficiency and Restructuring (CCC). The procedures for 
establishing the CCC would be slightly different for single-county 
and multi-county CCCs. Appointments would be made by elected 
officials from the county(ies), cities, school districts, and special 
districts. Further, each "type" of local government would be 
represented on the CCC, and each CCC would be required to reflect 
the diversity present within the community. The standard statutory 
selection process would be used for the appointments. The work of 
each CCC for preparing the Government Services Plan and the 
proposed Community Charter would be financed equally by the 
state and local entities. Each Charter Commission would allocate a 
proportionate share of the local financial obligation among the local 
entities. 
Single-County Commission: A single-county CCC would be 
comprised of at least 15 members, consisting of both 
non-government participants (majority) and government officials. 
Once formed, each CCC could appoint any number of additional 
members, but the majority of members would have to remain 
non-government officials. For single-county commissions, 
appointment to the 15-member CCC would be apportioned as 
follows: 
Non-
Govern- Govern-
Appointing ment ment 
Authority Officials Officials Total 
County Board of 
Supervisors 3 2 5 
City Councils 3 3 6 
School Boards 1 1 2 
Special District Boards 1 1 2 
8 7 15 
Multi-County Commission: With the passage of concurring 
resolutions by each county, a multi-county CCC may be formed to 
develop an areawide Government Services Plan and a Community 
Charter to be voted on by the people. For multi-county commissions, 
apportionment will be twice the numbers indicated in the above 
chart. 
Establishing the Citizens 
Charter Commission 
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• Allocating local service and regulatory re~m<Jmntl 
plan must designate local agency is ""'"'"'"''"'"' 
the delivery of services, the governing structure responsible for 
the services, and the financing of the services. The plan must 
also designate which entities are responsible for comprehensive 
planning, as well as functional planning, and the exercise of 
land use controls. The entities assigned the function of 
regulating land use will be responsible for simplifying and 
streamlining the existing land use regulatory process. 
As part of the allocation of service responsibilities, a process for 
developing, adopting, and updating a comprehensive multi-year 
capital outlay plan will be included. The Local Government 
Services Plan would identify all of the agencies responsible for 
capital facility planning, financing, and operation. The objective 
of this requirement is to improve the coordination and efficiency 
of capital facility programming in order to meet the needs of 
growing communities. General obligation bonds used to finance 
any project that is consistent with the plan will require a 
majority vote of the voters. 
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particular note 
in construct the state's local 
Since 1896, the constitution has included the power of rr.,-nn"'' 
to adopt charters which provide the rules governing local 
activities. As discussed in the recommendations regarding the 
rule power, the Commission concluded that there was a need to 
strengthen this provision as well as to recognize the special status of 
the 89 charter cities. The Commission determined that a home rule 
community charter could not interfere with or abrogate the authority 
of a charter city. 
Additionally, a state technical advisory group should be established 
by statute to provide technical assistance and to monitor the progress 
of the local charter commissions. This activity would also be useful 
in providing a link between the local charter commissions and the 
state-local realignment process. The technical advisory group would 
go out of existence following action by the local electorate. 
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34. Protect locally levied 
taxes and provide for a 
majority vote on local 
taxes and bond 
measures. 
The constitution should 
protect the property tax 
and other local taxes from 
state reallocation. Addition-
ally, increases in local 
taxes, except the property 
tax, should be subject to a 
majority vote of the 
governing board and the 
voters. A higher popular 
vote requirement may be 
included in the home rule 
community charter. 
Allocation of the property tax 
Allocation of the local 
sales tax 
Allocation of the vehicle 
license in-lieu fee 
One of the objectives of the Commission is to enhance local control 
and ensure that local taxes are maintained and protected for 
providing local services. Additionally, the Commission examined the 
current method of levying the local sales tax and found that it had 
an adverse effect on development patterns. Often described as the 
"fiscalization of land use," local zoning decisions are made based on 
the amount of sales tax that will be generated, rather than 
consistency with overall growth and development polices of the 
community. In order to accomplish these objectives-protect local 
taxes for local purposes and reduce the fiscal pressure on land use 
decisions-the Commission makes the recommendations described 
below: 
The non-school share of the property tax would be allocated by the 
charter. The state would be prohibited from redistributing this 
portion of the tax. The distribution of the local government share of 
the property tax would no longer be determined by state law, it 
would be determined by the local Community Charter. 
The general purpose locally levied 1% sales tax could be allocated by 
the Community Charter. The area covered by the sales tax would be 
determined in the charter. For example, a countywide charter may 
have sub-county components with the sales tax allocated to local 
governments within their respective areas. The objective of this 
recommendation is to reduce the fiscal influence of land use 
decisions. Currently there is extensive competition among cities for 
the location of retail outlets. Since the sales tax is levied on 
transactions that are not sensitive to the political boundaries of a city, 
it would make sense to allow the distribution of the sales tax to be 
based on a larger area covering more economic activity. 
At one time automobiles were subject to property tax. When the state 
repealed the tax it was repealing a local revenue. An "in-lieu" fee 
was established in the place of the property tax. About $3 billion 
goes to local government on a per capita basis. The allocation of 
these resources could also be part of the home rule charter process. 
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Proposition 13 attempted to distinguish between special taxes-those Local tax authority and the 
taxes levied on specific activities and other taxes. After 18 years of vote requirement 
initiative measures and endless court battles, the distinctions 
between "special" and other kinds of taxes remains muddled. The 
Commission concluded that voters should play an active role in 
issues dealing with local taxation. In order to simplify the process, 
the Commission chose to require that local taxes-either special or 
general-be subject to a majority vote of the governing body 
proposing the tax and the voters unless the home rule charter 
contained a higher threshold. This provision will allow the charter 
development process to determine not only the organization of 
services but also the vote requirements in excess of a majority vote. 
The Commission concluded that approval of local taxes by a 
majority the voters should be the rule unless the Community Charter 
provides for a higher vote requirement. The restrictions on the 
property tax contained in Proposition 13 would remain. 
Those specific local taxes could be included in the charter and the 
voters could adopt them as part of the adoption of the Community 
Charter. Some local taxes could be countywide, while others could 
be sub-county or community-based. The voters will have the 
opportunity to connect the governmental agency providing the 
service with the taxes levied to provide those services. 
The need for local control was reflected in the provisions of the 1879 
constitution which granted certain home rule authority to cities and 
to a limited extent to counties. Under Article XI and subsequent 
amendments, cities were authorized to enact local regulations that 
did not conflict with the general laws of the state and to engage in 
utility activities to provide services to their people. The legislature 
was prohibited from levying a state tax for a local purpose. Charter 
cities were granted protection from legislative interference in 
municipal affairs. 
The Commission's goal in strengthening home rule authority is to 
eliminate the confusion over matters in which charter cities and state 
interests might conflict. By strengthening home rule and more clearly 
defining its parameters, such conflicts should be minimized. 
Moreover, by extending home rule authority to agencies 
participating in a Home Rule Community Charter, the Commission 
is offering a meaningful incentive. 
35. Strengthening the 
home rule provision. 
The Commission recom-
mends that California's 
longstanding tradition of 
home rule be strengthened 
and provide a constitu-
tional standard for balanc-
ing of state vs. local 
interest. 
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The Commission proposes an approach in which charter entities will 
prevail over a state law unless one of the following conditions exists: 
• The local action has significant extraterritorial effects. The 
action of the local agency would affect the health, operation, or 
behavior of people, businesses, or governments outside the 
boundaries of the area covered by the charter or the action's 
primary purpose is to regulate activities outside the charter's 
boundary. 
• The need for statewide uniformity overwhelms local 
differences. In this case the policy interest in statewide 
uniformity outweighs a predisposition toward local control. For 
example the lack of uniformity might present substantial 
obstacles to travel, to the ordinary conduct of business in the 
state, or to the advancement of an important state policy that 
requires such uniformity. General laws relating to the state's 
health environmental, transportation social service and judicial 
systems that are matters of statewide concern and are not the 
purview of a local charter except to the extent that the state 
gave the charter the authority to act. 
One of the Commission's objectives is to provide additional 
incentives for local agencies to participate in the Community Charter. 
The ability to adopt local programs without state interference is one 
of those incentives. The purpose of the charter is to provide for a 
new governance document for defining the organization and powers 
of local agencies. The Commission's recommendation strengthens 
local government authority over issues that have been viewed as 
"municipal affairs," and provides a constitutional standard for 
balancing the interests of the state and local communities. 
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VI. Opposing Views 
A Difference of Principle: The Minority Report of the 
California Constitution Revision Commission 
Executive Summary 
The undersigned authors of this report register their opposition to the recommendations of the 
California Constitution Revision Commission. 
We oppose the report on many specific grounds: it opens, for example, wide breaches in Proposition 
13; it compromises the voters recent choices on term limits; it does nothing significant to restore the 
autonomy in local matters of local institutions; it provides hardly any increases in accountability of 
the government to the people, but more accountability of lower governments to higher; it increases 
control of elected officials over initiatives; it rejects a major proposal to defend the individual from 
invasion of his rights by government. 
We think, moreover, that the specific failures in the proposal are not accidental. They stem from 
principles that are already breaking down the constitutional limits on government. This report, if 
adopted, will hasten that process. 
After 24 months of patient and diligent work, the California 
Constitution Revision Commission has produced a document. It 
is a faithful effort by people of good will. The nature of its product 
speaks volumes about the age in which we live and the barriers to 
sound constitutional thinking within it. 
The art of making written constitutions was born and taken to its 
highest state of perfection here in this country. The framers of the 
first written constitutions-those of the United States of America and 
each of its constituent states built their work upon a consensus that 
does not exist today. 
The consensus among the Framers concerned the principles, the first 
things, of government. They agreed that government has but one 
legitimate purpose: to secure the rights of its citizens. They agreed 
that those rights are derived from the principles of human nature 
and that human nature (being a nature) does not change over time 
or from place to place. They agreed that the need for government is 
written in the failings and the unique capacities natural to man. 
Government is necessary because it enables us to secure our rights 
from deprivation by one another. "One another" includes all of our 
fellow citizens, not least the special case of those both elected and 
un-elected who staff the government. "It is of great importance in a 
republic," wrote Madison, "not only to guard the society against the 
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against 
the injustice of the other part." 1 
1 Federalist 51. 
Framers, Then 
and Now 
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The Framers were agreed on the character of these fundamental 
rights. In the Declaration of Independence they are listed as "life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; in the contemporaneous 
Virginia Bill of Rights, as "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the 
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and 
obtaining happiness and safety." 2 The Bill of Rights in the United 
States Constitution provides a more detailed list of rights, each 
fitting within the basic declarations of right that gave rise to the 
Revolution and stated its aims. That list includes the right to 
property, in roughly the form in which it occurs in the Virginia and 
Massachusetts bills of rights. 
We modern "framers" who sit upon the CCRC are not agreed about 
the first principles of government. One of our witnesses, called to 
help defeat a proposal that touched most directly upon them, stated 
that the Declaration of Independence was written so as to demote 
the idea of property rights from the understanding of it in John 
Locke. This was part of an argument he was building that the 
purpose of government is to "adjust clashing interests" in society. It 
is a gross error to say either that the authors of the Declaration were 
attempting merely to state the opinions of John Locke, or that they 
meant to demote the right to property below that of any other right, 
including freedom of speech, of worship, or of the press. To the 
Founders, as we shall argue below, the right to property is as 
fundamental as any right. 
The witness told us less than nothing about the opinions of those 
who wrote the most successful constitution. He told us volumes 
about opinion today, of which the recommendations made by this 
Commission are for the most part a fine reflection. In the 
contemporary understanding, government is conceived as a vast 
engineering scheme. It is managed by a professional class of social 
engineers. Their job is to guide society according to a uniform and 
comprehensive plan, made upon a national scale, conformed and 
applied down to each locality, revised and reapplied continuously, in 
an ongoing and evolutionary process. That is why when we use the 
expression "accountability" in our recommendations, we mean 
generally government professionals at one level, reporting to their 
counterparts at another. 
The Commission was charged to make rational the hopelessly 
tangled relations between state and local government. We have 
adopted measures that give local government wider scope, but only 
at the expense of private citizens through new tax powers and 
legislative authority. No co-opted authority, no pilfered revenue 
stream, is returned from state government to local. On the contrary, 
2 Adopted June 12, 1776; the Massachusetts Bill of Rights of 1780 includes the expression the right of 
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; 
in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. 
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state government is given new responsibility to rank and rate the 
performance of local government according to comprehensive 
criteria. Our recommendations continue and accelerate the 
movement to make local government-which remained well into this 
century the primary and largest agency of government in 
America-into subservient local administrative units. 
The specific recommendations of the Commission do not all fit into 
this theme. Several, concentrated especially in the executive branch, 
are salutary and we support them. But the thrust and meaning of the 
Commission recommendations is plainly as we have stated it above. 
We proceed then to an examination of the recommendations. 
We begin with the section of the Commission recommendations in 
which there are substantial items to praise. 
The proposal to reduce the number of statewide elective offices 
follows the thinking of the Federalist that unity in the executive is the 
best means to secure both energy and accountability. By making 
these offices appointive and under the direct supervision of the 
executive, policy-making becomes more streamlined and consistent, 
and the people know better whom to blame. 
The recommendation to combine the Franchise Tax Board and the 
Board of Equalization into a single agency is also good, but carried 
off badly in an important detail. Two taxing agencies waste money, 
duplicate one another, and dissipate accountability. The new agency 
would be run by a director, appointed by the governor, which is fine. 
But the tax appeals board would also be appointed by this same 
process, which makes it vulnerable to political pressure to get money 
for the state. Woe to the taxpayer who goes before this board when 
the governor and the legislature are scrambling to make up a deficit. 
Many of us also think that the consolidation of executive agencies 
goes too far when it includes the Treasurer, who has fiduciary 
responsibilities that might conflict with the political interest of a 
governor. 
We do little good and much mischief with the recommendations 
concerning the legislative branch. In particular: 
• The Commission proposes to have initiatives that amend the 
Constitution confined to the November general election ballot, 
but initiatives generated in the legislature are exempted. We see 
no reason for the exemption of the legislature from this 
restriction, except to give their proposals-and not those of 
private citizens-whatever political advantage is available on 
Executive Branch 
Legislative Functions 
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the primary ballot. Anyway, the restriction of initiatives 
proposed by private citizens to the November ballot will only 
make that ballot longer than it is now. This will make it yet 
more difficult for voters to analyze the many proposals before 
them. 
• The Commission proposes that any statutory initiative may be 
amended or repealed by the legislature after six years, provided 
the legislature passes the amendment by a two-thirds vote. It 
may amend or repeal younger statutory initiatives with the 
agreement of the people. Citizens who take the trouble to 
propose initiatives will not likely look forward to having their 
proposals altered by the legislature. This gives them a new 
motive to propose constitutional, rather than statutory, 
amendments. The likely result of this Commission proposal is 
therefore to complicate a document we are trying to simplify. In 
a similar vein, the Commission proposes that the legislature, via 
a special committee, be empowered to amend initiatives that 
have qualified for the ballot before they are voted upon by 
people. Some of us have grave reservations about allowing the 
legislature this avenue to enter the initiative process. 
• We agree warmly with the proposal to restrict the legislature to 
a session of six months per year.3 The old joke that the liberties 
of the people are not safe when the legislature is in session has 
an element of truth in it. Excessive time is a temptation to 
exceed the purview of the legislative office. Shorter sessions 
would provide an inducement to focus upon essentials. Four 
thousand bills a year is too many to write with any care, too 
many to read with any comprehension, too many to argue with 
any penetration-too many, in short, to be good. 
• Some of us argue with the proposal that the legislature should 
veto regulations produced in the executive branch. They argue 
upon constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court has found that 
such oversight at the federal level constitutes a diminishment of 
and interference with the executive power. By blurring the 
distinction between execution and making of the law it 
concentrates power in the legislature. On the other hand, some 
of us argue that the proposal is good, given the fact that the 
administrative agencies sprawl across and penetrate deeply into 
every part of society. No executive can alone monitor their 
activities. Some elected official, who after all owes his office to 
3 Tom McClintock, who gave excellent testimony to the Commission, makes the point that legislators 
should also be paid only half as much as currently, if they serve only half the time. Otherwise they will 
spend the six out-of-session months making political hay in some other way. 
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the regular approval of the people (who after all are still regarded 
in some quarters as sovereign) should watch what these agencies 
do. Let the legislature help. We should say here all together that 
above this disagreement is a deeper agreement that the 
administrative state must be curtailed. See our section below on the 
proposal regarding property rights. 
• The Commission proposes a series of reforms to the budget 
process. Several of these are admirable, including measures to 
increase the state reserve and to make firmer the existing 
requirement that the budget be balanced-a constraint honored 
as often in the breach as the observance. At the same time, these 
recommendations are at least partially offset by the movement 
to a two-year budget cycle. The Commission was informed of 
research showing larger spending for states with two-year 
cycles. This is no accident. Balancing a budget requires 
forecasting both revenue and expenditures, and both are tricky. 
Government habitually predicts more sunshine than appears, 
more revenue and less expenditure than is actually received and 
incurred. This permits more spending. In a two-year cycle, 
reality takes longer to impose its constraints. 
• The Commission proposal to include legislators in the public 
employees retirement system creates a conflict of interest. Public 
officers can judge better, when they are not judges in their own 
cause. Public employees are generally higher-paid and receive 
better benefits including pensions than private workers. Under 
this proposal, legislators will now vote upon their own pensions 
at the same time they vote upon those of this large and highly 
paid class. 
• Term Limits. We close this section with one of the Commission's 
two most spectacular offenses against the public will. The 
Commission proposes to double the terms of members of the 
Assembly and increase those of senators by 50%. This equalizes 
the terms in the two houses, and it eliminates thereby the 
difference of perspective aimed for in devising longer terms for 
the higher body. It alters a recent proposition approved by the 
voters (Proposition 140), the effect of which has not yet been 
fully realized. It constitutes, whether intended or not, a rank 
appeal to members of the legislature to vote for the whole 
constitutional revision package, because it gives them a thing 
for which they dare not ask directly, a thing that must be the 
heart's desire of many or most of them, a thing that comes 
conveniently concealed in a larger package of changes to the 
constitution. One need not agree with the often repeated 
arguments in favor of term limits to see the brazen quality of 
this recommendation. 
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When we reach education and local government, we reach places 
where administrative power is concentrated, where vast sums of 
public money are invested, where interests both private and public 
abound. We reach, in short, the essence of modern government. The 
Commission report is in these areas complex, like the phenomenon it 
would alter. Here the jargon of government in the administrative age 
is rampant. Here most egregiously we say one thing and mean 
another. Consider first education, the domain of the strongest forces 
in California government and politics. 
The Commission has set out to make education less centralized, but 
it cannot prosecute this mission with an undivided soul. Many 
members of the Commission believe that "the state has a 
fundamental interest in education." Notice the language. The state, 
not the people, has an "interest." This "interest" is apparently not an 
"authority," such as might be delegated from the people. Would the 
state have that interest apart from some interest of the people, or in 
opposition to their interests? 
The members making this point do not seem to have meant the 
"state" in the sense of "the people acting together." For they held 
that the "state" that has this "interest" must be able to protect that 
interest against any local body that might have authority in 
education. Under the theory of government to which we in this 
minority adhere, public bodies do not have "interests." They have 
authority, and that only to the extent delegated from the people. If 
one public body has a conflict of authority with another, they must 
settle it according to the documents by which the people have 
delegated authority to each of them. As our Commission is charged 
to revise the most important document making these delegations of 
authority (which the people would have then to approve by a 
constitutional procedure), we were unable to see how any 
"fundamental interest" of the "state" could rightly stand in our way. 
After a little discussion of the meaning of these terms, members of 
the Commission preferred to go on to other work. We adopted a 
plan that itself reveals the deeper principles upon which we were 
operating. 
Two points are central, each having to do with who would gain and 
who would lose power. First, we give broader authority to local 
school boards to make rules. At the same time we qualify this 
expanded authority in decisive ways. First, we take no money from 
the state authority and give it to local authority. Similarly we rescind 
no state rule or power, nor contemplate that any shall be rescinded 
later. Instead, we place a requirement upon the state that it adopt 
wider performance standards against which to measure local 
districts. 
This complex of recommendations has several implications. To start 
with, it means that local school boards can have more power only by 
--------------------------------A 
making more rules, new rules beyond those that the state has made, 
most likely in areas where the state has not legislated. Perhaps the 
whole problem has been not enough rules. If so, our 
recommendations will help solve it, and our children will soon be 
learning at a gallop. If more rules is not the answer, then we may not 
get that wonderful performance for which we hope. 
The state itself will also be making more rules. One section of the 
education recommendations is headed "Accountability in 
Education." Recall that "accountability" is an important word to this 
Commission. In this section local school boards are given power to 
make rules that do not conflict with existing state law. At the same 
time, the state is required to adopt an "accountability system . . . 
limited to education content, pupil performance, and financial and 
managerial responsibilities." 
Limited to? The state will set standards in the strictly confined area 
of what the children study, how their performance is measured, and 
all the money dealings of the school. If the state should choose to 
make use of this new power-if it should behave as it has 
systematically behaved for more than a generation-the way is open. 
The ratings will come out, and some school districts will fall short. 
Journalists will bemoan the fact that nothing can be done by the state 
to bring those districts into line. Few will remember that the children 
in question are raised by fathers and mothers, and taught by 
teachers, who are much nearer the children than the officials of the 
state. These parents and teachers may even care for the children 
more than remote officials who do not know their names. If schools 
fail to meet these new standards, whatever their quality or 
applicability to the local district, they will be labeled across the state 
as "bad" districts. Pressure will grow to make them conform to the 
mold. 
As a solace to local boards, and as a complement to their new 
rulemaking authority, they are given a handsome present: new tax 
powers. Here is the first of several major breaches to Proposition 13 
that the Commission recommends. The Commission would cripple 
Proposition 13 by altering two of its basic principles: the 1% property 
tax rate limit could be broken for schools with a two-thirds vote of 
the people; and the provision requiring a two-thirds vote for special 
taxes would fall to a majority vote on sales taxes for school financing 
within a county. 
We have many objections to these proposals. Whatever is wrong 
with education, restrictions on government taxing authority cannot 
be at fault. Our Commission makes its recommendations after a 
generation of unprecedented government growth, a growth that now 
reviles all but the most partisan enthusiasts for public 
administration. This growth affects every level of government down 
to the local, which in California, under Proposition 13, has kept pace 
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in spending with state and federal government since the passage of 
Proposition 13 in 1978. 
The expansion of power to raise ad valorem taxes will be a massive 
source of new revenue. The lifting of restrictions against speciaL taxes 
will give rise to new assaults upon the taxpayer in the name of any 
and every popular cause. If crime rates soar, taxes for law 
enforcement will flourish. If highways clog, if drugs are rampant, if 
garbage piles up to the rooftops-every urgent public need will 
provide the occasion for another special tax. 
If more taxes were the answer for our children, we would already be 
raising up a generation of Solomons, and these recommendations 
would be redundant. If we wish to liberate local districts and local 
people to manage education, we will have to place the means in 
their hands and let them use those means. We will not be able to 
perpetuate central bureaucracies, with interests of their own, with 
power to oversee and to have the final say. 
The recommendations concerning local government are parallel to 
those in education. Once again we set up a presumption that the 
local agency may make a law where none has been made before. 
Once again we return no centralized authority to local hands. Once 
again we allow the state to keep the revenue at its command.4 Once 
again we allow expanded scope for local authority only in areas now 
controlled by private citizens. 
We do, in certain ways, allow for some form of real devolution later 
on, but this is a weak reed. The Commission recommendations 
require the governor to propose a state/local realignment plan and 
to submit it to the legislature. In other words, we propose that the 
political powers of some future day deliberate whether to upset the 
arrangements of that day, which will have been solidly planted by 
past practice, and which will be defended by the legions who have 
an interest in them. We command the politicians of the future to fix 
the problems we have not the stomach to tackle-and we then take 
credit for what we expect them to do. 
The detailed and complicated provisions regarding "Community 
Charter Commissions" have many features to which we object. First, 
the Commission places its faith in the mere process of planning. If 
only local governments would plan ahead better, we could make 
4 The nearest thing to a restriction on state revenue power in this section is a provision that the state cannot 
reallocate the non-school share of the property tax, or other general purpose local taxes, in localities where 
a home rule charter is made. That would hamper future predations by the state upon local trea suries. It 
does not alter the massive fact that localities spend huge sums, at some levels the vast majority of their 
budgets, in just the way the state and federal governments demand. The mandates from above and the 
revenue streams from above often do not match. 
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progress. We therefore compel every local government to form a 
Commission to deliberate whether to make a new charter, and to 
make one if they think it a good idea. To make sure they proceed, 
plenty of people are on board who would likely want a new charter: 
the Commission in each locality is to include members who are 
public officials, offset by a slight majority who are picked by public 
officials. This, the Commission pretends, will ensure that private 
citizens will dominate the charter commissions. Some commissioners 
even argued in open session that there were too few government 
officials on the proposed revision commissions! 
Once formed and working, these commissions will have power to 
eliminate the two-thirds majority requirement for a tax increase. 
Here, as in education, new taxing powers complement new power to 
make law where no law has been made. This is the second major 
breach of Proposition 13. For any community that makes a charter, 
this is a breach wide enough to accommodate an entire fleet of city 
vehicles. 
The Commission also proposes that the current two-thirds vote for 
passage of local general obligation bonds be lowered to a simple 
majority. This provision has been in the state constitution since 1879. 
Over that time, which included two world wars, a depression, and 
the incredible growth of the post-World War II period, this great 
state has flourished under the law requiring a two-thirds vote for 
local general obligation bonds. Also, about half of the bonds for 
schools have passed under the two-thirds requirement. 
Despite the fact that they often vote for the bonds, the people of 
California support the two-thirds majority requirement for local 
bonds. When an attempt to lower the two-thirds majority for school 
bonds was on the ballot as Proposition 170 in 1993, it was defeated 
by nearly 70% of the voters. An attempt to lower the two-thirds vote 
requirement for bonds to a three-fifths vote in 1966 for schools and 
libraries was also defeated. They understand that bonds must be 
repaid, repaid with taxes, taxes that must continue for the years or 
decades for which the bonds are issued. 
One of the hallmarks of successful government in America has been 
the primacy and preponderance of local institutions. This success 
was built upon local discretion in all matters administrative, and 
upon local responsibility for funding local matters. No state 
mandates encouraged local spending and taxing. Restraint a.J!d 
economy, built upon voluntary labor and local responsibility, were 
the rule. This gave rise to a wonderfully various and adaptable 
system. It was a marvel. We have lost it. Our Commission does 
nothing to restore it, except to rationalize the top-down system, to 
urge more consolidation locally, to give local government more 
power to be the tax collector for the state. More of the same. 
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The unpopularity of government in America dates back about 30 
years, to the time of its transformation. As it has grown in relation to 
the rest of society, as it has become more centralized and less 
responsive to the public will, people have come to resent it. Today, 
government and most of its activities are held in slight regard. At the 
same time, each of its major programs has its constituents who are 
deeply attached and will fight to preserve their own foothold in 
power. As a group, the people would restrain and even contract the 
power of government; at the same time each particular policy has its 
constituency. Divided by this paradox, the people are unable to act. 
Meanwhile government grows, and no force can stand in its way. 
If the people are to retain control of this formidable engine, it must 
be made to operate within limits that are agreed and observed as a 
matter of law. The Commission considered one major proposal that 
would have set such a limit. It was a proposal to rewrite Article 1, 
section 19 of the Constitution. That article defends property rights. 
We proposed to alter the provision to prohibit a modern method of 
taking property without compensation, a method characteristic of the 
new bureaucratic state. 
The right to property is ranked in several of the Founding 
documents alongside the right to life and to liberty. It is seen in the 
Founding as a bulwark of those other rights. If one is entitled to 
what he earns, he is then able to build by his labor the material 
conditions of his independence. The Founders believed and argued 
that nature was so arranged as to enable everyone with diligence to 
earn a living. Those unable by physical impediment or misfortune 
would be aided by local charity and public support, which would 
distinguish carefully among cases of need to prevent subsidy of 
idleness or immorality. Otherwise, each would provide for himself, 
entitled to labor, entitled to keep what he earns. Thomas Jefferson 
and Abraham Lincoln condemned slavery upon this ground, and 
they supported limited and frugal government upon the same 
ground. 
Jefferson, who was cited by a witness against our proposal as only a 
weak defender of property rights, wrote: 
"To take from one, because it is thought his own industry and 
that of his fathers has acquired too much, in order to spare to 
others, who, or whose fathers have not, exercised equal industry 
and skill, is to violate arbitrarily the first principle of 
association, the guarantee to everyone the free exercise of his 
industry and the fruits acquired by it." 5 
5 Letter to Milligan, April 6, 1816. 
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Madison, too, was said by our witness to have only a qualified 
commitment to the right of property. If this is true, how are we to 
interpret his statement that "The diversity in the faculties of men, 
from which the rights of property originate, is not less an 
insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of 
these faculties is the first object of government." 6 
Property to the Founders is, as we said, the bulwark of the other 
rights, and in its broad application a synonym for them. Madison 
wrote: 
This term in its particular application means that dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of 
the world, in exclusion of every other individual. 
In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces everything to 
which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which 
leaves to everyone else the like advantage. . . 
In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandise, or money is 
called his property. 
In the latter sense, a man has a property in his opinions and the 
free communication of them. 
He has a property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of 
his person. 
He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, 
and in the profession and practice dictated by them. 
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free 
choice of the objects on which to employ them. 
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he 
may be equally said to have a property in his rights. Where an 
excess of power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected. 
No man is safe in his opinions, his person, his faculties, or his 
possessions. 
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as 
well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that 
which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of 
government, that alone is a just government, which impartially 
secures to every man, whatever is his own.7 
6 The Federalist, 10. 
7 "Property," March 29, 1792, in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, The Founders' Constitution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1:598. 
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Today we often hear the claim that the Founders built a nation 
devoted to pursuit of wealth as its highest aim. In truth, they 
understood the right to property as necessary to all liberty; they saw 
that any government powerful enough to violate that right, would 
violate the others, too. They understood feudalism, in which control 
of property is centralized, in which the right to build or to alter, to 
sell or divide property remains with the crown even when the deed 
has changed hands. They understood that this system demotes all 
but the privileged to a dependent station. Forgetting that danger, we 
implement a kind of feudalism in our own day. 
What else would one call the experience of Mr. Erlich? He built and 
ran a fitness center in one of our California cities. He found over 
many years that it was difficult to make money in that business at 
that place. He asked the city if he might build condominiums (in the 
court case that followed, these are called "luxury" condominiums, to 
emphasize that Mr. Erlich was proposing something questionable). 
The city asked Mr. Erlich to mitigate the harm the city would incur 
by the loss of these "recreational facilities." The city was after all in 
acute need of such facilities, being "land locked " (its western border 
is about eight miles from the sea). The theory here seems to be that 
Mr. Erlich, in accepting his original permit to build his fitness center, 
took on an obligation to provide "recreational facilities" to the 
people of this city, whether they were prepared to purchase them or 
not. Erlich was asked to pay $280,000. 
The facts in this particular case and many others like it have been 
established in court, this one before the California Supreme Court in 
March of this very year. These cases were before the Commission 
when it considered the proposal regarding property rights. The 
chairman himself found these facts regarding Mr. Erlich 
"outrageous." He and others wondered how often such things 
happened. Members seemed to feel that the rights of citizens should 
be protected only when they are frequently abused. Otherwise, place 
no shackles on government, which values its prerogatives highly. 
In the face of these outrageous and established facts from court 
cases, the Commission voted down the proposal, eight to eight. 
Members were not yet "comfortable" with the proposal. They 
needed more time, as it was all very complicated. Some suggested 
that although we should not make any specific recommendation, we 
should recommend that the legislature look into the issue and come 
up with one. A meager little sop. 
Here, then, is a clear matter. The government is invading people's 
rights. Courts are saying so, consistently. The California Supreme 
Court has itself said so in the past ninety days. These court cases are 
very clear, almost as clear as the plain common sense that calls these 
takings "outrageous." But the court alone cannot stop them. Only 
the few with the money and the dedication to sue for many years, 
with little or no hope of return of their money, in litigation with 
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people who are spending tax dollars on their side, can win in that 
manner. To stop this practice only one thing will do: a law that is 
outside the reach of the political forces of the day. 
Our country, during its birth, invented a way to make such a law 
and write it down for everyone to read. It is called a written 
constitution. In voting down the protection of property rights, our 
Commission exhibits its ignorance or repudiation of the thing it was 
organized to revise and improve. 
We can name other significant omissions in this report that would 
have served to limit the government and protect the rights of 
citizens, including their right to control the government. The 
Commission considered for example "contracting out," a mild form 
of privatization in which the government contracts with private 
firms, upon a competitive basis, for work that is currently done by 
the monopoly of state employees. This idea has broad support, 
including the solid support of the governor who appointed ten 
members to the Commission. Contracting out will save money and 
strengthen the private sector, and it will reduce government payrolls. 
When some members insisted that we should adopt language that 
was not a mere sham, seeming to support but actually forbidding 
contracting out, the idea was exiled to a sub-committee that never 
met. 
The Commission considered redistricting, the drawing of district 
lines for elections. The decennial re-districtings in this state have 
become increasingly scandalous exercises in incumbent protection 
and partisan aggrandizement. The opposition of one powerful 
member of the legislature was apparently sufficient to deter the 
Commission from considering even the most modest reforms. Either 
an independent commission to draw district lines, or some criteria 
that limits partisan abuse, are necessary to make sure districts are 
drawn to represent the people and not the incumbents. The 
Commission report is silent on this issue. 
Our opposition to this report is based, then, on grounds both specific 
and general. We do not like the overturning of term limits that the 
people have lately adopted. We do not like the invasion of 
Proposition 13, which has stood as a bastion of tax resistance in our 
state and nation for almost twenty years. We do not like many other 
specific items noted above. 
In recognizing the good will and ability of those who differ from us, 
and in thanking the chairman for his work if not for his product, we 
must still make the general point. Free government is rare, and 
Contracting Out 
and Redistricting 
Conclusion 
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rarely successful. Where it abides over time, it operates in 
recognition of the principles informing our own precious 
Constitution of the United States. Every nation must vindicate those 
principles for itself. Our own nation must vindicate them for itself, in 
each generation. That is the urgent work that faces California and 
America today. 
This report of this Commission obstructs more than advances that 
highest work. We here register our firm opposition. 
Larry P. Arnn 
Edward J. Erler 
Alan Heslop 
Steven Frates 
Senator William Leonard 
Joel Fox 
Richard Rider 
George Babikian 
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An Opposing View on Recommendations by the 
California Constitution Revision Commission 
by Joel Fox, Member 
California Constitution Revision Commission 
Taxpayer protections will be sacrificed if certain recommendations of the California Constitution 
Revision Commission are adopted. As proposed, the recommendations: make it easier to raise taxes; 
set up confusing Charter Communities which entice local governments to join by offering easier 
routes to tax increases but offer little incentive for the taxpayers; and take away the people's ability to 
vote for important officers who oversee tax revenue. Further, the important initiative process is 
weakened under the CCRC plan. 
The Commission would cripple Proposition 13 by altering two of its 
basic principles. The 1% property tax rate limit could be broken for 
schools with a two-thirds vote of the people; and Proposition 13's 
provision requiring a two-thirds vote for special taxes would fall to a 
majority vote on sales taxes for school financing within a county. In 
addition, a majority vote for special taxes for other services will 
likely be the result of the CCRC' s Charter Communities proposal. 
Altering the 1% ad valorem property tax rate is not only designed as 
a new revenue source for schools, but as a way to raise great 
amounts of tax dollars. Schools currently have the power to increase 
property tax revenue with a two-thirds vote of the people for a 
parcel tax. The parcel tax is a flat charge levied against properties. 
The ad valorum property tax is based on the percentage of the 
property's value and can bring in a large amount of revenue at 
deceptively low percentage rate increases. 
Aside from its potential to drain the property taxpayer, there are 
further dangers in cracking the 1% property tax rate for education. 
Other public agencies will seek a property tax override if one is 
granted for schools. 
If public safety is the first responsibility of local government, police 
and fire officials will ask why they cannot have the same property 
tax override, (or majority vote sales tax), that schools are granted. 
Once the limit is pierced, additional public agencies will make 
similar demands and soon the tax limitations of Proposition 13 will 
become meaningless. 
Changes to 
Proposition 13 
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The two-thirds vote to raise special taxes is under attack in the 
CCRC recommendations. The proposal seeks to allow a majority 
vote for sales taxes for schools within a county. Further, the 
recommendations allow for Charter Communities to seek a majority 
vote for all taxes if the Charter Commission, made up of elected 
officials and those appointed by elected officials, so choose.Majority 
vote selection by the Charter Commissions is a foregone conclusion. 
These majority votes could apply to all types of taxes, including 
property taxes in the form of parcel taxes. 
In certain circumstances, the two-thirds vote is a necessary protection 
for taxpayers. 
The argument against the two-thirds vote is that this is a democracy, 
therefore majority rules. With the two-thirds vote, one-third of the 
voters plus one can block the will of the majority. Thus, it is argued, 
with a two-thirds vote we have a tyranny of the minority. 
However, the concept of the two-thirds vote has always been part of 
our democratic republic, it appears ten times in the United States 
Constitution. The purpose is to give certainty to important decisions. 
There is no more important power of government than the power to 
levy taxes. Chief Justice John Marshall reminded us that the power 
to tax is the power to destroy. We live in a country that sets up 
extraordinary safeguards to protect us in life, liberty, and property. 
The two-thirds vote is a protection against a tyranny of a majority to 
take property . . . that is taxes . . . from the people. 
The two-thirds vote is a safeguard against historian Alexander 
Tytler' s oft-quoted plaintive lament: "A democracy cannot exist as a 
permanent form of government. It can only exist until a majority of 
voters discover that they can vote themselves largess out of the 
public treasury." 
On the practical side, the two-thirds vote discourages earmarked 
taxes, called special taxes. Earmarked taxes take away discretionary 
decision making from elected officials. If a majority vote is granted 
for all tax increases, every tax increase on the ballot will be 
earmarked taxes for popular services. These taxes will be dedicated 
and elected officials will not be able to direct this tax money for 
other uses. In an emergency, they cannot shift earmarked revenue 
away from its intended purpose. If too much earmarked revenue is 
coming in for a particular service, officials cannot reduce the revenue 
without first going to the ballot. To prevent ballot box budgeting that 
will tie government into knots, maintaining the two-thirds vote for 
special taxes is necessary. 
--------------------------------~ 
The Commission also is recommending the two-thirds vote for local 
general obligation bonds be lowered to majority. This provision has 
been in the state constitution since 1879. Over that time, which 
included two world wars, a depression, and the incredible growth of 
the post-World War II period, this great state has flourished under 
the law requiring a two-thirds vote for local general obligation 
bonds. 
The people of California support the two-thirds vote for local bonds. 
When an attempt to lower the two-thirds vote for school bonds was 
on the ballot as Proposition 170 in 1993, it was defeated by nearly 
70% of the voters. An attempt to lower the two-thirds vote 
requirement for bonds to a three-fifths vote in 1966 for schools and 
libraries was also defeated. 
Taxes which repay bonds are paid over a long period of time. While 
other taxes can be altered or eliminated from year to year, once a 
bond contract is in place, the tax to repay the bond is an obligation 
for two to three decades. Local general obligation bonds are backed 
by the collateral of an individual's home or property. If someone 
cannot pay the tax, the home or property can be forfeited. This 
extraordinary tax demands an extraordinary vote for approval. 
The goal of eliminating some of the 7,000 local government entities 
as proposed by the CCRC is an admirable one. However, the method 
chosen is a muddled concept of Charter Communities that offer 
some vague notion of reform and efficiency while promising, with 
near certainty, that taxes will increase. 
The question that goes unanswered is this: Why do we need to offer 
governments easier access to tax dollars if the ultimate goal of the 
reform is more efficiency which means the need for less tax revenue? 
The Charter Community process would begin with the establishment 
of a Citizens' Charter Commission made up of at least seven elected 
officials and eight appointees of elected officials. There is danger 
here. Bias toward more government and turf wars over government 
powers can be the only result. 
One task given the Charter Commission is to establish the vote 
requirement for tax increases within the Charter Community with a 
majority vote being the floor. I see no elevator to raise that 
requirement above the floor, meaning, if approved, tax increases will 
be more easily achieved than under current requirements. 
Furthermore, charter cities, where half the population of California 
resides, will be exempt from vote requirements for general tax 
increases. 
Majority Votes 
For Bonds 
Community Charters 
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Where is the incentive for taxpayers to accept such a plan? 
While the stated purpose of the Charter Community reform is to 
eliminate some of the current number of governments and taxing 
authorities, there is a suspicion that we will end up with new levels 
of government in the form of sub-counties and the like. 
Charter Communities will be allowed to pass general obligation 
bonds by a majority vote. For the reasons discussed above, I oppose 
this plan. 
The CCRC recommends that the State Treasurer become an 
appointed position; and that the Board of Equalization be abolished, 
with the Board's functions merged with the functions of the 
Franchise Tax Board in a new combined Department of Revenue. 
While the merging of the functions of two agencies into one is a 
good plan, the new agency's top officials must be elected. The 
Treasurer should remain an elected position, also. 
The people want direct control over officials who manage their tax 
dollars. By keeping these positions elective, these officers will be 
more responsive to the people, rather than to the person who 
appoints them. 
The initiative process grants the people equal law-making power to 
the legislature. The constitution declares that, "All political power is 
inherent in the people." Proposed changes by the CCRC will make 
the legislative power more equal than the people's power in making 
law. 
A proposal to allow initiative constitutional amendments to appear 
only on the November ballot allows an exemption for the legislature 
to put legislative constitutional amendments on primary and special 
election ballots with a two-thirds vote. There is no reason for this 
special dispensation. All constitutional amendments should be 
treated equally and given access to any ballot. By putting all 
initiative constitutional amendments on the same ballot, a long ballot 
may likely result. Long ballots often discourage voters, and they may 
not give certain initiatives the attention they deserve. 
The recommendations propose that any statutory initiative may be 
amended by the legislature after six years. Those who believe the 
legislature should not have this power, will most likely turn to 
qualifying a constitutional amendment which cannot be amended 
directly by the legislature. The end result will mean more 
amendments to the constitution, burdening a document the CCRC 
hoped to condense. 
When the federal constitution was written in Philadelphia over two 
centuries ago, the new constitution did not meet the approval of the 
people until a Bill of Rights was added guaranteeing the citizens 
protection from government. 
The first consideration of any constitutional change must be an 
enumerated Bill of Rights for taxpayers-beginning with the right of 
the people to vote on local tax increases-no matter what aliases 
these tax increases go under. 
The right to vote on taxes is the only protection taxpayers have from 
being drained by the combined force of all the taxing authorities in 
this state. 
There must be a vote on all local tax increases. All tax increase 
elections should appear on general election ballots to avoid the 
practice of holding special elections at off-times when only 
supporters of a tax increase are mobilized and motivated to vote. 
If the people want to reduce or eliminate a tax in the future, they 
should have that right through an amendment to the constitution 
which recognizes the people's power of initiative to change any long 
standing tax. Referendum power should also be added for measures 
that would not be covered by automatic votes, such as certain fees or 
assessments; or new types of revenue raising devices which courts 
may rule fall outside the automatic vote requirement. 
The initiative and referendum powers must be reasonably attainable. 
That means the number of petition signatures required for a measure 
to qualify for the ballot should be five percent of the number of 
people who voted in the last election, the same as the state 
requirement for initiatives. The current standard for local initiatives 
is signatures from ten percent of registered voters, an unrealistic 
total. 
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Biographies of Commission Members 
William Hauck, Chairman, is President of the California Business 
Roundtable. He has also served as Executive Vice President, and 
member of the Board of Directors for Information for Public Affairs, 
Inc. since 1975. Hauck has also served as a Deputy Chief of Staff to 
Governor Wilson, in various capacities in the State Assembly, as the 
Chief of Staff to former Speaker of the Assembly Bob Moretti, and as 
director of the Assembly Office of Research. 
Donald C. Benninghoven, Vice-Chairman, of Sacramento, has been 
employed by the League of California Cities for the past 37 years 
and has served as the League's executive director since 1972. 
Patricia E. Castillo, was the mayor of Sunnyvale from 1991 to 1993 
and has served on the City Council since 1985. From 1992 to 1993, 
Castillo served as the president of the League of California Cities, 
and also served as the League's vice president from 1991 to 1992. 
Joel Fox, of Granada Hills, has been the President of the Howard 
Jarvis Taxpayers Association, a 200,000 member taxpayer association 
in California since 1986. As President, Fox serves as the association's 
chief of policy and spokesman reporting to the Board of Directors 
(served from March 25, 1996 to June 30, 1996). 
Russell S. Gould, of Sacramento, recently joined Metropolitan West 
Securities as director of Financial Advisory Services. He served as 
the director of the California Department of Finance from 1993 to 
March, 1996. 
Alan Heslop, Ph.D., of Claremont, has been a professor at 
Claremont McKenna College since 1967, where he is also the director 
of the Rose Institute, a Claremont McKenna College research center. 
He has also taught political science at the University of Texas and 
TexasA&M. 
Gary H. Hunt is Executive Vice President, Corporate Affairs and 
Administration of the Irvine Company. He is currently responsible 
for entitlement, regional infrastructure planning, and strategic 
governmental and communications efforts to enable the company to 
develop the nation's largest master planned urban environment in 
Orange County, California (served from March 25, 1996 to June 30, 
1996). 
Governor Wilson 
Appointees 
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Senator Bill Leonard, of Upland, was first elected to the California 
state senate in 1988 and was re-elected in 1992. Prior to his election 
to the senate he served five terms as a state assemblyman, 
representing California's Inland Empire. 
Jane G. Pisano, Ph.D., of Los Angeles, is Vice President for External 
Relations at the University of Southern California. In addition, she is 
Dean of the School of Public Administration, a position she has held 
since 1991. 
Leon L. Williams, of San Diego, has spent three decades in public 
service, first as a member of the San Diego City Council and then as 
a Supervisor on the San Diego County Board of Supervisors. He has 
been active in transit development for many years and currently 
serves as the chairman of the Board of Directors for the Metropolitan 
Transit Development Board. 
Anne Bakar, of San Francisco, currently serves as president and chief 
executive officer of Telecare Corporation where she is responsible for 
the leadership, management and development of a $70 million 
behavioral health care corporation. 
Andrew R. Baron, served as the California political and legislative 
director of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME). 
Lewis Coleman is Senior Managing Director and co-head of 
Investment Banking at Montgomery Securities. 
Betty Tom Chu was the Founding Chairman of the Board of 
Directors and Chief Executive Officer for the Trust Savings Bank 
from 1975 to 1995. Chu has also served as the Principal Deputy 
County Counsel for Los Angeles County Counsel's Office, Schools 
Division. 
Senator Lucy Killea, of San Diego, was first elected to the state 
senate in 1989 as a Democrat after serving three and one-half 
consecutive terms in the state assembly. Killea also served on the San 
Diego City Council from 1978 to 1982. 
Dr. Larry Arnn has served as President of The Claremont Institute 
since 1985, and he currently serves as the co-chairman of the 
California Civil Rights Initiative campaign (Served from January 31, 
1996 to June 30, 1996). 
George Babikian, of Palos Verdes Estates, is president of Los 
Angeles 2000 Partnership. He retired from ARCO in June 1993, after 
serving for eight years as President of ARCO Products Company, the 
corporation's refining and marketing division. 
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Dr. Edward Erler is a Professor of Political Science at California State 
Bernardino and a the California Advisory 
on has also director of 
Endowment for the 
Bicentennial Constitution in 1983 to 1984 from 31, 
1996 to 30, 1996). 
Dr. Steven Frates served as the Executive of the San Diego 
County Taxpayers Association from 1990 to 1994. Currently, he is the 
Second Vice President of Girl Scouts of San Diego and Imperial 
Counties. He has held teaching positions at several universities 
including the University of Southern California, San Diego State 
University, and California State University, Fullerton (Served from 
January 31, 1996 to June 30, 1996). 
Richard Rider is a retired stockbroker and financial planner, who 
has been active in several taxpayer-advocacy organizations. These 
include the National Taxpayers Union, San Diego Taxpayers 
Association and Paul Gann's Citizens Committee (served from 
January 31, 1996 to June 30, 1996). 
Craig L. Brown, Director, Department of Finance, of Citrus Heights, 
served as the Director of the California Youth Authority from June 
1995 until March 1996. He also served on the California Task force to 
Review Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice Response. Previously, he 
was the undersecretary of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency 
from 1987 to 1995 (served from March 4, 1996 to June 30, 1996). 
Elizabeth G. Hill, Legislative Analyst, was appointed state 
Legislative Analyst by the Joint Legislative Budget Committee in 
1986. As Legislative Analyst, she oversees the preparation of annual 
fiscal and policy analyses of the state of California's budget and its 
various programs. 
Judge Ronald B. Robie (for Supreme Court Chief Justice, Malcolm 
M. Lucas), of Sacramento, was presiding judge of the consolidated 
Superior and Municipal Courts for 1994 and 1995. He has also 
served as a member of the Appellate Department, Superior Court. 
Robie also served as the Director of California's Department of Water 
Resources from 1975 to 1983. Robie received his J.D. from McGeorge 
School of Law (Served from March 25, 1996 to June 30, 1996). 
Ex-Officio Members 
of the Commission 
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Elizabeth Cabraser, of Santa Rosa, is an attorney and Partner with 
Lieff, Cabraser and Heinmann law offices in San Francisco. Cabraser 
holds a J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall 
(served from April 11, 1994 January 31, 1996). 
Kamala Harris, of Oakland, is a deputy district attorney for Alameda 
County. Harris holds a J.D. from Hastings College of Law (served 
from April 11, 1994- January 31, 1996). 
Assemblyman Phil Isenberg formerly served as a city 
. councilmember and later as mayor of the Sacramento. He was first 
elected to the Assembly in 1982 (served from April 11, 1994 -January 
31, 1996). 
Dr. Chui Tsang is the Dean of Vocational Education for the John 
O'Connell Campus at San Francisco City College. Tsang received his 
Ph.D. from Stanford University (served from April11, 1994- January 
31, 1996). 
Judge Roger Warren (for Supreme Court Chief Justice, Malcolm M. 
Lucas), formerly a Sacramento Superior Court Judge. Warren left the 
Courts in March of 1996 to become the President of the National 
Center for State Courts, based in Williamsburg, Virginia (served from 
Aprilll, 1994- February 22, 1996). 
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APPENDIX 2 
Chapter 1243 of the Statutes of 1993 
Senate Bill 16 
Senator Lucy Killea 
An act to add and repeal Article 1.5 (commencing with Section 8275) 
of Chapter 3.5 of Division 1 of Title 2 of the Government Code. 
SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares the following: 
(a) California's budget process has become crippled by a complex 
entanglement of constraints that interfere with an orderly and 
comprehensive consideration of all fiscal matters. A complete review of 
the process by an independent citizens' commission would provide the 
Legislature a basis for considering changes that would result in a more 
thoughtful and deliberative process. 
(b) The legislative process has at times become mired in gridlock. 
Rivalries between the two houses of the Legislature and the executive 
branch have deterred the state's ability to make significant policy changes 
in response to the changing times. Changes to existing government 
organizational structures may provide a more responsive and productive 
form of governance for California than the current system. 
(c) California's existing "system" of government is dysfunctional and 
does not work together sufficiently to achieve the public's goals. The 
various components have no common conception of mission and often 
work at cross-purposes. 
SEC. 2. Article 1.5 (commencing with Section 8275) is added to 
Chapter 3.5 of Division 1 of Title 2 of the Government Code, to read: 
Article 1.5. California Constitution Revision Commission 
8275. There is created in state government the California Constitution 
Revision Commission. 
8275.1. (a) The commission shall consist of 23 members, as follows: 
(1) Ten members appointed by the Governor. No more than six 
members may be registered with the same political party. 
(2) Five members appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly. No more 
than three members may be registered with the same political party. Two 
members shall be appointed in consultation with the Assembly Minority 
Caucus. 
(3) Five members appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules. No 
more than three members may be registered with the same political party. 
Two members shall be appointed in consultation with the Senate Minority 
Caucus. 
(4) The Chief Justice of California, or his or her designee. 
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(5) The Legislative Analyst, or his or her designee. 
( 6) The Director Finance, or his or her designee. 
The Governor, Committee on Rules, and the Speaker of 
Assembly may each appoint no more one the ~~"'""''-' 
to the commission. No lobbyist, as defined in Section 82039, may serve 
as a member of the commission. The membership of commission shall 
broadly reflect the ethnic, racial, cultural, geographic, and gender diversity 
of the state. 
(b) The initial appointments to the commission shall be made not later 
than 90 days after this article becomes operative. 
8275.2. Each member of the commission shall serve without 
compensation, but each member other than an elected officer shall receive 
one hundred dollars ($100) for each day on official business of the 
commission. In addition, each member shall also be entitled to receive 
necessary expenses actually incurred in the performance of his or her 
duties. 
8275.3. (a) The Governor shall select one of the members as the chair 
of the commission. 
(b) The commission may appoint an executive secretary and fix his 
or her compensation in accordance with law. The commission may employ 
and fix the compensation, in accordance with law, of any professional, 
clerical, and other assistants that may be necessary. 
(c) The Legislative Counsel, Legislative Analyst, State Auditor, and 
the Department of Finance shall assist the commission in the performance 
of its duties. 
8275.4. The commission shall assist the Governor and the Legislature 
by doing the following: 
(a) Examining the process by which a budget is formulated and enacted 
by state government, the manner in which the budget serves the future 
needs of the state, the appropriate balance of resources and spending 
by the state, and the fiscal relations of the state, federal, and local 
governments, and any constraints and impediments that interfere with 
an orderly and comprehensive consideration of all fiscal matters that 
impact upon the development of a budget for the state. 
(b) Examining the structure of state governance and proposed 
modifications that may increase accountability and improve the process 
of formulation, consideration, and approval of policy determinations and 
a budget for the state. 
(c) Examining the current configuration of state and local government 
duties, responsibilities, and priorities; the fiscal relations of state and local 
governments; the types of services delivered; mechanisms of service 
delivery; desired program outcomes; and methods of performance 
measurement; and any constraints or impediments that interfere with 
the most effective allocation of state and local responsibilities. 
(d) Examining the feasibility of integrating community resources into 
service delivery mechanisms in order to reduce duplication and increase 
efficiency, and the feasibility of community coalitions making 
recommendations to local entities regarding a community's vision and 
goals. 
--------------------------------~ 
8275.5. The commission shall submit a report to the Governor and 
the Legislature no later than August 1, 1995, that sets forth its findings 
with respect to the mandate in Section 8275.4. The commission should 
submit interim reports before that date whenever it makes a finding and 
recommendation on a specific topic. 
8275.6. In carrying out its duties and responsibilities, the commission 
shall have the following powers: 
(a) To meet at times and places as it may deem proper. The commission 
is a state body subject to the provisions of the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting 
Act (Article 9 (commencing with Section 11120) of Chapter 1 of Part 1 
of Division 3). 
(b) To issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of books, records, papers, accounts, reports, and documents. 
(c) To administer oaths. 
(d) To contract, as it deems necessary, for the rendition of services, 
facilities, studies, and reports to the commission as will best assist it to 
carry out its duties and responsibilities. 
(e) To cooperate with and to secure the cooperation of county, city, 
city and county, and other local law enforcement agencies in investigating 
any matter within the scope of its duties and responsibilities, and to direct 
the sheriff of any county or any marshal to serve subpoenas, orders, and 
other process. 
(f) To secure directly from every department, agency, or instrumentality 
full cooperation, access to its records, and access to any information, 
suggestions, estimates, data, and statistics that it may have available. 
(g) To do any and all things necessary or convenient to enable it fully 
and adequately to perform its duties and to exercise the powers expressly 
granted to it. 
8275.7. This article shall become inoperative on July 1, 1996, and, as 
of January 1, 1997, is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which 
becomes effective on or before January 1, 1997, deletes or extends the 
dates on which it becomes inoperative and is repealed. 
SEC. 3. The sum of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) is hereby 
appropriated from the General Fund for the 1993-94 fiscal year to the 
California Constitution Revision Commission established by this act to 
carry out its duties and responsibilities under this act. 
SEC. 4. This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning 
of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The 
facts constituting the necessity are: 
In order for the California Constitution Revision Commission, created 
by this act, to carry out its functions and duties as soon as possible, it 
is necessary that this act take effect immediately. 
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Commission Votes on the Recommendations * 
I. Improving Accountability in State Government Yes No Abstain 
Executive Branch 
The Governor and the Lieutenant Governor should run on the same ticket 18 0 0 
Reduce the number of elective statewide offices 
- Governor appoints Treasurer 11 5 2 
- Governor appoints Superintendent of Public Instruction 15 1 2 
- Governor appoints Insurance Commissioner 14 1 3 
Abolish the BOE, merge tax admin. functions and appoint appeals board 16 2 0 
Shorten the term sof the University of California Board of Regents 14 2 2 
Change the Responsibilities and Terms of the State Personnel Board 9 5 4 
Legislative Branch 
Lengthen the terms of Legislators 12 6 0 
Shorten legislative sessions 17 0 1 
Give legislature the power to veto administrative regulations 9 6 2 
Provide limited retirement benefits 11 7 0 
Initiative Process 
Place initiative constitutional amendments on the November Ballot 15 1 2 
Allow amendment of statutory initiatives after six years 13 3 2 
Provide a role for the legislature in the initiative process 11 6 0 
II. Improving the State Budget and Fiscal Process 
Adopting a longer vision 
Require strategic planning and performance measures in the budgetary process 16 2 0 
Outcome-based performance measures 11 3 4 
Authorize the adoption of a two-year budget 10 5 3 
Provide a budget rebalancing mechanism 14 2 0 
Increasingfiscal discipline 
Require state's budget to be balanced 18 0 0 
Require a three percent general fund reserve 13 2 3 
Prohibit external borrowing across fiscal periods 18 0 0 
Require a majority vote to enact the budget and budget-related legislation 15 3 0 
Allow multiple subject implementation legislation 10 7 1 
Tie budget passage to salaries 16 0 2 
* Commission actions were taken at meetings held on February 5, 6, and 25, 1996. 
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III. Changing K-12 Education Yes No Abstain 
Accountability In Education 
Provide local boards with greater authority 14 0 0 
Establish a K-12 accountability system 14 0 4 
Constitutional/Statutory Nature of Education Governance 
Change constitutional nature of the Superintendent of Public Instruction 15 1 2 
Change constitutional nature of the state Board of Education 16 0 2 
Delete constitutional references to county 17 0 1 
Superintendents of schools and school boards 
Financing Education 
Maintain the current guarantee with excess funding to be one time unless legislature 
puts it into the base 12 2 0 
Allow property tax increase for unified districts with a two-thirds vote of the voters 16 1 0 
Allow an increase of up to one-half cent on the sales tax with a majority vote for 
school districts 10 6 0 
IV. State and Local Relations 
State-Local Realignment Process 
Require a state-local realignment process 9 8 1 
V. Strengthening Local Government 
The Structure o[ Local Government 
The Home Rule Community Charter 10 7 1 
Establish Citizens Charter Commission 10 6 0 
Contents of the Charter 10 6 0 
Straightening out the state/local relationship 17 1 0 
Fiscal Disclosure requirements 9 8 0 
Local Tax Authorit!f. and Vote Req_uirement 
Require that local taxes (except property) be approved by a majority vote of the 
governing board and the electorate unless a higher vote requirement is provided 
for by the Community Charter 11 7 0 
Page 114- Appendix 3 
-----------------------------------~ -----------------------------------
Appendix 4 
Reference Material 
Association of Bay Area Governments. Platform on Restructuring 
Government. April 21, 1994. 
Baker, Alonzo L. Problems in State Constitution Revision, with Special 
Reference to California. Stockton: University of the Pacific, 1964. 
Baldwin, Simeon E. Modern Political Institutions. Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1898. 
Blum, John M., Edmund S. Morgan, Willie Lee Rose, Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., Kenneth M. Stampp, C. Vann Woodward, eds. The 
National Experience: A History of the United States. 2 vols., 3rd ed. New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973. 
Browne, J. Ross. Report of the Debates in the Convention of California, on 
the Formation of the State Constitution. Washington, DC: John Towers, 
1850. 
Browne, J. Ross. Report of the Debates in the Convention of California on 
the Formation of the State Constitution in September and October, 1849. 
Washington: John T. Towers, 1850; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 
1971. 
Cain, Bruce E., Ph.D. California's Constitution: Analysis and 
Comparative Perspective. Presentation to the CCRC, May 3, 1994. 
Cain, Bruce E. and Roger G. Noll. Principles of State Constitutional 
Design. n.d. 
Cain, Bruce E., Roger G. Noll, editors Constitutional Reform in 
California, Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1995. 
California Common Cause. The Great Money Chase, 1994 Campaign 
Fundraising by California State Candidates. April 1995. 
California Constitution Revision Commission. Meeting files. 
California Constitution Revision Commission Papers, California State 
Archives, F3675:99, F3675:126-127. 
California Issues Forums. Reforming Government in California: What Do 
We Do? University Extension, University of California, Davis, 1995. 
Constitution Revision Commission. Working Papers, 1964-72. 
California State Archives, Sacramento, California. 
I. Improving 
Accountability in 
State Government 
Appendix 4 - Page 115 
--------------------------------~ 
Page 116- Appendix 4 
California Council for Environmental and Economic Balance. List of 
Concepts for Discussion for Government Efficiency and Accountability 
Reforms. May 30, 1995. 
California State Legislature, Assembly Select Committee on 
Government Restructuring. Initial Principles for Government 
Restructuring. October 16, 1994. 
California State Legislature. Constitution of the United States ... Articles 
of Confederation Constitution of the State of California. Sacramento: 
California Legislature, Assembly, 1993. Journals of the Senate and 
Assembly. Statutes of California. 
California Voter Foundation. Democracy Online: An Evaluation of the 
1994 California Online Voter Guide. February 1995. 
Center for a New Democracy. A Side-by-Side Comparison of: 
CALPIRG's Anti-corruption Act of 1996 and the California Political 
Reform Act of 1996. February 1996. 
Claremont Institute, The. "Contract With California: Charting a New 
Course for California Government." Briefings. No. 1995-41, March 30, 
1995. 
Cook, Corey and Charlene Wear Simmons, Ph.D. "California Political 
Reform: Selected Research." California Research Bureau Issue Summary. 
January 1994. 
Davis, Winfield J. History of Political Conventions in California, 
1849-1892. Sacramento: California State Library, 1893. 
Desty, Robert. The Constitution of the State of California Adopted in 
1879, with References to Similar Provisions in the Constitutions of Other 
States ... to which is Prefixed ... a Parallel Arrangement of the 
Constitutions of 1863 and 1879. San Francisco: Sumner Whitney & Co., 
1879. 
Dryden, Gail D., League of Women Voters of California, and the 
California Constitution Revision Commission. Report on the 
Community Forums. July 6, 1995. 
Emmons, David M. "Constructed Province: History and the Making 
of the Last American West." Western Historical Quarterly 25-4 (Winter 
1994): 437-59. 
Farager, John Mack, ed. The Encyclopedic Dictionary of American 
History. 4th ed. Guilford, Connecticut: Dushkin Publishing Group, 
Inc., 1991. 
Fazzino, Gary, Hewlett-Packard Company. Comments to the 
Constitution Revision Commission. Presentation to the CCRC July 7, 
1995. 
FitzRandolph, John. Article IX Background Study. San Francisco: 
California Constitution Revision Commission, 1967. 
--------------------------------~ 
Gerston, Larry N. and Terry Christensen. California Politics and 
Government: A Practical Approach. 3rd. Ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1995. 
Goodwin, Cardinal. The Establishment of State Government in 
California. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1914. 
Governor's Committee on the Law of Preemption. Report. California 
Constitution Revision Commission Papers, California State Archives, 
F3675:192. 
Grad, Frank P. The Drafting of State Constitutions: Working Papers for a 
Manual. New York: National Municipal League, 1967. 
Graymer, Leroy. Options for Reforming California Governance. 
California Policy Seminar, Working Paper Technical Assistance 
Program 1995. 
Graymer, Leroy, Ph.D. California Governance Reform Study Report. 
UCLA Extension, March 1994. 
Grodin, Joseph R., Professor of Law, University of California, 
Hastings College of Law. The Role of State Constitutions in a Federal 
System. n.d. 
Hall, Stuart. County Supervisorial Districting in California. Berkeley: 
University of California, Bureau of Public Administration, 1961. 
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist 
Papers. ed. by Clinton Rossiter. New York: New American Library, 
1961. 
Hartley, James et al. Reform During Crisis: The Transformation of 
California's Fiscal System During the Great Depression. 1994. 
Hichborn, Franklin. Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 
1911. San Francisco: James H. Barry Company, 1911. 
Hill, Elizabeth G., Legislative Analyst. Revising the Constitution to 
Implement MGMS. Memo to the CCRC August 10, 1994. 
Hodson, Timothy A., Ph.D. and Jamie Regalado, Ph.D. Conceptual 
Ideas for Revising the California Constitution. June 13, 1994. 
Hornbeck, David. California Patterns: A Geographical and Historical 
Atlas. Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1983. 
Hurt, Elsey. California State Government: An Outline of its 
Administrative Organization from 1850 to 1936. 2 vols. Sacramento: 
Supervisor of Documents, 1936. 
Isenberg, Phillip, Assemblymember. California Constitution Revision 
Commission: Proposed Mission and Principles Statement. Speech before 
the Little Hoover Commission, December 9, 1994. 
Appendix 4- Page 117 
--------------------------------~ --------------------------------
Page 118 - Appendix 4 
Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network. White Paper for California 
Constitution Revision Commission. Presentation to the CCRC, July 6, 
1995. 
Keene, Barry. Parliamentary Backgrounder and a List of Recommendations 
of Former Majority Leader Barry Keene. Presentation to the CCRC, 
February 10, 1995. 
Kettleborough, Charles, ed. The State Constitutions and the Federal 
Constitution and Organic Laws of the Territories and Other Colonial 
Dependencies of the United States of America. Indianapolis: B. F. Bowen 
& Company, 1918. 
Killea, Senator Lucy, Basic Organizing Principles for the CCRC. Memo 
presented to the CCRC, June 13, 1994. 
Killea, Senator Lucy. Proposed State Governance Reforms. Presentation 
to the CCRC, February 10, 1995. 
Langum, David J. Law and Community on the Mexican-California 
Frontier: Anglo-American Expatriates and the Clash of Legal Traditions, 
1821-1846. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987. 
Lavender, David. California: A Land of New Beginnings. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1972. 
LA 2000 Partnership. Managing Growth in Southern California: A 
Proposal. January 28, 1992. 
League of California Cities, Making California's Governments Work, 
January 1995. 
League of Women Voters, The. The California Voter. Gail Dyden, 
Editor. Fall 1995. 
Lee, Eugene C. "The Revision of California's Constitution." California 
Policy Seminar Brief, Vol. 3, No. 3. April 1991. 
Legislative Analyst's Office. Making Government Make Sense: 
Developing a Reform Proposal. July 21, 1994. 
Limerick, Patricia Nelson. The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of 
the American West. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987. 
National Performance Review, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a 
Government that Works Better & Costs Less, September 7, 1993. 
Oregon Progress Board, Oregon Benchmarks: Standards for Measuring 
Statewide Progress and Governmental Performance, December 1992. 
Schuman, David. The Origin of State Constitutional Direct 
Democracy: William Simon Uren and The Oregon System. Temple 
Law Review. Vol. 67, March 1994 (pp. 947-963). 
------------------------------~ 
Swisher, Carl Brent. Motivation and Political Technique in the California 
Constitutional Convention, 1878-79. Claremont: Pomona College, 1930; 
reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1969. 
United States Congress. The Constitutions of the Several States of the 
Union and the United States, Including the Declaration of Independence 
and Articles of Confederation. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co., 1852. 
Willis, E. B. and P.K. Stockton. Debates and Proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention of the State of California. Sacramento: State 
Printing Office, 1881. 
Wilson, E. Dotson, Chief Clerk of the Assembly. California's 
Legislature, 1994. Sacramento: California State Assembly, 1994. 
Wilson, Governor Pete. Remarks Before the Constitution Revision 
Commission, Sacramento, May 3, 1993. 
Asimow, Michael, Professor of Law, UCLA Law School. 
Administrative Law and the California Constitution. n.d. 
Blanning, Bruce. Contracting for Governmental Services: Is it Time to 
Amend the Constitution? An analysis presented to the CCRC, on 
behalf of Professional Engineers in California Government, 
Association of California State Attorneys and Administrative Law 
Judges, and the California Association of Professional Scientists. May 
18, 1995. 
Bawn, Kathleen, Department of Political Science, UCLA. 
Representation in California: Issues and Alternatives. Conference Draft, 
prepared by the California Constitution Project, n.d. 
California State Employees Association. Setting California Right: 
Proposals to Reinvigorate California's Government. June 1993. 
California Taxpayers Association. Privatization: "A Fresh Look at 
Cost-cutting Options." Cal-Tax Research Bulletin. March 1992. 
Cox, Daniel G. Second Thoughts About the Second Banana. The Council 
of State Governments. 1995. 
Cross, Ira. History of the Labor Movement in California. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1935. 
DiCamillo, Mark and Mervin Field, The Field Institute. Voters Want 
Governor and Lt. Governor to Run Separately and Not as a Ticket. Release 
#1746, March 10, 1995. 
Eggers, William D. Privatization Opportunities for States. Report by the 
Reason Foundation, Privatization Center. Policy Study No. 154. 
January 1993. 
A. Executive Branch 
Appendix 4- Page 119 
--------------------------------~ 
Page 120-Appendix 4 
English, Jeannine L., Executive Director, Little Hoover Commission. 
Memorandum to Chairman William Hauck on the subject of the 
State's Civil Service, February 8, 1995. 
Hill, Elizabeth G., Legislative Analysts. "Reinventing the State Civil 
Service." Reprinted from The 1995-96 Budget: Perspectives and Issues. 
March 1995. 
Jensen, Christy, Sacramento Center, School of Public Administration, 
University of Southern California. "State Civil Service Reform." 
California Policy Choices, Vol. 8, Ed. John J. Kirlin, 1994. 
Keil, Steve, California State Association of Counties. Local Government 
Perspective on Contracting-Out. Presentation to the CCRC, May 18, 
1995. 
Little Hoover Commission. Too Many Rules: Reforming California's 
Civil Service. April1995. 
Masden, Daniel. "Observations and Comments on Reinventing 
Government." Public Personnel Management, Vol. 24, No. 1. Spring 
1995. 
McMillan, William M., Warren F. Schwegel. "Contracting in Lieu of 
Using State Civil Service." 1994 Labor Relations Conference. 
Presentation to the CCRC, May 18, 1995. 
Noll, Roger R., Stanford University. Executive Organization. Prepared 
for the Conference on California Constitutional Reform, June 8-10, 
1995. 
Sherman, Brad, State Board of Equalization. Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment Consolidating California Tax Administration Under Single 
Elected Body. June 1995. 
State Employee Coalition. Potential Revisions to Article VII of the 
California Constitution. Position paper presented to the CCRC, 
February 10, 1995. 
Tirapelle, David J., Director, Department of Personnel 
Administration. Department of Personnel Administration's 
Recommendations for Revising California's Constitution. Memorandum 
to Chairman Bill Hauck, January 9, 1995. 
Vaughn, Walter, Acting Executive Officer, California State Personnel 
Board. Response to Department of Personnel Administration's 
Recommendations for Revising California's Constitution. Memorandum 
to the CCRC, February 10, 1995. 
------------------------------~ 
Alquist, Senator Alfred E. SCA 1 Position Paper, A Solution to 
Gridlock: Accountability and the Parliamentary System. Senate Budget 
and Fiscal Committee, December 5, 1994. 
Brady, David W. and Brian J. Gaines. "A House Discarded? 
Evaluating the Case for a Unicameral California Legislature." eds. 
Roger Noll and Bruce Cain, Institute of Governmental Studies Press: 
1995. 
Brazaltis, Tom. "Throwing Their Votes Away." The Plain Dealer. 
Perspective Section, July 30, 1995. 
Cain, Bruce E., Ph.D. Parliamentary Systems and Legislative 
Accountability. February 1995. 
Cain, Bruce E., and Nathaniel Persily, University of California, 
Berkeley. Legislative Accountability: Could California's Legislature Be 
More Accountable Under a Parliamentary Form of Government. n.d. 
Cohen, Linda R. Terms of Office, Legislative Structure, and Collective 
Incentives. Prepared for the California Constitutional Revision Project. 
June 1995. 
Hill, Steven. "Lessons on the Mechanics of Democracy." Los Angeles 
Times. January 5, 1996. 
Jones, Rich. State Legislatures. The Book of the States 1994-95, Vol. 30. 
Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments, 1994. 
McClintock, Tom. Testimony on the Structure of Government. 
Presentation to the CCRC, February 10, 1995. 
McClintock, Tom. "The California Constitution Revision 
Commission: Returning to the Fundamentals?" The Claremont 
Institute Golden State Center for Policy Studies, Briefings, 1995-39, 
February 27, 1995. 
Michigan Legislative Service Bureau, Legislative Research Division. 
"Unicameral Legislatures Versus Bicameral Legislatures." January 
1993. 
Ownby, Adrian R., Graduate School of Public Policy and 
Administration, California State University, Sacramento. A Legislature 
for the 21st Century. December 19, 1994. 
Raglin, Dennis. Unicameral Proposals in California: A Brief History. 
January 16, 1996. 
Reding, Andrew A., "Let's Dump Single-Member Electoral Districts." 
Christian Science Monitor. Opinion/Essays Section, page 8. August 8, 
1995. 
Storey, Tim. "Alternatives to Traditional Redistricting." National 
Conference of State Legislatures, Legisbrief Vol. 4, No.5, January 1996. 
B. Legislative Branch 
Appendix 4 - Page 121 
--------------------------------~ 
C. The Initiative 
Process 
Page 122 - Appendix 4 
Volunteers Organizing Toward Electoral Reforms (VOTERS). 
Presentation on Proportional Representation. Presentation to the 
CCRC, April 7, 1995. 
Wunnicke, Pat. "Nebraska's Unicameral: Fifty Years Without a 
Conference Committee." State Legislatures. October 1987 (Pp. 20-23) 
Ballot Arguments. November, 1910; November, 1911; November, 
1912; November, 1920; November, 1922; June, 1933; November, 1946; 
November, 1956; November, 1962; June, 1970; November, 1970; 
November, 1993. 
Bounds, Gregory. State Debt Background Study. San Francisco: 
California Constitution Revision Commission, 1969. 
California Commission on Campaign Financing, Center for 
Responsive Government. Democracy by Initiative: Shaping California's 
Fourth Branch of Government. 1992. 
Cain, Bruce, Sara Ferejohn, Margarita Najar, and Mary Walther. 
Constitutional Change: Is it Too Easy to Amend Our State Constitution? 
n.d. 
Dubois, Philip L. and Floyd F. Feeny. "Improving the California 
Initiative Process: Options for Change." The California Policy Seminar 
Report. California Policy Seminar, University of California, 1992. 
Dubois, Philip. L., Floyd F. Feeny. "Improving the California Initiative 
Process: Options for Change." The California Policy Seminar Report, 
Vol. 3, No. 10. November 1991. 
Eu, March Pong, Secretary of State. A History of the California Initiative 
Process. Sacramento: Secretary of State, Elections, November 1992. 
Gerber, Elizabeth R. The Indirect Initiative in California: A Proposal to 
Increase Flexibility and Legislative Accountability. May 1995. 
League of Women Voters. The Initiative Process in California. 
Memorandum to the CCRC March 21, 1995. 
League of Women Voters. Initiative and Referendum Process: Position 
Adopted 1984. Position paper presented to the CCRC, March 21, 1995. 
Lee, Eugene C. "Representative Government and the Initiative 
Process." The Initiative Process. (pp. 228-253). 
Lee, Eugene C. "Hiram Johnson's Great Reform is an Idea Whose 
Time Has Passed." Public Affairs Report, Institute of Governmental 
Studies, Vol. 31, No.4. July 1990. 
Post, A. Alan, Citizen's Commission on Ballot Initiatives. Report and 
Recommendations on the Statewide Initiative Process. January 1994. 
-------------------------------~ 
Schrag, Peter. "California's Elected Anarchy." Harpers Magazine, 
November 1994 (pp. 50-58). 
University of California, Davis, University Extension. The California 
Initiative Process: Current Controversies and Prescriptions. A Summary of 
Proceedings from a Public Issues Fourm, held March 23, 1990. Ed. Roger 
Rose. Produced and Distributed by California Policy Seminar, 
University of California. 
California State Department of Finance. 1995-96 Governor's Budget 
Highlights. January 1995. 
California Business-Higher Education Forum. Testimony for the 
Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review. Presented by Steven 
M. Sheffrin, Professor, Department of Economics, University of 
California, Davis. February 15, 1996. 
California Business-Higher Education Forum. California Fiscal Reform: 
A Plan for Action. Recommendations and Summary, June 1994. 
California's Citizens Budget Commission. Reforming California's 
Budget Process: Preliminary Report. February 15, 1995. 
California Citizens Budget Commission. Materials for the Second 
Meeting. Meeting held in Sacramento, March 10, 1993. 
California Debt Advisory Commission. "California Total Debt 
Issuance Drops to $42 Billion in 1994." Debt Line. Volume 14, No.3, 
March 1995. 
California Department of Finance, California Trade and Commerce 
Agency. Reducing Taxes for California's Competitiveness. February 15, 
1995. 
California State Legislature, Senate and Assembly Revenue and 
Taxation Committees. Restrictions on the Taxing Power of the 
Legislature. March 1995. 
California Taxpayers' Association. "Plan for Stabilizing California 
Public Finance: Cal-Tax Recommendations for Public Spending 
Reform." Cal-Tax Policy Brief March 1995. 
Carrol, Stephen J., Kevin F. McCarthy and Mitchell Wade. 
"California's Looming Budget," Rand Research Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 
2, Fall 1994. 
Center for the Contiriuing Study of the California Economy. The 
Outlook for the California Economy. November, 1994. 
Center for the Continuing Study of the California Economy. Fiscal 
Reform in Support of Economic Crisis. Growth. Presentation to the 
CCRC, July 7, 1995. 
II. Improving the State 
Budget and Fiscal 
Process 
Appendix 4- Page 123 
--------------------------------~ 
Page 124- Appendix 4 
Clingermayer, James C. and B. Dan Wood. "Disentangling Patterns 
of State Debt Financing." American Political Science Review. Vol. 89, 
No.1. March 1995. 
Connell, Kathleen, Controller of the State of California. Response to 
the CCRC's preliminary recommendations. January 24, 1996. 
Doubleday, D. Jay. Institute of Governmental Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley. Legislative Review of the Budget in California. 
October 1967. 
Ellwood, John W., Mary Sprague. Options for Reforming the California 
State Budget Process. Paper prepared for Conference on California 
Constitutional Reform, June 8-10, 1995. 
Fankhauser, William. A Financial History of California: Public Revenues, 
Debts, and Expenditures. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1913. 
Gould, Russell S. Director of State Department of Finance. 1994-95 
Proposed Governor's Budget. Presentation to the CCRC, May 4, 1994. 
Gould, Russell S., Director of State Department of Finance. Capital 
Outlay and Infrastructure Report 1995. 
Hill, Elizabeth G., Legislative Analyst. California's Tax Structure. 
Presentation to the California Legislature, Senate Revenue and 
Taxation Committee. February 15, 1995. 
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, California Institute of Technology. 
Constitutional Limitations on Indebtedness: The Case of California. June 
1995. 
Kirlin, John J. Tax Issues Seminar. For the Senate Revenue and 
Taxation Committee, St. Helena, CA. September 28, 1994. 
Kirlin, John J. and Jeffery I. Chapman, Peter Asmus and Roy 
Thompson. Fiscal Reform in California. Prepared for the Task Force on 
Fiscal Reform, California Business Higher Education Forum. 
February 17, 1994. 
La Vally, Rebecca and Tim Fong. "The History of State Deficits in 
California." For Your Insight, California Senate Office of Research, 
June 29, 1992. 
Legislative Analyst's Office. California's Government Levy a Wide 
Variety of Different Taxes. February 15, 1995. 
Legislative Analyst's Office. "California's Cash Crunch." California 
Update. March 1994. 
Legislative Analyst's Office. Information on the Status of the State's 
Compliance With the Serrano Decision. November 2, 1990. Presented to 
the CCRC, April 7, 1995. 
-------------------------------~ 
Legislative Analyst's Office. Marginal Tax Rates For Western and Major 
Industrial States - 1994. February 15, 1995. 
Legislative Analyst's Office. Status: Uses and Costs of Lease-Payment 
Bonds. May 3, 1995. 
Legislative Analyst's Office. State Budget and Fiscal Issues 1994-95, 
March 16, 1995. Presentation to the CCRC, March 21, 1995. 
Little Hoover Commission. State Fiscal Condition Report. Executive 
Summary. March 1995. 
Mathews, Jon. "No Budget, No Pay? No Way, Senate Says." 
Sacramento Bee. Sec. A3. September 14, 1995. 
McCubbins, Mathew D. Putting the State Back into State Government: 
The Constitution and the Budget. Paper prepared for Conference on 
California Constitutional Reform, June 8-10, 1995. 
McGuire, Theresa J. "State and Local Tax Reform for the 1990's: 
Implications from Arizona." Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management. Vol. 10, No. 1. 1991 (pp. 64-77). 
National Association of State Budget Officers. Budget Process in the 
States. February 1995. 
Sherman, Brad, State Board of Equalization. Testimony Regarding 
Taxation of Insurance Companies. Presentation to the CCRC, June 16, 
1995. 
Santa Clara County Committee on the State Budget. Statement before 
the Constitution Revision Commission. Presentation to the CCRC July 7, 
1995. 
Allen, Hollis and Conrad Briner. Study of the Educational Provisions of 
the California State Constitution. San Francisco: California Constitution 
Revision Commission, 1966. 
Education Commission of the States. Rising to the Challenge: A New 
Agenda for California Schools and Communities. March 1995. 
Fox, Warren H., California Postsecondary Education Commission 
(CPEC). A Capital Crisis in California's Colleges. January 13, 1995. 
Gordon, Stuart. "Drastic Reforms Urged to Rescue Colleges." San 
Jose Mercury News, California News, Sec. 3 B, December 18, 1994. 
Hall, Kenneth F. and Bob Blatner. Schools for Sound Finance (SF) 
School Services of California Inc., Annual Meeting. March 14, 1996. 
Higher Education Members of the Higher Education Roundtable. 
Constitutional Issues Affecting Higher Education. CCRC Workshop, 
Sacramento Convention Center, January 13, 1995. 
Ill. Changing K-12 
Education 
Appendix 4- Page 125 
---------------------------------~ ---------------------------------
IV. State-Local 
Relations and 
Strengthening 
Local Government 
Page 126- Appendix 4 
Higher Education Roundtable. The Golden State at Risk: A Joint 
Statement on the Crisis Facing California Higher Education. Presentation 
to the CCRC, January 13, 1995. 
Kirst, Michael W., Gerarld C. Hayward and Julia E. Koppich. 
Rebuilding Education in the Golden State: A Plan for California's Schools. 
Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE), April1995. 
Kirst, Michael W., Gerarld C. Hayward and Julia E. Koppich. 
Conditions of Education In California 1994-95. Policy Analysis for 
California Education (PACE), 1995. 
Reinard, Ray. Rodriguez Case (School Finance), Memorandum to 
Chairman William Hauck, June 13, 1994. 
Rubinfield, Daniel L. California Fiscal Federalism: A School Finance 
Perspective. Prepared for the California Constitutional Reform 
Conference, June 8, 1995. 
Whiteneck, William. Public Education and the California Constitution: 
Are Revisions Necessary? Presentation to the CCRC, May 4, 1994. 
Whiteneck, William. School District Budget Planning Cycle Issue. 
Presentation to the CCRC, December 9, 1994. 
Association of Bay Area Governments. Recommended Revisions to the 
Constitution of the State of California. Adopted by the General 
Assembly, December 9, 1994. 
Benninghoven, Donald. Local Government Reorganization Proposal: 
Allocation of Local and Regional Services and Facilities. Presentation to 
the CCRC, April 7, 1995. 
Bergeson, Supervisor Marian. Orange County 2001. Proposal on 
Restructuring Orange County Government, May 17, 1995. 
Bollens, John. County Government Organization in California. Berkeley: 
University of California, Bureau of Public Administration, 1947. 
Brockman, Jan, Orrick, Herrinton & Sutcliffe Attorneys at Law. The 
Debt Clause, Presentation to the CCRC, December 9, 1994. 
California Association of Realtors. Summary of Local Taxation 
Measures. December 22, 1992. 
California Council for Environmental and Economic Balance. Draft 
Principles for State and Local Fiscal Reform. August 8, 1994. 
California State Association of Counties. Constitutional Issues Affecting 
Counties. Presentation to CCRC Workshop, Long Beach Convention 
Center, November 18, 1994. 
--------------------------------d 
California State Legislature, Assembly Committee on Local 
Government, Allocation of Sales Tax and Other Local Government 
Revenues: Developing Workable Incentives for Balanced Development. A 
Briefing Paper. October 7, 1994. 
California State Legislature, Senate Local Government Committee. 
Assessing the Benefits of Benefit Assessments: A Citizen's Guide to Benefit 
Assessments in California. May 15, 1995. 
California State Legislature, Senate Local Government Committee. 
Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino: Facts, 
Impacts and Options. Prepared for informational hearing. Sacramento, 
January 24, 1996. 
California State Legislature, Senate Local Government Committee. 
What's So Special About Special Districts? A Citizen's Guide to Special 
Districts in California. 2nd Ed., November 5, 1993. 
David, Leon and Mark Allen. The Law of Local Government. Los 
Angeles: np, 1966. 
DeFuniak, William Q., and Michael J. Vaughn. Principles of 
Community Property. 2nd. ed. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 
1971. 
Detwiler, Peter M. and Steven Sanders, Center of California Studies, 
California State Univeristy, Sacramento. Growth Management and 
Public Finance. May 15, 1991. 
Detwiler, Peter M. "Is Cooperation Enough? A Review of San Diego's 
Latest Growth Management Program." State and Regional Initiatives 
for Managing Development: Policy Issues and Practical Concerns. Ed. 
Douglass R. Porter, The Urban Land Institute, n.d. pp. 57-80. 
Dillon, Michael F. Presentation to the CCRC on behalf of the 
California Association of Sanitation Agencies, December 9, 1994. 
Dunstan, Roger. "Local Government Revenue and Expenditures 
Since Proposition 13: A Historic Primer." California Research 
Bureau-Issue Summary, August 1993. 
Dunstan, Roger. Definition of Special Districts. California Research 
Bureau Memorandum, December 8, 1994. 
Galbraith, J. K. California County Expenditures. University of 
California College of Agriculture, Agriculture Experiment Station, 
Berkeley, California. Bulletin 582, August 1934. 
Gerston, Larry N., Terry Christensen. Local Government: Politics at 
the Grass Roots, California Politics and Government: A Practical 
Approach, 2nd Ed. 
Graves, Gary A., Santa Clara County Office of Budget and Analysis. 
Analysis of Program Mandates and Net County Costs. May 21, 1993. 
Appendix 4 - Page 127 
--------------------------------~ 
Page 128- Appendix 4 
Hall, Stephen K. Special Districts Response to CCRC' s Question. 
Letter submitted to the CCRC, February 1, 1995 on behalf of the 
Association of California Water Agencies. 
Hill, Elizabeth G., Legislative Analyst. An Overview and Assessment of 
Los Angeles County's 1995-96 Budget Problem. July 11, 1995. 
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association. Santa Clara County 
Transportation Authority v. Guardino: Background, Analysis, Impact, 
Enforcement and Legislation. Prepared for informational hearing. 
Sacramento, January 24, 1996. 
Joint Task Force: California Library Association, League of California 
Cities, California State Association of Counties, and California 
Association of Library Trustees and Commissioners. Restructuring 
California Public Libraries. Presentation to the CCRC, July 7, 1995. 
Koppel, Mayor Barbara. Comments to the Constitution Revision 
Commission. Presentation to the CCRC July 7, 1995. 
League of California Cities. Constitutional Issues Affecting Cities. 
Presentation to CCRC Workshop, Long Beach Convention Center, 
October 24, 1994. 
League of California Cities. Making California's Governments Work: A 
Discussion Paper Prepared as a Basis for Advancing Solutions that Will 
Benefit the Public. January 1995. 
Legislative Analyst's Office. "Proposition 62 Voter Approval 
Requirements Upheld." California Update. October 1995. 
Legislative Analyst's Office. State and Local Finance. Presentation to 
CCRC, May 3, 1994. 
Legislative Analyst's Office. Cities and Counties Spend Funds 
Differently: Two Perspectives on Local Government Expenditures. July 21, 
1994. 
Legislative Analyst's Office. Problems Seeking Solutions: Examples of 
Weaknesses in the State and Local Government Partnership. September 1, 
1994. 
Lewcock, Thomas F. Remarks to the California Constitutional 
Revision Commission. Presentation to the CCRC, July 7, 1995. 
Mayer, Steven L. Selected Problems in Municipal Finance: Proposition 13, 
Proposition 62, Refunds and Retroactivity. Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, 
Canady, Robertson, Falk and Rabkin, A Professional Corporation, 
August 22, 1994. 
Miliman, Gary D. "Reinventing Local Government." Fort Bragg 
Advocate News. November 10, 1993. 
---------------------------------~ 
Morgan, Stephen P., MPA. USC School of Public Administration, 
Sacramento Center. Special Districts Response to CCRC' s Question. 
Letter submitted to the CCRC, January 31, 1995 
Morgan, Stephen P., MPA, Jeffrey I. Chapman, Ph.D. Special District 
Consolidations. Presentation to the Association of California Water 
Agencies, October 4, 1994. 
Office of Planning and Research, Research Unit. Introduction and 
Summary of Council on Intergoverment Reform. Spring and Summer 
1973 
Olsen, Steve. California Constitution Revision Commission: Problem 
Statement Regarding State and Local Governance. Memorandum 
presented to CCRC, August 29, 1994. 
O'Sullivan, Arthur, Terri A. Sexton and Steven M. Sheffrin. "The 
Future of Proposition 13 in California." The California Policy Seminar 
Brief, Vol. 5, No.4, March 1993. 
Paik, Helen C. City and County Revenues and Expenditures Since 
Proposition 13: A Historical Primer. Prepared by the California 
Research Bureau, California State Librar)" February 28, 1995. 
Phillips, John D., Local Government Reform Task Force. 
Strengthening Home Rule for the Counties and Cities of California. 
November 1973. 
Pope, Alexander H. "Simplifying the Property Tax: Will We Make a 
Virtue of Today's Fiscal Necessities?" California Tax Lawyer. Fall1994 
(Pp. 9-15). 
Providence Associates Inc. Final Report, Consolodation Study for the 
Mendocino and Sonoma County Libraries. September 8, 1995. 
Reiter, Glenn M., Representing California Special Districts 
Association. Presentation to the California Constitution Revision 
Commission. San Diego, November, 3, 1995. 
Rodriguez, Daniel B. State Supremacy, Local Sovereignty: Reconstructing 
State/Local Relations Under the California Constitution. n.d. 
San Diego Association of Governments. Draft Proposal For 
Consideration by the California Constitution Revision Commission. 
October 27, 1995. 
Sherman, Brad, State Board of Equalization. Municipal and County 
Finance: Testimony Outline. Presentation to the CCRC, May 19, 1995. 
Smith, Rodney T., Director, Lowe Institute of Political Economy, 
Claremont McKenna College. Local Fiscal Arrangements After 
Proposition 13. April 1988. 
Appendix 4 - Page 129 
Page 130- Appendix 4 
Swendiman, Steve, California State Association of Counties. 
Background Materials for California Constitution Revision Commission. 
1995. 
Tuteur, John. A Proposal for Restructuring California's System of 
Governance and State-Local Financing. Presentation to the CCRC, May 
19, 1995. 
Van Alstyne, Arvo. Background Study Relating to Article XI: Local 
Government. San Francisco: California Constitution Revision 
Commission, 1966. 
----------------------------------d ----------------------------------
Appendix 5 
Constitutional Language Implementing the 
Commission's Recommendations 
- Guide By Subject -
NOTE: The effective dates included on this table assumed placement and approval by the 
voters at the November 1996 ballot. For placement on future ballots, the effective dates 
would change to conform to the date of the election and the desired effective date. 
I Improving Accountability in State Government 
Article# Page# 
Effective 
Date 
Executive Branch 
• Governor maintains powers when absent from the state V Sec 10 145 1/1/97 
• Governor and Lt. Governor run on the same ticket V Sec 9.5 145 1/1/98 
• Governor may appoint Lt. Governor to executive branch V Sec 10.5 145 1/4/99 
position 
• Governor has a 60 day veto period at end of legislative session IV Sec 10 141 1/1/97 
• Reduce the number of elective statewide offices V Sec 12 & 14(f) 145 1/4/99 
- Governor Appoints Treasurer 
- Governor Appoints Superintendent of Public Instruction 
- Governor Appoints Insurance Commissioner 
• Abolish the Board of Equalization, provide for an V Sec 14(f) 145 1/4/99 
appointed tax appeals body, and consolidate tax XIII Sees. 3(j), 11, 153 
administration duties 17, 18, 18.5, 19, 
28(h) 
• University of California Board of Regents terms IX Sec 9 147 1/1/97 
and membership 
• State Personnel Board terms and functions VIISec2&3 145 1/1/97 
Legislative Branch 
• Six month legislative sessions IV Sec 3 138 1/1/97 
• Term limits IV Sec 2.1 138 1/1/2002 
• Allow legislation to be heard sooner than 31 days IV Sec 8 139 1/1/97 
• House of origin bill deadline IV Sec 10 141 1/1/97 
• Oversight of the regulatory process IV Sec 29 144 1/1/97 
• Retirement IV Sec 4.5 139 1/1/97 
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Articte # Page# 
Effective 
Date 
• Place constitutional amendments on the November ballot II Sec 8 137 1/1/97 
XVIII Sec 1 161 1/1/97 
• Amending statutory initiatives II Sec 10 137 1/1/2002 
• Legislative review and enactment of statutory and II Sec 8.5 137 1/1/97 
constitutional initiatives 
• Referendum provisions (conforming to the budget revisions) II Sec 9 137 1/1/97 
II Improving the State Budget and Fiscal Process 
NOTE: The revisions to the budget process are phased in over two periods. Section 12 of Article IV includes all 
of the changes that begin 1/1/97. The 2 year budget and rebalancing process begins in 2001. Section 21.1 
of Article IV includes all of the budget provisions that will be in effect after 2001. 
• Balanced budget requirement IV Sec 12(f) 141 1/1/97 
• Phase in Three Percent Prudent Reserve IV Sec 12(g) 142 1/1/97 
• Multiple subject budget implementation bill IV Sec 9 140 1/1/97 
• Majority vote on budget bills IV Sec 12(d) 142 1/1/97 
• Two-year budget process IV Sec 12.1 142 1/1/2001 
• Budget rebalancing bill IV Sec 8 & 9 139 1/1/2001 
• Limitations on state borrowing XVI Sec 1.2 158 1/1/97 
• Governor and legislature forfeit salary I per diem IV Sec 12(h) 142 1/1/97 
if budget not passed on the deadline 
• Strategic planning/ four-year capital outlay plan V Sec 3 144 1/1/2001 
• Outcome-based performance measures IV Sec 12 141 1/1/99 
• Changes to the spending limit to conform to the XIII B 155 1/1/2001 
two-year budget 
III Changing K-12 Education 
Accountability in Education 
• Provide for local school boards and grant greater authority IX Sec 13.5 149 1/1/97 
• Establish an accountability system and standards for Public IX Sec 14 149 1/1/97 
schools 
Constitutional/Statutory Nature of Education 
Governance 
• Change constitutional nature of the Superintendent of Public V Sec 12 145 1/1/99 
Instruction IX Sec 2 146 
• Change constitutional nature of the State Board of Education IX Sec 2.1, 7 & 8 146 1/1/97 
• Delete constitutional references to county IX Sec 3, 3.1, 3.2, 146 1/1/99 
superintendents of schools and school boards 3.3 
• Organization of Community Colleges IX Sec 12 148 1/1/97 
• Organization of the State University IX Sec 13 149 1/1/97 
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Effective 
Article# Page# Date 
Financing Education 
• Revisions to Proposition 98 XVI Sec 8 & 8.5 159 1/1/97 
- Property Tax XIIIA Sec 1 154 1/1/97 
- Sales Tax XIIIA Sec 4 155 1/1/97 bond 
vote 
requirements 
XIASec4 152 HRCC 
XVI Sec 18 161 adoption 
IV State-Local Relations 
• Straightening out the state/local relationship V Sec 3, 5 144 1/1/97 
V Strengthening Local Government 
.. Citizen Charter Commission XIASec 1 151 1/1/97 
• Governmental Service Plan and Home Rule Community XIA Sec 2 152 CCAdoption 
Charter 
• Sub-county charters XIA Sec 3 152 CC Adoption 
• New Authority for HRCC CCAdoption 
- Vote requirements for local taxes IXA Sec 5 152 CCAdoption 
XIIIA Sec 4 155 
Vote requirements for GO bonds IXA Sec 4 152 CCAdoption 
XVI Sec 18 161 
- Authority to allocate local revenue XIA Sec 2(£) 152 CC Adoption 
Home Rule 
Authority 
- Charter cities XI Sec 5 150 1/1/97 
- Counties XI Sec 7 150 1/1/97 
- Home Rule Community Charters XIA Sec 6 152 CCAdoption 
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Commission's Recommendations 
-Guide By Article-
Article 
Article II 
Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and Recall 
• Place initiative constitutional amendments on November ballot (Sec. 8) 
• Legislative review and amendment of qualified statutory and constitutional initiatives 
(Sec. 8.5) 
• Amendment of statutory initiatives (Sec. 10) 
Article III 
State of California 
• Conforming change to eliminate Insurance Commissioner, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Treasurer, and members of the Board of Equalization from the list of state 
officers (Sec. 8) 
Article IV 
Legislative 
• Legislative term limits (Sec. 2.1) 
• Shorten legislative sessions (Sec. 3) 
• Allow legislators to participate in state retirement system (Sec. 4.5) 
• Shorten in-print requirement for legislation in house of origin (Sec. 8) 
• Forfeiture of pay by Governor and Legislature for failure to reach a budget agreement 
(Sec. 12 (h)) 
• Multiple subject budget implementation bill (Sec. 9) 
• Phased in three percent reserve (Sec. 12 (g)) 
• Balanced budget requirement (Sec. 12(f)) 
• Majority vote on budget (Sec 4( d) 
• Two-year budget (Sec 12.1) 
• Budget rebalancing process (Sec. 21.1) 
• Legislative oversight of the regulatory process (Sec. 29) 
• Performance budget measures (Sec 12 (a) 
Article V 
Executive 
• Strategic planning (Sec. 3) 
• State-local government realignment plan (Sec. 3.5) 
• Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall run on a single ticket in primary election 
(Sec. 9.5) 
• Governor retains power when absent from the state (Sec. 10) 
• Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Insurance Commissioner shall be 
appointed by the Governor (Sec. 12) 
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137 
138 
138 
144 
Article 
Article VII 
Public Officers and Employees 
• Conforming change eliminating Insurance Commissioner, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Treasurer, and members of the Board of Equalization as elective statewide 
offices Sec. 11) 
• Reduction of Personnel Board terms (Sec. 2) 
• Personnel Board Duties (Sec 3) 
Article IX 
Education 
• Conforming changes removing constitutional references to state Board of Education, 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction 
(Sec. 2 & 2.1) 
• Provide local boards with greater authority 
• Establish accountability system and standards for public schools 
• Reduction of the terms of the UC Regents and reduction of the number of members to 
conform with recommendations 
Article XI 
Local Government 
• Strengthening of the Home Rule provision 
• Procedures for governance under the Home Rule Community Charter of Article XIA 
Article XIA 
Community Charter 
• Establishment of the Community Charter Commission and process for adoption of Home 
Rule Community Charters 
Article XIII 
Taxation 
• Elimination of Board of Equalization and the establishment of a single state government 
entity in its place 
Article XIIIA 
Tax Limitation 
• Two-thirds vote requirement for local property taxes under the Home Rule Community 
Charter 
Article XIIIB 
Government Spending Limitation 
• Conforming changes on the limitations of state and local government spending under 
the two-year budget 
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Article 
Article XVI 
Public Finance 
• Balanced budget requirement 
• Public school system finance 
• Vote requirement for General Obligation bonds 
Article XVIII 
Amending and Revising The Constitution 
• Legislative amendments to the Constitution shall be placed on the November ballot 
Article XX 
Miscellaneous Subjects 
• Conforming changes to legislative terms 
Article XXI 
Reapportionment of Senate, Assembly, Congressional, and Board 
of Equalization Districts 
• Elimination of references to Board of Equalization districts 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE TO IMPLEMENT THE 
COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS * 
Resolved by the Senate, the Assembly concurring, That the Legislature of the State of California at its 1995-96 Regular 
Session commencing on the fifth day of December 1994, two-thirds of the members elected to each of the two houses 
of the Legislature voting therefor, hereby proposes to the people of the State of California that the Constitution of 
the State be amended as follows: 
First-That subdivision (c) of Section 8 of Article II thereof is amended to read: 
(c) (1) The Secretary of State shall then submit the measure at the next general election held at least 131 days 
after it qualifies or at any special statewide election held prior to that general election. The Governor may call a 
special statewide election for the measure. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an initiative measure that proposes an amendment to this Constitution shall be submitted 
to the electors only at a statewide election held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of an even-
numbered year. 
Second-That Section 8.5 is added to Article II thereof, to read: 
SEC. 8.5. (a) (1) Following certification of an initiative measure for the ballot, each house of the Legislature, at least 124 
days prior to the election at which the measure is to be voted upon, shall hold and complete a committee hearing during which 
testimony on the initiative measure shall be received. As an alternative to committee hearings of each house for this purpose, 
a hearing may be held by a joint committee of the Senate and the Assembly, or a hearing may be held at which separate committees 
of each house meet jointly. The proponents of the initiative measure shall be given written notice of a committee hearing held 
pursuant to this paragraph at least three days prior to the hearing. 
(2) Immediately upon the completion of the hearing or hearings both committees or, if applicable, the joint committee, shall 
recommend to the Legislature whether the Legislature should take a course of action described in subdivision (b), or should 
take no action. 
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (c) of Section 8, the Secretary of State immediately shall modify the initiative measure to 
include the legislative changes described in this subdivision if, not later than 117 days prior to the general election at which 
the initiative measure is scheduled to be submitted to the voters, both of the following occur: 
(1) By concurrent resolution adopted by both houses of the Legislature, by rollcall vote entered in the journal, the Legislature 
proposes only clarifying or technical changes, or both, to the initiative measure. 
(2) The legislative changes are endorsed in writing by the proponent or a majority of the proponents of the initiative measure, 
and that written endorsement is submitted to the Secretary of State. 
(c) The Secretary of State shall place any initiative measure, modified as provided by subdivision (b), on the ballot of the 
election at which the original initiative would have been submitted to the voters. 
(d) For the purposes of this section, "proponent" or "proponents" means the person or persons who submit a draft of a petition 
proposing the initiative measure to the Attorney General with a request that he or she prepare a title and summary of the measure 
as provided by law. 
Third-That subdivision (a) of Section 9 of Article II thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 9. (a) The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes except 
urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, arui statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current 
expenses of the State, urgency statutes, any statute implementing a budget bill as described in subdivision (b) of Section 
9 of Article IV, any statute enacting a budget bill, and any statute enacting a budget rebalancing bill. 
Fourth-That subdivision (c) of Section 10 of Article II thereof is amended to read: 
(c) (1) The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes. It may am-eM GJ: ~ aH initiative~ 
P:y another ~ .that becomes effective nnly wrum approved P:y tl:le electors ~ tl:le initiative ~ permits 
amendment GJ: ~ without th@ii: approval. 
(2) The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved 
by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval. This paragraph applies only 
to initiative statutes approved by the electors on or before November 5, 1996. 
* NOTE: This language was included in Senate Constitutional Amendment 39 and Assembly Constitutional Amendment 49 which 
were introduced in the California Legislature on May 13, 1996. No action was taken. Effective and operative dates contained 
in this language assume adoption by the voters in November 1996. For placement on future ballots, effective dates would 
need to be revised accordingly. 
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(3) With regard to initiative statutes approved by the electors after November 5, 1996: 
(A) The Legislature rtUIY amend or repeal an initiative statute that has been in effect for less than six years by another statute 
that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without 
their approval. 
(B) The Legislature, by a two-thirds vote of the membership of each house, and notwithstanding any provision in the initiative 
statute, may amend or repeal an initiative statute by a statute that does not become operative sooner than six years after the 
initiative statute took effect. A bill to enact a statute pursuant to this subparagraph shall specifically identify the affected initiative 
statute, and state that the initiative statute was previously approved by the electors and the date on which the approval occurred. 
This subparagraph does not affect the power of the electors to amend or repeal an initiatipe statute pursuant to Section 8. 
Fifth-That subdivision (b) of Section 14 of Article II thereof is amended to read: 
(b) A petition to recall a statewide officer must be signed by electors equal in number to 12 percent of the last 
vote for the office, with signatures from each of 5 counties equal in number to 1 percent of the last vote for the office 
in the county. Signatures to recall Senators, members of the Assembly, membsrs Gf ~ ~ Gf Eqy.alization, and 
judges of courts of appeal and trial courts must equal in number 20 percent of the last vote for the office. 
Sixth-That subdivision (1) of Section 8 of Article III thereof is amended to read: 
(l) "State officer," as used in this section, means the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller, 
Insurancs Commissionsr, Secretary of State, Supsrintendent Gf ~ Instruction, Treasurer, member Gf ~ ~ 
~ Gf Eqy.ali!6ation, and Member of the Legislature. 
Seventh-That Section 2 of Article IV thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 2. (a) The Senate has a membership of 40 Senators elected for~ four-year terms, 20 to begin every 
2. two years. No Senator may serve more than 1 two terms. 
The Assembly has a membership of 80 members elected for ~ two-year terms. No member of the Assembly 
may serve more than ~ three terms. 
Their terms shall commence on the first Monday in Dscembsr January next following their election or, if that day 
is a holiday, then on the next day. 
(b) Election of members of the Assembly shall be on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of even-
numbered years unless otherwise prescribed by the Legislature. Senators shall be elected at the same time and places 
as members of the Assembly. 
(c) A person is ineligible to be a member of the Legislature unless the person is an elector and has been a resident 
of the legislative district for one year, and a citizen of the United States and a resident of California for~ three years, 
immediately preceding the election. 
(d) When a vacancy occurs in the Legislature the Governor immediately shall call an election to fill the vacancy. 
(e) The limitations on the number of terms prescribed by this section shall not apply to any term of office as a Senator or 
member of the Assembly that commences on or after January 6, 2003. This section shall remain in effect only until January 
6, 2003, and as of that date is repealed. 
Eighth-That Section 2.1 is added to Article IV thereof, to read: 
SEC. 2.1. (a) The Senate has a membership of 40 Senators elected for four-year terms, 20 to begin every two years. No 
Senator may serve more than three terms. 
The Assembly has a membership of 80 members elected for four-year terms, 40 to begin every two years. No member of the 
Assembly rtUIY serve more than three terms. 
Their terms shall commence on the first Monday in January next following their election or, if that day is a holiday, then 
on the next day. 
(b) Election of members of the Assembly shall be on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of even-
numbered years unless otherwise prescribed by the Legislature. Senators shall be elected at the same time and places as members 
of the Assembly. 
(c) A person is ineligible to be a member of the Legislature unless the person is an elector and has been a resident of the 
legislative district for one year, and a citizen of the United States and a resident of California for three years, immediately preceding 
the election. 
(d) When a vacancy occurs in the Legislature the Governor immediately shall call an election to fill the vacancy. 
Ninth-That Section 3 of Article IV thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 3. (a) The Legislature shall convene in regular session in each odd-numbered year at noon on the first Monday 
in December Gf @ach even numbered ~ January or, if that day is a holiday then on the next day, and each house shall 
immediately shall organize. The Legislature shall not meet in regular session on or after July 8th of any calendar year, except 
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that, immediately following the conclusion of the 60-day period described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b) of 
Section 10, the Legislature may meet for a period of not more than five consecutive days to reconsider any bill returned by 
the Governor in that calendar year. Either house of the Legislature may authorize the introduction of bills at any time during 
a regular or special session, including during any recess of the house. Each session of the Legislature shall adjourn sine 
die by operation of the Constitution at midnight on November 30 December 31 of the following even-numbered year. 
(b) On extraordinary occasions the Governor by proclamation may cause the Legislature to assemble in special 
session. When so assembled it has power to legislate only on subjects specified in the proclamation but may provide 
for expenses and other matters incidental to the session. 
Tenth-That Section 4.5 of Article IV is thereof amended to read: 
SEC. 4.5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution or other existing law, a person elected to or 
serving in the Legislature on or after November 1, 1990, shall participate in the Federal Social Security (Retirement, 
Disability, Health Insurance) Program System, and~ may elect to participate in the Public Employees' Retirement System. 
The State shall pay only the employer's share of the contribution contributions necessary to su4 that participation. 
No other pension or retirement benefit shall accrue as a result of service in the Legislature, su4 that service not 
being intended as a career occupation. This Section section shall not be construed to abrogate or diminish any vested 
pension or retirement benefit whlch that may have accrued under an existing law to a person holding or having 
held office in the Legislature, but upon adoption of this Act act no further entitlement to nor vesting in any existing 
program shall accrue to any such person, other than the Social Security System and the Public Employees' Retirement 
System to the extent herein provided. 
Eleventh-That Section 8 of Article IV thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 8. (a) At regular sessions no bill other than the budget bill may be heard or acted on by committee or either 
house until the 11th day after the bill is introduced, nor may any such bill be passed by the house of origin until the 31st 
day after the bill is introduced rmless , except that the house dispenses witA tl+.is requirement may dispense with either 
or both of these requirements by rollcall vote entered in the journal, tRree ~ threefourths of the membership concurring. 
(b) The Legislature may make no law except by statute and may enact no statute except by bill. No bill may be 
passed unless it is read by title on 3 days in each house except that the house may dispense with this requirement 
by rollcall vote entered in the journal, twG .thWs two-thirds of the membership concurring. No bill may be passed 
until the bill with amendments has been printed and distributed to the members. No bill may be passed unless, 
by rollcall vote entered in the journal, a majority of the membership of each house concurs. 
(c) (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision, a statute enacted at a regular session shall 
go into effect on January 1 next following a 90-day period from the date of enactment of the statute and a statute 
enacted at a special session shall go into effect on the 91st day after adjournment of the special session at which 
the bill was passed. 
(2) A statute, other than a statute establishing or changing boundaries of any legislative, congressional, or other 
election district, enacted by a bill passed by the Legislature on or before the date the Legislature adjourns for a joint 
recess to reconvene in the second calendar year of the biennium of the legislative session, and in the possession 
of the Governor after that date, shall go into effect on January 1 next following the enactment date of the statute 
unless, before January 1, a copy of a referendum petition affecting the statute is submitted to the Attorney General 
pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 10 of Article II, in which event the statute shall go into effect on the 91st day 
after the enactment date unless the petition has been presented to the Secretary of State pursuant to subdivision 
(b) of Section 9 of Article II. 
(3) Statutes calling elections, statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses 
of the State, and urgency statutes, any statute implementing a budget bill as described in subdivision (b) of Section 9 and 
any statute enacting a budget bill shall go into effect immediately upon their enactment. 
(d) Urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety. A statement 
of facts constituting the necessity shall be set forth in one section of the bill. In each house the section and the bill 
shall be passed separately, each by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two tRirGs two-thirds of the membership concurring. 
An urgency statute may not create or abolish any office Gr , change the salary, term, or duties of any office, Gr grant 
any franchise or special privilege, or create any vested right or interest. 
(e) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed. 
Twelfth-That Section 8 is added to Article IV thereof, to read: 
SEC. 8. (a) At regular sessions no bill other than the budget bill may be heard or acted on by committee or either house 
until the 11th day after the bill is introduced, nor may any such bill be passed by the house of origin until the 31st day after 
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the bill is introduced, except that the house may dispense with either or both of these requirements by rollcall vote entered in 
the journal, three1ourths of the membership concurring. 
(b) The Legislature may make no law except by statute and may enact no statute except by bill. No bill may be passed unless 
it is read by title on 3 days in each house except that the house may dispense with this requirement by rollcall vote entered 
in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring. No bill may be passed until the bill with amendments has been printed 
and distributed to the members. No bill may be passed unless, by rollcall vote entered in the journal, a majority of the membership 
of each house concurs. 
(c) (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision, a statute enacted at a regular session shall go into 
effect on January 1 next following a 90-day period from the date of enactment of the statute and a statute enacted at a special 
session shall go into effect on the 91st day after adjournment of the special session at which the bill was passed. 
(2) A statute, other than a statute establishing or changing boundaries of any legislative, congressional, or other election 
district, enacted by a bill passed by the Legislature on or before the date the Legislature adjourns for a joint recess to reconvene 
in the second calendar year of the biennium of the legislative session, and in the possession of the Governor after that date, 
shall go into effect on January 1 next following the enactment date of the statute unless, before January 1, a copy of a referendum 
petition affecting the statute is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 10 of Article II, in 
which event the statute shall go into effect on the 91st day after the enactment date unless the petition has been presented to 
the Secretary of State pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 9 of Article II. 
(3) Statutes calling elections, statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses of the State, 
urgency statutes, any statute implementing a budget bill as described in subdivision (b) of Section 9, any statute enacting a 
budget bill, and any statute enacting a budget rebalancing bill shall go into effect immediately upon their enactment. 
(d) Urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety. A statement of 
facts constituting the necessity shall be set forth in one section of the bill. In each house the section and the bill shall be passed 
separately, each by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring. An urgency statute may not 
create or abolish any office, change the salary, term, or duties of any office, grant any franchise or special privilege, or create 
any vested right or interest. 
Thirteenth-That Section 9 of Article IV thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 9. A as provided in subdivision a statute shall embrace but one "u'"cc'-'· 
in its title. If a statute embraces a not its the not ex1JressE~d void. A 
One statute may be enacted each calendar year that embraces more than one 
in law that are necessary to the the nn11rn-nri.?titln<; 
P'YYJrP<:<:.Pfi in itS 
act. If the statute makes a substantive 
any section the bill'"'"'+"'"'"'u' 
the statute! 
those '"'""'"'''""' 
if the statute makes rVI~ffft>,c>C 
rnnrJm,Pnr:'Ino that calendar 
the 
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that change is void. The Governor, while approving other sections of the bill that enacts the statute, may eliminate one or more 
sections that he or she determines not to be reasonably related to the implementation of one or more of the purposes of the budget 
rebalancing bill as enacted. Any section of the bill eliminated by the Governor pursuant to that determination shall be '>Pn•'1mi'Pi11 
reconsidered and may be passed over the Governor's veto in the same manner as bills. 
(c) A statute may not be amended by reference to its title. A section of a statute may not be amended unless the section 
is re-enacted as amended. 
Fifteenth-That Section 10 of Article IV thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 10. (a) Each bill passed by the Legislature shall be presented to the Governor. It becomes a statute if it 
is signed by the Governor. The Governor may veto it by returning it with any objections to the house of origin, which 
shall enter the objections in the journal and proceed to reconsider it. If each house then passes the bill by rollcall 
vote entered in the journal, two thirds of the membership concurring, it becomes a statute. 
(b) (1) Any bill, other than a bill which would establish or change boundaries of any legislative, congressional, 
or other election district, passed by the Legislature on or before the date the Legislature adjourns fffi: a ~ ~ 
.00 reconv~ m ~ ~ in July of the first calendar year of the biennium of the legislative session pursuant to subdivision 
(a) of Section 3, and in the possession of the Governor after that date, that is not returned within ,W 60 days after 
that date becomes a statute. 
(2) Any bill passed by the Legislature on or before Sep~mber 1- the date the Legislature adjourns in July of the second 
calendar year of the biennium of the legislative session pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 3, and in the possession 
of the Governor on or after Septsmber .t that date! that is not returned GR Ql' ~ September ,W e£ tRat ~ within 
60 days after that date, becomes a statute. 
(3) Any other bill to the Governor that is not returned within 12 becomes a statute. 
(4) If the Legislature by adjournment of a special session the return of a bill with the veto message, the 
bill becomes a statute unless the Governor vetoes the bill within 12 after it is by it and 
the veto message in the office of the of State. 
(5) If the 12th of the within which the Governor is to perform an act 
of this subdivision is a or the is extended to the next 
--------------------------------d 
during the fiscal year for which the budget bill is to be enacted, except emergency bills recommended by the Governor 
or appropriations for the salaries nn4 expenses of the Legislature , not including salaries, or travel or living expenses, 
of Members of the Legislature . 
(d) No bill except the budget bill may contain more than one item of appropriation, and that for one certain, expressed 
purpose. Appropriations from the General Fund of the State, except appropriations for the public schools or appropriations 
made in the budget bill or a budget implementation bill as described in subdivision (b) of Section 9, are void unless passed 
in each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, ~ .tl:Hr4s two-thirds of the membership concurring. 
(e) The Legislature may control the submission, approval, and enforcement of budgets and the filing of claims 
for all state agencies. 
(j) (1) The total of all expenditures that are authorized to be made from the .General Fund of the State by the budget bill 
or any other statute for the fiscal year for which the budget bill is to be enacted, combined with the total of all General Fund 
reserves required under subdivision (g) for that fiscal year and any deficit in the General Fund remaining from the preceding 
fiscal year, may not exceed the total of all revenues and other resources, including reserves for prior years, that are estimated 
to be available to the State for General Fund purposes for that fiscal year. The total amount of those expenditures and reserves 
authorized by the budget bill or any other statute for that fiscal year, as of the date of enactment of the budget bill, together 
with any deficit in the General Fund remaining from the preceding fiscal year, and the total amount of the revenues and other 
resources, including reserves, estimated to be available to the State for General Fund purposes for that fiscal year, shall be set 
forth expressly in the budget bill. 
(2) After the enactment of the budget bill, no bill shall be enacted that would cause the total of all General Fund expenditures, 
together with any remaining deficit, as identified pursuant to paragraph (1) for the fiscal year for which the budget bill is enacted, 
to exceed the total of all revenues and other resources estimated for that fiscal year pursuant to paragraph (1). If any bill is 
enacted that makes an appropriation in violation of this paragraph, as determined by final judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, all sections of that bill that make an appropriation are thereupon void. 
(g) (1) Except as otherwise specified in paragraph (2), the budget bill for each fiscal year shall provide for a state reserve 
fund, to include General Fund moneys in an amount equal to 3 percent of the total of all expenditures that, as of the date of 
enactment of the budget bill, are authorized to be made from the General Fund of the State for that fiscal year by the budget 
bill and any other statute. 
(2) The minimum amount required to be set aside in the state reserve fund as provided for by this subdivision for the 1997-98 
fiscal year shall be an amount equal to one-third, and for the 1998-99 fiscal year shall be an amount equal to two-thirds, of 
the amount that otherwise would be calculated for each of those fiscal years pursuant to paragraph (1). 
(h) Notwithstanding Sections 4 and 8 of Article III and Section 4 of this article, in any year in which the budget bill is 
not enacted by midnight on June 30, the Governor and each Member of the Legislature shall forfeit any salary or reimbursement 
for travel or living expenses during any regular or special session for the period from midnight on June 30 until the day preceding 
the date that the budget bill is enacted. No forfeited salary or travel and living expenses shall be paid retroactively. 
(i) This section shall not apply to The budget or budget bill for any fiscal period commencing on or after July 1, 2001. This 
section shall remain in effect only until July 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed. 
Seventeenth-That Section 12.1 is added to Article IV thereof, to read: 
SEC. 12.1. (a) Within the first 10 days of each odd-numbered calendar year, the Governor shall submit to the Legislature, 
with an explanatory message, a budget for the two-year fiscal period commencing on the ensuing July 1, containing itemized 
statements for recommended state expenditures and estimated state revenues. If recommended expenditures exceed estimated 
revenues, the Governor shall recommend the sources from which the additional revenues should be provided. Together with 
the budget, the Governor shall submit to the Legislature a statement , as prescribed by statute, identifying both the policy goals 
to be accomplished by the recommended state expenditures and outcome-based performance measures to determine the extent 
to which the goals are accomplished, for use by the Legislature in considering the budget bill. 
(b) The Governor and the Governor-elect may require a state agency, officer, or employee to furnish whatever information 
is deemed necessary to prepare the budget. 
(c) The budget shall be accompanied by a budget bill itemizing recommended expenditures. The bill shall be introduced immediately 
by the person chairing the committee that considers the budget. The Legislature shall pass the budget bill by midnight on June 
30 of the year in which it is introduced. Until the budget bill has been enacted, the Legislature shall not send to the Governor 
for consideration any bill appropriating funds for expenditure during the fiscal period for which the budget bill is to be enacted, 
except emergency bills recommended by the Governor or appropriations for the expenses of the Legislature, not including salaries, 
or travel or living expenses, of Members of the Legislature. 
(d) No bill except the budget bill, or the budget rebalancing bill enacted for the purpose set forth in subdivision (h), may 
contain more than one item of appropriation, and that for one certain, expressed purpose. Appropriations from the General Fund 
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of the State, except appropriations for the public schools or appropriations made in the budget bill , the budget implementation 
bill as described in subdivision (b) of Section 9, or the budget rebalancing bill, are void unless passed by the Legislature by 
rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring. 
(e) The Legislature may control the submission, approval, and enforcement of budgets and the filing of claims for all state 
agencies. 
(j) (1) The total of all expenditures that are authorized to be made from the General Fund of the State by the budget bill 
or any other statute for the ensuing fiscal period for which the budget bill is to be enacted, combined with the total of all General 
Fund reserves required under subdivision (g) for that fiscal period and any deficit in the General Fund remaining from the 
preceding fiscal period, may not exceed the total of all revenues and other resources, including reserves for prior years, that 
are estimated to be available to the State for General Fund purposes for that ensuing fiscal period. The total amount of those 
expenditures and reserves authorized by the budget bill or any other statute for that ensuing fiscal period, as of the date of 
enactment of the budget bill, together with any deficit in the General Fund remaining from the preceding fiscal period, and 
the total amount of the revenues and other resources, including reserves, estimated to be available to the State for General Fund 
purposes for that ensuing fiscal period, shall be set forth expressly in the budget bill. 
(2) After the enactment of the budget bill, no bill shall be enacted that would cause the total of all General Fund expenditures, 
together with any remaining deficit, as identified pursuant to paragraph (1) for the fiscal period for which the budget bill is 
enacted, to exceed the total of all revenues and other resources estimated for that fiscal period pursuant to paragraph (1). If 
any bill is enacted that makes an appropriation in violation of this paragraph, as determined by final judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction, all sections of that bill that make an appropriation are thereupon void. 
(g) (1) The budget bill for each fiscal period shall provide for a state reserve fund, to include General Fund moneys in an 
amount equal to 3 percent of the total of all expenditures that, as of the date of enactment of the budget bill, are authorized 
to be made from the General Fund of the State for that fiscal period by the budget bill and any other statute. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subdivision, if, at the conclusion of any fiscal period, the balance of the state 
reserve fund is less than the amount required to be provided for in that fund for that fiscal period pursuant to paragraph (1), 
at the election of the Legislature, as declared in the budget act, the minimum amount that shall be required to be provided for 
in that fund by the budget act for the next succeeding fiscal period shall be an amount equal to that remaining balance. Regardless 
of the concluding balance for that succeeding fiscal period, the minimum amount required to be provided for in the state reserve 
fund by the budget act for the fiscal period following a fiscal period for which that election is made shall be determined pursuant 
to paragraph (1). 
(h) (1) No later than February 1 of each even-numbered calendar year, the Governor shall submit to the Legislature a budget 
rebalancing plan containing recommendations for adjustments in expenditures or revenues, or other changes, as necessary to 
maintain the balance required by subdivision (j) throughout the two-year period for which the budget bill was enacted. The 
plan shall be accompanied, as appropriate, by a budget rebalancing bill itemizing those adjustments or other changes, as described 
in subdivision (b) of Section 9. The bill shall be introduced immediately by the person chairing the committee that considers 
the budget. 
(2) If the Governor determines that no adjustments are necessary for the purpose described in paragraph (1), he or she shall 
submit to the Legislature by February 1 a report updating, for the current fiscal period, the totals of expenditures, reserves, 
deficits, and revenues and other resources identified for that fiscal period pursuant to subdivision (j). 
(i) Notwithstanding Sections 4 and 8 of Article III and Section 4 of this article, in any odd-numbered calendar year in which 
the budget bill is not enacted by midnight on June 30, the Governor and each Member of the Legislature shall forfeit any salary 
or reimbursement for travel or living expenses during any regular or special session for the period from midnight on June 30 
until the day preceding the date that the budget bill is enacted. No forfeited salary or travel and living expenses shall be paid 
retroactively. 
(j) This section applies only to the budget and budget bill for fiscal periods commencing on or after July 1, 2001. 
(k) Whenever, in this Constitution or any other law, reference is made to "Section 12" of this article, that reference shall 
be deemed to refer to this section unless that reference expressly provides that it does not apply to this section. 
Eighteenth-That Section 18 of Article IV thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 18. (a) The Assembly has the sole power of impeachment. Impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. A 
person may not be convicted unless, by rollcall vote entered in the journal, twG .thl£4; two-thirds of the membership 
of the Senate concurs. 
(b) State officers elected on a statewide basis 7 members ~ the £tate ~ ~ Eqaalization, and judges of state 
courts are subject to impeachment for misconduct in office. Judgment may extend only to removal from office and 
disqualification to hold any office under the State, but the person convicted or acquitted remains subject to criminal 
punishment according to law. 
Appendix 5-Page 143 
--------------------------------~ 
Nineteenth-That Section 29 is added to Article IV thereof, to read: 
SEC. 29. (a) The Legislature may, by adoption of a concurrent resolution, repeal any state agency regulation. Regulations 
repealed by the Legislature shall thereafter have no force or effect. 
(b) Any concurrent resolution to repeal a regulation shall identify specifically the regulation to be repealed or, if an entire 
title, part, division, chapter, or article is to be repealed, a specific reference thereto shall be made. 
(c) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to this section shall be subject to the same procedural rules, including, 
but not limited to, rules regarding public notice, printing, and committee referral, that apply to bills. 
(d) Every regulation, to be effective, shall include a citation to the statute or constitutional provision that is being interpreted, 
carried out, or otherwise made more specific by the regulation. 
(e) As used in this section, the term "state agency" includes every state office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, 
and commission, whether created by the Constitution, statute, or initiative, but does not include the courts, any agency in the 
judicial or legislative branch of state government, the University of California, or the Hastings College of the Law. 
(j) As used in this section, the term "regulation" includes every rule, regulation, order, or standard of general application 
or the amendment, supplement, or revision of any of those rules, regulations, orders, or standards adopted by any state agency 
to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure, except one that 
relates only to the internal management of the state agency. "Regulation" does not mean or include any form prescribed by 
a state agency or any instructions relating to the use of the form, except that this provision is not a limitation upon any provision 
of law governing the adoption of any regulation that is needed to implement the law under which the form is issued. 
Twentieth-That Section 3 of Article V thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 3. (a) The Governor shall report to the Legislature each calendar year on the condition of the State and 
may make recommendations. 
(b) In addition to the report prepared pursuant to subdivision (a), in 2001 and every fourth year thereafter the Governor 
shall submit a strategic plan to the Legislature, no later than February 1, that sets forth all of the following: 
(1) Policy and fiscal priorities of the State. 
(2) Outcome-based performance measures that gauge the productivity of state expenditures. 
(3) A capital facilities and financing plan that includes a state policy for infrastructure investment, an assignment of responsibilities 
for implementing the capital outlay plan, and the financing methods to be used for each program area. 
( 4) Proposed programmatic relationships between the State and local government agencies. 
(c) In each calendar year specified in subdivision (b), the Legislature shall adopt a concurrent resolution containing findings 
and declarations of the Legislature, with regard to the issues set forth in the strategic plan submitted that year by the Governor. 
Twenty-First-That Section 3.5 is added to Article V thereof, to read: 
SEC. 3.5. (a) By October 1, 1997, the Governor shall submit a state-local government realignment plan to the Legislature. 
To assist in preparing the plan, the Governor shall establish an advisory committee including representatives of local government. 
The plan shall include the assignment of program responsibilities of state and local government, assigning program responsibility, 
to the extent possible, to the agency of government having the authority to organize, administer, and finance the program. In 
the case of a program that is shared among government agencies, the plan shall provide for administrative flexibility at the 
local level. 
(b) The realignment plan shall be submitted to the Legislature in the form , as appropriate, of a bill setting forth any necessary 
statutory changes, a measure proposing amendment or revision to the Constitution, or both. The bill or measure shall be introduced 
immediately in each house by the chair of the committee that considers local government matters and, subject to amendment, 
shall be passed by the Legislature and presented to the Governor by June 30, 1998, or, in the case of a measure proposing amendment 
or revision to the Constitution, shall be submitted to the voters at the general election held on November 3, 1998. 
(c) Following the adoption of the realignment plan statute, the constitutional amendment or revision, or both, as appropriate, 
the state-local government realignment plan, as reviewed and updated, shall be incorporated into the state strategic plan described 
in subdivision (b) of Section 3. 
Twenty-Second-That subdivision (b) of Section 5 of Article V thereof is amended to read: 
(b) Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Superinmndent Gf ~ Instruction, ti::l.@ Lieutenant Governor, 
Secretary of State, Controller, TI'E!asurer, or Attorney General, GJ: Gn ~ £tate &am Gf Equalization, the Governor 
shall nominate a person to fill the vacancy who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority of the membership 
of the Senate and a majority of the membership of the Assembly and who shall hold office for the balance of the 
unexpired term. In the event the nominee is neither confirmed nor refused confirmation by both the Senate and 
the Assembly within 90 days of the submission of the nomination, the nominee shall take office as if he or she had 
been confirmed by a majority of the Senate and Assembly 7 provided1 that i£ ~ However, i£ ~ 90-day period 
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ends during a recess of the Legislature, the period shall be extended until the sixth day following the day on which 
the Legislature reconvenes. 
Twenty-Third-That Section 9.5 is added to Article V thereof, to read: 
SEC. 9.5. (a) The Governor and the Lieutenant Governor shall be of the same political party. With respect to each political 
party, the person receiving the highest number of votes in a primary election for Governor and the person receiving the highest 
number of votes in a primary election for Lieutenant Governor shall jointly represent that political party at the general election. 
(b) The candidate for Governor shall appear on the ballot jointly with the candidate for Lieutenant Governor and each shall 
be elected by the casting by each voter of a single vote applicable to both offices. 
Twenty-Fourth-That Section 10 of Article V thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 10. The Lieutenant Governor shall become Governor when a vacancy occurs in the office of Governor. 
The Lieutenant Governor shall act as Governor during the impeachment 7 absenciOl £mm tile~ of the Governor 
or ~ during any temporary disability of the Governor or of a Governor-elect who fails to take office. 
The Legislature shall provide an order of precedence after the Lieutenant Governor for succession to the office 
of Governor and for the temporary exercise of the Governor's functions. 
The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions arising under this section. 
Standing to raise questions of vacancy or temporary disability is vested exclusively in a body provided by statute. 
Twenty-Fifth-That Section 10.5 is added to Article V thereof, to read: 
SEC. 10.5. (a) The Governor may appoint the Lieutenant Governor to any office or position in the executive branch of 
government. The Lieutenant Governor shall hold that office or position at the pleasure of the Governor. Except as specified in 
subdivision (b), the Lieutenant Governor shall not hold more than one office or position to which he or she has been appointed 
under this subdivision at any one time. 
(b) The Lieutenant Governor may hold other offices or positions as provided by statute or the Constitution. 
Twenty-Sixth-That Section 11 of Article V thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 11. The Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller, and Secretary of State 7 nn4 Tn2asurer shall be 
elected at the same time and places and for the same term as the Governor. No Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, 
Controller, or Secretary of State 7 Gr Tn2asurer may serve in the same office for more than 2 terms. 
Twenty-Seventh-That Section 12 is added to Article V thereof, to read: 
SEC. 12. The Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Insurance Commissioner shall be appointed by the Governor, 
subject to confirmation by the Senate, and shall hold office at the pleasure of the Governor. 
Twenty-Eighth-That subdivision (f) of Section 14 of Article V thereof is amended to read: 
(f) "State officer," as used in this section, means the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller, 
Insurance Commissioner, and Secretary of State 7 Superintendent Gi ~ Instruction, Treasurer, nn4 member Gi 
~ ~ ~ Gi Equalization. 
Twenty-Ninth-That Section 2 of Article VII thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 2. (a) There is a Personnel Board of 5 members appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, 
a majority of the membership concurring, for 10 year 6-year terms and until their successors are appointed and qualified. 
Appointment to fill a vacancy is for the unexpired portion of the term. A member may be removed by concurrent 
resolution adopted by each house, two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring. 
(b) The board annually shall elect one of its members as presiding officer. 
(c) The board shall appoint and prescribe compensation for an executive officer who shall be a member of the 
civil service but not a member of the board. 
Thirtieth-That Section 3 of Article VII thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 3. (a) The board shall enforce the civil service statutes and, by majority vote of all its members, shall pr€lscribe 
prooationary periods nn4 classifications, adopt other rules authorized by statute , and review disciplinary actions. 
(b) The executive officer shall administer the civil service statutes under rules of the board. 
Thirty-First-That subdivision (i) of Section 4 of Article VII thereof is amended to read: 
(i) The teaching staff of schools under the jurisdiction of the State Department of Education er tile Superintendent 
~~Instruction. 
Thirty-Second-That subdivision (a) of Section 10 of Article VII thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 10. (a) No person who is found liable in a civil action for making libelous or slanderous statements against 
an opposing candidate during the course of an election campaign for any federal, statewide, ~ Gi E~ualization, 
or legislative office or for any county, city and county, city, district, or any other local elective office shall retain the 
seat to which he or she is elected, where it is established that the libel or slander was a major contributing cause 
in the defeat of an opposing candidate. 
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A libelous or slanderous statement shall be deemed to have been made by a person within the meaning of this 
section if that person actually made the statement or if the person actually or constructively assented to, authorized, 
or ratified the statement. 
"Federal office," as used in this section, means the office of United States Senator and Member of the House of 
Representatives; aa4 to the ~xtent that the provisiOilS e£ this section 4G does not conflict with any provision of federal 
law, it is intended that candidates seeking the office of United States Senator or Member of the House of Representatives 
comply with this section. 
Thirty-Third-That Section 2 of Article IX thereof is repealed. 
~ Z. A SuperiatenGlent ~ ~ Instruction shall bQ electeGl ~ th@ "iualifieGl el9ctors e£ th@ StaW at ~ 
gubernatorial election. ::Qle. SuperintenGlent e£ l4lblie Inswction shall enter :ypnn the dYties e£ the ~ on th@ first 
Monday aftel: the first 4a;t e£ Janyary ~ succeeGling ~ gybematorial election. ~ SuperintenGlent ~ ~ 
Instruction ~ ~ more tl:\an 2. terms. 
Thirty-Fourth-That Section 2.1 of Article IX thereof is repealed. 
SEG. l,.l... ~ State lloarG e£ EGlYcation, on nommatinn e£ the 5\lperintenGlent e£ ~ Inswction, sllall appoint 
~ Deputy SuperintenGlent e£ l4lblie Instruction and tmee .'tssociate 5\lperintenGlents e£ ~ Inswction :wl:\,Q 
~ bQ e*empt £rGm state ~ service aa4 wl\ose tefms e£ Gffiee shall bQ fuY£ ;rears. 
+Ris seQion sllall not bQ cOilSweGl as prohibiting the appointn'lent, in accomance witl\ law, e£ aGlGitional.'\.£sociate 
SuperintenGlentB ~ ~ Imwction ~to state ~ service. 
Thirty-Fifth-That Section 3 of Article IX thereof is repealed. 
SEc;;. J.. A SuperintenGlent e£ Schools fui: ea4 coYnty ~ bQ electeGl ~ th@ "iualifieGl electors thereof at ea4 
gubernatorial election '* ~ bQ appointeGl ~ the mYnty Poar4 ~ eGlucation, aa4 the manner e£ the selection shall 
~ GletermineGl ~ a majority ¥Gte ~ th@ electors ~ th@ mYnty ¥Gting Otl th@ "l\lestion; proviGleGl, that tw:o Gr more 
counties ma;7 ~ an election conGlucteGl pursuant to Section J..2. ~ this ~ Ytlite fui: th@ purpose e£ electing Gr 
appointing one joint superintenGlent fui: th@ co1mties so Ytliting. 
Thirty-Sixth-That Section 3.1 of Article IX thereof is repealed. 
SEc;;. J..l. {a} Not>.vithstanQing any provision e£ this Cotl!ltirution to the contrary, the Legislatw:e shall prescribe 
~ qyalifkations re"'YireGl ~ mYtlty superintenGlentB ~ schools, and fui: these purposes shall classify th@ several 
counties in th@ State. 
(bj NotwithstanGling any provision e£ this Constimtion to th@ contrary, th@ mYnty Poar4 ~ eGlucation Gr joint 
county Poar4 ~ eGlucation, as th@ ~ ~ ber shall ~ th@ salary e£ th@ mYnty superintenGlent ~ schools Gr th@ 
jQint county superintenGlent ~ schools, respectv;ely. 
Thirty-Seventh-That Section 3.2 of Article IX thereof is repealed. 
SEc;;. ~ NotwithstanGling any provision e£ this COilStit\ltion to the contra~y, any tw:o or more chartereGl cOYnties, 
'* nonchartereGl col:Ulties, Gr any coltlbination theE9of, ma;7 ~ a majority ¥Gte ~ th@ electors ~ each such coYnty 
voting Otl the proposition at an election call9d fui: that purpose in each such country', establish one joint ~ ~ 
edYCation aa4 one joint COYtlty superintenGent e£ schools for the co\lnties so Ytliting. A joint CO\ltlty boarQ e£ eGiYcatinn 
and a joint mYnty superintenGlent ~ schools shall bQ govemeGl ~ the general stamtes anGl shall not bQ govemeGl 
~ ~ provisions e£ any mYnty charter. 
Thirty-Eighth-That Section 3.3 of Article IX thereof is repealed. 
~ ~ ~as proviGeGl in Section J..2. e£ this~ it shall bQ competent to proviGle in any charter frameGl 
for a county Ytl4er any provision e£ this Constit\ltion, Gr ~ th@ amenGlment e£ any such charter, fui: th@ election 
~ ~ meltlbers ~ th@ mYtlty ~ e£ ed\lcation ~ such mYtlty anGl fui: tl:\@ir "l\lalifications anGl tefms ~ office.. 
Thirty-Ninth-That Section 4 is added to Article IX thereof, to read: 
SEC. 4. (a) The Public School System includes all public kindergartens, elementary schools, and secondary schools established 
in accordance with law, and the school districts and other public agencies authorized to maintain those kindergartens and schools. 
(b) No school or any part of the Public School System shall be, directly or indirectly, transferred from the Public School 
System or placed under the jurisdiction of any authority other than one included within the Public School System. 
(c) Solely for purposes of subdivision (d) of Section 12 of Article IV, the "public schools" include the Public School System, 
the California Community Colleges, and the California State University. 
Fortieth-That Section 5.5 is added to Article IX thereof, to read: 
SEC. 5.5. Each school district maintaining one or more public schools shall be governed by a board of education elected, 
in accordance with law, by the voters in the school district. · 
Forty-First-That Section 6 of Article IX thereof is amended to read: 
SEC 6. ~ person, other than a substimte empl~e, employeGl ~ a school Gistrict as a teacher or in any other 
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p9sition l'@qtliring certificatign q:yalifications AAall be paiQ a ~ whlch AAall be at tl:w rate ~ an annttal ~ 
~ ~ kss ~ twenty four hundred 4ollars ($2AOO) for a~ ssrving. full ~as dsfinsd by law. 
~ l2uPlic £chool Sysoom shall iP.dude all kindsrgartsn schools, slsmffitill)' schools, sscondary schools, oochnical 
schools, and state collsgss, establishsd in accordance with law and, in addition, tl:w schoGl districts and ~ ~ 
agencies authorized to maintain them.. Wo schoGl Gr ~ Gr .any: ~ ¥aft ~ tl:w l2uPlic £chool Systsm AAall ~ 
directly Gr indirectly, transfsrrsd from tl:w ~ School Systsm Gr placed ~ tl:w jurisdiction ~ .any: authority 
~than one included within~~ School System. 
~ Legislature shall adG to the State £choolllund such ~ ~ £rom the l'@V:enues g{ the Stat9 as shall prov:ide 
m said funG for apportionment in ea4 fiscal~ an amount :nGt kss ~one hundrsd ~ dGllars ~ ~ 
pupil in avsrage daily attsndance in the kindergartsn schools, elemsntary schools, secondary schools, and technical 
schools in the~ School System during~ mOO: preceding fiscal y.e.ar.. (a) There shall be maintained in the State 
Treasury the State School Fund. Appropriations by the State for the support of the Public School System shall be transferred 
to the State School Fund prior to apportionment. 
(b) The entire State School Fund shall be apportioned in each fiscal year in such the manner as the Legislature 
nny: provide provides, through the school districts and other public agencies maintaining such schools, for the support 
of7 and aid tor kindergarten schools, elementary schools, and secondary schools 7 and technical schools ~ that 
there shall be apportioned to ea4 schoGl district in ea4 fiscal ~ :nGt less than one hundred twenty dGllars {$U()j 
per pupil in average daily attsndance in the district 4uring the ~ preceding fiscal ~ and ~ that the amount 
apportioned to ea4 ~ district in ea4 fiscal :yea,r AAall be :nGt less than p;;,zenty four hundred dollars ($2,400). 
~with~ to .any: retiremsnt ~provided for in the chart9r ~.any: wunty Gr Qty and county pursuan-t 
.00 the provisigns ~ which tl:w contributions ~ and benefits tor certificaood employees ~ a schGo.l district who are 
members ~ such system are baSE!d upnn the pwportion ~ ~ salaries ~ such certificated employees contributed 
PJt said oounty Gr citf and county, all 
(c) Any amounts apportioned to saiG a county or city and county, or to any school districts district therein, pursuant 
.00 the pmvisigns ~ this section solely for a retirement system provided for in the charter of a county or city and county, 
pursuant to which the contributions of, and benefits to, certificated employees of a school district who are members of that retirement 
system are based upon the proportion of the salaries of those certificated employees contributed by the county or city and county, 
shall be considered as though deemed to be derived from county or city and county school taxes for the support of 
county and city and county government and shall not be deemed money provided by the State within the meaning 
gfth,is~. 
Forty-Second-That Section 7 of Article IX thereof is repealed. 
~ 7-. :rh9 Legislatul'@ shall provide for the app9intment Gr election ~ the State .6oord g{ Education and a board 
gf education in ea4 county Gr for~ election~ a jGint ~board~ education for tw:g Gr m wunties. 
Forty-Third-That Section 7.5 of Article IX thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 7.5. The State .&ard ~ Education shall adopt Legislature shall provide for the adoption of tsxtboo!Q; instructional 
materials for use in kindergarten and grades Gn9 through eight throughout ~ StatE! 1 to 8, inclusive, of each school in 
the Public School System, to be furnished without cost as provided by statute . 
Forty-Fourth-That Section 9 of Article IX thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 9. (a) The University of California shall constitutE! constitutes a public trust, to be administered by the existing 
corporation known as "The Regents of the University of California," with full powers of organization and government, 
subject only to such legislative control as may be necessary to insure ensure the security of its funds and compliance 
with the terms of the endowments of the university and such any competitive bidding procedures as may be made 
applicable to the university by statute for the letting of construction contracts, sales of real property, and purchasing 
of materials, goods, and services. Said, The corporation shall be in fGrm a board composed of ~ six ex officio 
members, which shall be • . the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly, :rh9 Superintsndffit 
~ I4Wlic Instructi~ the president and the vice president of the alumni association of the university , and the acting 
president of the university, and 1S 15 appointive members appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, 
a majority of the membership concurring 7 provide~ howe'ler that the pressnt appointi'le members shall hold ~ 
Ylltil the expiration ~ ~ present terms . 
(b) :rh9 tE!rms g{ ~ members appointed prior to Nov:ember ~ ~ shall be ¥ years7 the tE!rms ~ tw.o appointive 
members to expire as heretofore nn March J.st ~ ~ even numbered calendar ~ and tw:g Two members shall 
be appointed for terms commencing on March 1, 1976, and on each March 1 ~ ea4 :yea,r thereafter 7 provided that 
no~ appointmsnts AAall be made for terms to commence nn, except March 1, 1979, (;)( nn and March 1 of each 
fourth year thereafter, to the end that no appointment to the regents for a newly commencing term shall be made 
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during the first year of any gubernatorial term of office. The terms of the members appointed for terms commencing 
on and after March 1. 1976, shall be 12 years. The terms of the members appointed for terms commencing on and after 
March 1, 1997, shall be 10 years. During the period of transition until the time when the appointive membership is 
comprised exclusively of persons serving for terms of .U 10 years, the total number of appointive members may 
exceed the numbers specified in the preceding paragraph subdivision (a). No member appointed on or after November 
6, 1996, to serve a full term shall be eligible to serve more than one full term. 
In case of any vacancy, the term of office of the appointee person appointed to fill SYGh the vacancy, who shall be 
appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, a majority of the membership concurring, shall be for the 
balance of the term for which SYffi the vacancy exists. A person appointed to fill the balance of a term subsequently may 
be appointed to fill one full term. 
(c) The members of the board may, m ~discretion, following procedures established by them and after 
consultation with representatives of the faculty and students of the university, including appropriate officers of the 
academic senate and student governments, may appoint to the board~ fir both o£ the follovving persons as ~mbers, 
with all rights of participation T , a member of the faculty at a campus of the university or of another institution 
of higher education 7 or a person enrolled as a student at a campus of the university for each regular academic term 
during his or her service as a member of the board , or both of those persons. Any person so appointed shall serve 
for not less than one year commencing on July 1. 
(d) Regents shall be able persons broadly reflective of the economic, cultural, and social diversity of the State, 
including ethnic minorities and women. However, it is not intended that formulas or specific ratios be applied in 
the selection of regents. 
(e) In the selection of the Regents regents, the Governor shall consult an advisory committee composed as follm;,rs; 
~ of the Speaker of the Assembly and two public members appointed by the Speaker, the President Jqg. pro Tempore 
of the Senate and two public members appointed by the RYles Committee o£ the Senate Committee on Rules , two 
public members appointed by the Governor, the chairman chairperson of the regents o£ the tmiversity , an alumnus 
of the university chosen by the alumni association of the university, a student of the university chosen by the Council 
of Student Body Presidents, and a member of the faculty of the university chosen by the academic senate of the 
university. Public members shall serve for four years, except that one each of the initially appointed members selected 
by the Speaker of the Assembly, the President Jqg. pro Tempore of the Senate, and the Governor shall be appointed 
to serve for two years; student, alumni, and faculty members shall serve for one year and may not be regents of 
tHe university at the time of their service on the advisory committee. 
(f) The Regents o£ the University o£ California shall be regents are vested with the legal title and the management 
and disposition of the property of the university and of property held for its benefit, and shall ~ the ~ to 
may take and hold, ~ by purchase or by , donation, or gift, testamentary or otherwise, or in any other manner, 
without restriction, all real and personal property for the benefit of the university or incidentally to its conduct 7 
provided, howe,,rer, that sales . However, the sale of university real property shall be subject to SYffi any competitive 
bidding procedures as may be provided by statute. £aid The corporation shall also ~ has all the powers necessary 
or convenient for the effective administration of its trust, including the power to sue and, to , be sued, to use a seal, 
and to delegate to its committees or to the faculty of the university, or to others, SYGh any authority or functions 
as it rna;<~ deems wise. ~ Regents 
The regents shall receive all funds derived from the sale of lands pursuant to the act of Congress of July 2, 1862, 
and any subsequent acts amendatory thereof. The university shall be entirely independent of all political or sectarian 
influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its regents and in the administration of its affairs, and no 
person shall be debarred admission to any department of the university on account of race, religion, ethnic heritage, 
or sex. 
(g) Meetings of the Regents of the University Gf California regents shall be public, with exceptions and notice 
requirements as may be provided by statute. 
Forty-Fifth-That Section 12 is added to Article IX thereof, to read: 
SEC. 12. (a) The Legislature shall have power to provide for a postsecondary education system of community colleges to 
be known as the California Community Colleges. 
(b) The Legislature, by general law, may provide for the incorporation and organization of community college districts as 
part of the California Community Colleges. The Legislature may authorize the governing boards of community college districts 
to initiate and carry on any program or activity or to otherwise act in any manner that is not in conflict with the laws and 
purposes for which community college districts are established. 
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Forty-Ninth-That Section 16 of Article IX thereof is amended and renumbered to read: 
~ l-9,. 
SEC. 11. (a) It shall be in all charters framed under the by Section 5 of Article XI 
and Article XIA , to provide, in to those allowable by this Constitution 7 and the laws of the 
State , for the manner in the times at which, and the terms for which the members of boards of education 
shall be elected or for their qualifications, , and removal, and for the number ~ that 
shall constitute any one of~ these boards. 
(b) Notwithstanding Section 3 of Article XI, when the boundaries of a school district 9l.' community ~ ~ 
extend beyond the limits of a city whose charter provides for any or all of the foregoing with respect to the members 
of its board of education, no charter amendment effecting a change in the manner in which, the times at 
or the terms for which the members of the board of education shall be elected or appointed, for their qualifications, 
compensation, or removal, or for the number ~ that shall constitute ~ the board, shall be adopted unless 
it is submitted to and approved by a majority of all the qualified electors of the school district GJ: community ~ 
district voting on the question. Any such amendment, and any portion of a proposed charter or a revised charter 
~ that would establish or change any of the foregoing provisions respecting a board of education, shall be submitted 
to the electors of the school district GJ: community college district as one or more separate questions. The failure 
of any such separate question to be approved shall have the result of continuing in effect the applicable existing 
law with respect to that board of education. 
(c) A home rule community charter, as provided for in Article XI A, may establish a procedure for board of education fomuztion 
or reorganization without regard to the requirements of this section. 
Fiftieth-That Section 1 of Article XI is amended to read: 
SEC. 1. (a) The State is divided into counties .wJ::H4 that are legal subdivisions of the State. The Legislature shall 
prescribe a uniform procedure for county formation, consolidation, and boundary change. Formation or consolidation 
requires approval by a majority of electors voting on the question in each affected county. A boundary change requires 
approval by the governing body of each affected county. A home rule community charter for a multicounty region, adopted 
pursuant to Article XI A, may establish a procedure for county fomuztion, consolidation, or boundary changes without regard 
to the requirements of this section. 
(b) No county seat shall be removed unless two-thirds of the qualified electors of the county, voting on the proposition 
at a general election, shall vote in favor of ~ the removal. A proposition of removal shall not be submitted in 
the same county more than once in four years. 
w 
(c) The Legislature shall provide for county powers, an elected county sheriff, an elected district attorney, an elected 
assessor, and an elected governing body in each county. Except as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 4 of this 
article, each governing body shall prescribe by ordinance the compensation of its members, but the ordinance prescribing 
~ that compensation shall be subject to referendum. The Legislature or the governing body may provide for other 
officers whose compensation shall be prescribed by the governing body. The governing body shall provide for the 
number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of employees. 
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subgovernment in all or part g£ a city ~ conduct g£ city elections and {4} plenary authorit;r is hereby granted, ~ 
~ tG the restrictions g£ this article, tG provide therein or by amendment thereto, the manner in ~ the method 
by~ the times at~ and the terms for which the~ municipal gfficers and employees whose compensation 
is paid by the city sl:lall be elected or appointed, and for their removal, and for their compensation, and for the number 
G£ deputies, ~ an4 ~ employees that ea4 shall ~ and~~ compensation, method g£ appointment, 
qualifications, tnnure g£ ~ and removal g£ &YCh dsputies, ~and~ employees. 
Fifty-Second-That Section 5 is added to Article XI thereof, to read: 
SEC. 5. (a) A city that adopts a charter may govern as to all matters with respect to municipal affairs, subject only to 
limitations provided in the charter. 
(b) A city charter may, among other things, provide for the government of the city, including, but not limited to, the following: 
(1) The selection, terms of office, and removal of city officers and employees. 
(2) The conduct of city elections. 
(c) An enactment or failure to act by a city governed by a charter is presumed to pertain to the city's municipal affairs. 
In the event a charter-city enactment or failure to act conflicts with a general law, the burden of rebutting the presumption 
rests with the person challenging the enactment or failure to act by the charter city. In rebutting that presumption, the challenger 
shall show that the Legislature, in adopting the general law, expressly declared its intention that the law apply to charter cities 
and supported that declaration with findings based on the criteria stated below. Furthermore, the challenger shall demonstrate 
to the satisfaction of the court, exercising its independent judgment, one or more of the following: 
(1) The charter city's enactment or failure to act significantly and directly interferes with the State's effective administration 
of its health, justice, environmental, transportation, or social services systems. 
(2) The enactment or failure to act has significant extraterritorial effects. To demonstrate the regulation has significant 
extraterritorial effects, the challenger shall demonstrate all of the following: 
(A) The enactment or failure to act affects significantly the health or behavior of people, or the operation of businesses or 
governments outside the city's boundary. 
(B) The enactment's primary, rather than incidental, effect is to regulate activities beyond the city's boundary. 
(C) The effect is not merely speculative or theoretical. 
(3) The State's public policy interest in statewide uniformity outweighs the presumption of local control. For purposes of 
this paragraph, the challenger shall demonstrate either of the following: 
(A) The lack of statewide uniformity would present substantial obstacles to travel or to the ordinary and usual conduct of 
business throughout the State. 
(B) Statewide uniformity is essential, and not merely desirable, to advance an important policy of the State, and the means 
selected is narrowly tailored to accomplish the enactment's purpose with the least intrusion on local control. 
(d) A general law conflicts with a charter city enactment or failure to act when either the city enactment or failure to act 
frustrates the goals sought to be achieved by the State in adopting the law, or compliance with both the general law and the 
city enactment is either physically impossible or prohibitively expensive. 
(e) The provisions of a home rule community charter, as provided for in Article XI A, may not interfere with or derogate 
the authority of a charter city with regard to its municipal affairs. 
Fifty-Third-That Section 6 of Article XI thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 6. (a) A county and all cities within it may consolidate as a charter city and county as provided by statute 
or as provided in a home rule community charter adopted pursuant to Article XI A. 
(b) A charter city and county is a charter city and a charter county. Its charter city powers supersede conflicting 
charter county powers. 
Fifty-Fourth-That Section 7 of Article XI thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 7. A county or city may make and enforce, within its limits, all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances 
and regulations not in conflict with general laws. A county or city that is not governed by a charter provided for in Section 
3 or 4 that is a participant in a home rule community charter, as provided for in Article XI A, additionally shall possess the 
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authority with respect to municipal affairs specified in Section 5 except as otherwise specified by the home rule community 
charter. 
Fifty-Fifth-That Section 8 of Article XI thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 8. (a) The Legislature may provide that counties perform municipal functions at the request of cities within 
them. 
(b) If provided by their respective charters, a county may agree with a city within it to assume and discharge 
specified municipal functions. 
(c) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (b), municipal functions may be perfonned, as prescribed in a home rule community 
charter, as provided for in Article XI A. 
Fifty-Sixth-that Section 13 of Article XI thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 13. (a) The provisions of Sections~ subdivision (b) of Section 1 (except for the second sentence),~ 
subdivision (a) of Section 3, and Sections 4 7 and 5 ~ thls ~,as enacted in 1970, relating to matters affecting 
the distribution of powers between the Legislature and cities and counties, including matters affecting supersession, 
shall be construed as a restatement of all related provisions of the Constitution in effect immediately prior to tRe 
effective date~ thls amendment June 3, 1970, and as making no substantive change. 
The terms general law, general laws, and laws, as used in this ~article, shall be construed as a continuation 
and restatement of those terms as used in the Constitution in effect immediately prior to the effeetive date~ thls 
amendment June 3, 1970, and not as effecting a change in meaning. 
(b) The provisions of subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 5 enacted in 1996 shall be construed as a restatement of all related 
provisions of the Constitution in effect immediately prior to November 6, 1996, and as making no substantive change. 
Fifty-Seventh-That Section 14 of Article XI is repealed. 
SI!G.. .U.. A ~ government formed a£tel: the effeetive date ~ thls section, the boYndaries ~ whlcf\ inclYde 
all GJ: part~ two GJ: ~ counties, Bhall nGt ~a property ~~~~rut-s been approved bf a majority 
¥Gte ~the qualified ¥Gters ~ ~ ~ government ¥Gting nn the issue~ the~ 
Fifty-Eighth-That Section 15 of Article XI thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 15. (a) All Except as otherwise prescribed in a home rule community charter adopted pursuant to Article XI A, 
all revenues from taxes imposed pursuant to the Vehicle License Fee Law, or its successor, other than fees on trailer 
coaches and mobilehomes, over and above the costs of collection and any refunds authorized by law, shall be allocated 
to counties and cities according to statute. 
(b) This section shall apply to those taxes imposed pursuant to that law on and after July 1 following tl:\e approval 
G£ thls section bf the ¥Gters, 1986. 
Fifty-Ninth-That Section 16 is added to Article XI thereof, to read: 
SEC. 16. The Legislature shall provide for a uniform system of financial disclosure applicable to all local government 
agencies. This disclosure shall include, but is not limited to, revenues from all sources, expenditures for all purposes, 
debts, and liabilities. 
Sixtieth-That Article XI A is added thereto, to read: 
ARTICLE X/A 
HOME RULE COMMUNITY CHARTERS 
SECTION 1. (a) On or before February 1, 1997, a citizens' charter commission on local government efficiency and restructuring 
shall be appointed in each county. The commission shall consist of persons appointed as follows: 
(1) The board of supervisors shall appoint five persons, two of whom are officers or employees of a local government agency. 
(2) The cities within the county shall jointly appoint, pursuant to a procedure to be established by statute, six persons, three 
of whom are officers or employees of a local government agency. In any county in which there is no city, the appointments 
described in this paragraph shall be made by the board of supervisors. 
(3) The school districts within the county shall jointly appoint, pursuant to a procedure to be established by statute, two 
persons, one of whom is an officer or employee of a local government agency. 
( 4) The special districts within the county, not excluding any special district for which the board of supervisors is the governing 
board, shall appoint, pursuant to a procedure to be established by statute, two persons, one of whom is an officer or employee 
of a local government agency. 
(b) By resolution of the boards of supervisors, several counties may form a multicounty commission and adopt a multicounty 
charter. 
(c) "Local government agency," for purposes of this article, includes any city, county, city and county, school district, special 
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district, authority, or other political subdivision of or within the State. 
(d) The commission may appoint additional members to the commission, subject to the condition that a majority of the members 
of the commission consists of persons who are neither officers nor employees of any local government agency. 
(e) For purposes of this article: 
(1) "Citizens' charter commission on local government efficiency and restructuring" or "commission" means the body appointed 
pursuant to Section 1, which is responsible for developing a government services plan and community charter within a county. 
(2) "Community charter" means the implementing grant of authority for the governmental services plan, which provides 
for greater public accountability in the delivery and financing of local governmental services. A community charter is a grant 
of authority for those actions required to implement the governmental services plan. 
(3) "Governmental services plan" means a plan for the delivery and financing of a variety of local governmental services 
as described in Section 2. 
SEC. 2. Each commission shall develop and adopt a governmental services plan, which shall address the delivery and financing 
of local government services. The government services plan shall contain the following: 
(a) Changes that will result in a reduction in the number of local government agencies and the cost of local government, 
taking into consideration the geography, population density, and other factors that influence the operation of local government. 
The goal of these changes shall be to reduce the cost of local government and the number of local government agencies. 
(b) Changes that will result in greater accountability to the public. 
(c) Specifications that designate which local government agencies are responsible for the delivery of certain services, the local 
agency governing entity responsible for each service, and the method of financing that service. Specifications in the plan also 
shall designate which local government agencies are responsible for comprehensive and functional planning. The agencies responsible 
for land use regulation shall be required to simplify, and increase the efficiency of existing land use regulation procedures. 
(d) A multiyear capital outlay plan for infrastructure needs in the jurisdiction covered by the charter and the local government 
agencies responsible for implementation of the capital outlay plan. 
(e) The organization and administration of programs administered jointly by the State and local government agencies in 
accordance with any state-local government realignment plan adopted pursuant to Section 3.5 of Article V . 
(j) The allocation of the nonschool share of the property tax, Bradley-Bums Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax-Law revenue, 
and vehicle license fee revenue. The plan may impose terms and conditions under which any local agency covered 
by the charter may levy any local tax otherwise authorized by state law. 
(g) Procedures for the organization, reorganization, and boundaries of local government covered the charter. The 
governmental services plan may include subcounty components. 
SEC. 3. (a) The commission shall develop a community charter that is consistent and a framework for 
implementing, the governmental services plan described in Section 2. The community charter shall be submitted to the voters 
as provided in Section 7. 
(b) A subcounty region that includes one or more local government agencies may develop and propose to the voters of that 
region a subcounty charter that provides for the structure and authority of the agency or involved. That subcounty 
charter shall be consistent with the charter adopted by the commission pursuant to Section 2. 
(c) If a charter is not approved by the voters, as proposed by a plan pursuant to Section 2, a subcounty charter may be proposed 
and approved pursuant to this section that is not in conflict with the plan adopted by the commission pursuant to Section 2. 
SEC. 4. General obligation bond indebtedness incurred by a local government agency, in implementing the multiyear capital 
outlay plan specified in subdivision (d) of Section 2, that is included under a charter adopted pursuant to this article may be 
incurred only with the approval of a majority of the voters voting on the proposal. 
SEC. 5. (a) Any new tax or increase in an existing tax levied for general or special purposes, except any tax as described 
in Section 1 of Article XIII A may be imposed by a local government agency governed by a charter adopted pursuant to this 
article with the approval of a majority of the governing board of the agency and a majority of the voters voting on the proposal. 
A charter adopted pursuant to this article may provide expressly for a higher vote requirement as to either or both of the vote 
requirements described in this subdivision. 
(b) Where local government agencies are governed by a charter adopted pursuant to this article, taxes may be countywide 
or effective in a region of the county that is under the jurisdiction of one or more agencies. 
(c) In the case of charter cities, the authority to levy taxes may not be reduced or restricted by this article or the community 
charter. 
SEC. 6. (a) An enactment or failure to act by a city or county participating in a community charter is presumed to pertain 
to that agency's municipal affairs. In the event an enactment or failure to act is alleged to conflict with a general law, the burden 
of rebutting the presumption rests with the person challenging the enactment or failure to act by the city or county, as the 
case may be. In rebutting that presumption, the challenger shall show that the Legislature, in adopting the general law, expressly 
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declared its intention that the law apply to a city or county participating in a community charter and supported that declaration 
with findings based on the criteria stated below. The challenger shall prove to the satisfaction of the court, exercising its independent 
judgment, one or more of the following: 
(1) The enactment or failure to act significantly and directly interferes with the State's effective administration of its health, 
justice, environmental, transportation, or social services systems. 
(2) The enactment or failure to act has significant extraterritorial effects. To demonstrate the regulation has significant 
extraterritorial effects, the challenger shall prove all of the following: 
(A) The enactment or failure to act affects significantly the health or behavior of people, or the operation of businesses or 
governments outside the agency's boundary. 
(B) The enactment's primary, rather than incidental, effect is to regulate activities beyond the agency's boundary. 
(C) The effect is not merely speculative or theoretical. 
(3) The State's public policy interest in statewide uniformity outweighs the ordinary predisposition toward local control. 
To demonstrate that the public policy interest in statewide uniformity outweighs the ordinary predisposition toward local control, 
the challenger shall prove all of the following: 
(A) The lack of statewide uniformity would present substantial obstacles to travel or to the ordinary and usual conduct of 
business throughout the State. 
(B) Statewide uniformity is essential, and not merely desirable, to advance an important policy of the State and the means 
selected is narrowly tailored to accomplish the enactment's purpose with the least intrusion on local control. 
(b) A general law conflicts with an enactment or failure to act when either the enactment or failure to act frustrates the 
goals sought to be achieved by the State in adopting the law, or compliance with both the general law and the enactment is 
either physically impossible or prohibitively expensive. 
SEC. 7. The commission established pursuant to Section 1 shall submit the proposed plan for a charter to the voters in 
the county on or before the general election on November 7, 2000. Approval of the charter requires a majority vote of the voters 
voting in the election. 
SEC. 8. Of the costs incurred by local government agencies to form the commissions specified in Section 1, to provide for 
the administrative costs of these commissions, and to conduct the election required by Section 7, 50 percent shall be paid by 
those agencies and 50 percent by the State, pursuant to procedures specified by statute. 
Sixty-First-That subdivision (j) of Section 3 of Article XIII thereof is amended to read: 
G) Immature forest trees planted on lands not previously bearing merchantable timber or planted or of natural 
growth on lands from which the merchantable original growth timber stand to the extent of 70 percent of all trees 
over 16 inches in diameter has been removed. Forest trees or timber shall be considered mature at such time after 
40 years from the time of planting or removal of the original timber when so declared by a majority vote of a board 
consisting of a representative from the State Board of Forestry, a representative from the State &al:4 Gf Eqyalization 
state government entity designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of Article XIII, and the assessor of the county 
in which the trees are located. 
The Legislature may supersede the foregoing provisions with an alternative system or systems of taxing or exempting 
forest trees or timber, including a taxation system not based on property valuation. Any alternative system or systems 
shall provide for exemption of unharvested immature trees, shall encourage the continued use of timberlands for 
the production of trees for timber products, and shall provide for restricting the use of timberland to the production 
of timber products and compatible uses with provisions for taxation of timberland based on the restrictions. Nothing 
in this paragraph shall be construed to exclude timberland from the provisions of Section 8 of this article. 
Sixty-Second-That subdivision (g) of Section 11 of Article XIII thereof is amended to read: 
(g) Any assessment made pursuant to~ nw tG ~ inclmive, Gf tRis Amel@ subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, 
shall be subject to review, equalization, and adjustment by the State &aJ:G Gf Eq~aalization state government entity 
designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of this article, but an any adjustment shall conform to tile provisionB 
Gf ~ Sections those subdivisions. 
Sixty-Third-That Section 16 of Article XIII thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 16. (a) The county board of supervisors, or one or more assessment appeals boards created by the county 
board of supervisors, shall constitute the county board of equalization for a county. Two or more county boards 
of supervisors may jointly create one or more assessment appeals boards which shall constitute the county board 
of equalization for each of the participating counties. 
~ as provided in sttbdivision {gj Gf Section U., t:M 
(b) The county board of equalization, under SY.4 rules of notice as the county board may prescribe, shall equalize 
the values of all property on the local assessment roll by adjusting individual assessments. 
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(c) County boards of supervisors shall fix the compensation for members of assessment appeals boards, furnish 
clerical and other assistance for those boards, and adopt rules of notice and procedures for those boards as may be required 
to facilitate their work and to ~ ensure uniformity in the processing and decision of equalization petitions, and 
may provide for their discontinuance. 
(d) The Legislature shall provide by statute for each of the following: W ~ 
(1) The number and qualifications of members of assessment appeals boards, the manner of selecting, appointing, and removing 
them, and the terms for which they serve 1 af\4 W the. 
(2) The procedure by which two or more county boards of supervisors may jointly create one or more assessment 
appeals boards. 
Sixty-Fourth-That Section 17 of Article XIII thereof is repealed. 
£EG.. J.7. +Re ~ g£ EquaJigation consists g£ e ¥Gting ITI.@mbsrs: ~ Controllsr af\4 4 msmbsrs slsctsd fur 4-
~ t8rms at gubsmatorial slsctions. +Re statE! sllall b8 dividsd intG fum: ~ g£ Equalii!:ation districts with ~ 
~ g£ ~ district slscting ~ msmbsr. WG msmbsr 1naf ~ ~ tRaro ~ tElrms. 
Sixty-Fifth-That Section 18 of Article XIII thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 18. The ~ Legislature shall designate by statute the state government entity that shall both measure county 
assessment levels annually and sl:lall bring those levels into conformity by adjusting entire secured local assessment 
rolls. In the event a property tax is levied by the statE! State, however, the effects of unequalized local assessment 
levels, to the extent any remain after~ those adjustments, shall be corrected for purposes of distributing this tax 
by equalizing the assessment levels of locally and state-assessed properties and varying the rate of the state tax inversely 
with the counties' respective assessment levels. 
Sixty-Sixth-That Section 18.5 is added to Article XIII thereof, to read: 
SEC. 18.5. (a) The Legislature shall establish by statute in the state government the Board of Tax Appeals, which shall 
be vested with all powers and duties necessary to conduct the de novo administrative review of all tax matter determinations 
made by the state governmental entity designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of this article. 
(b) The board shall be composed of five members appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate. 
Sixty-Seventh-That Section 19 of Article XIII thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 19. (a) The~ state government entity designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of this article annually 
shall annually assess (l} pipelines, flumes, canals, ditches, and aqueducts lying within~ two or more counties, and 
~ property, except franchises, owned or used by regulated railway, telegraph, or telephone companies, car companies 
operating on railways in the State, and companies transmitting or selling gas or electricity. This property shall be 
subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property. 
No other tax or license charge may be imposed on these companies .whl4 that differs from that imposed on 
mercantile, manufacturing, and other business corporations. This restriction does not release a utility company from 
payments agreed on or required by law for a special privilege or franchise granted by a government body. 
(b) The Legislature may authorize~ asssssmsnt g£ the state government entity designated by statute pursuant 
to Section 18 of this article to also assess property owned or used by other public utilities. 
The ~state government entity designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of this article may delegate to 
a local assessor the duty to assess a property used but not owned by a state assessee on which the taxes are to be 
paid by a local assessee. 
Sixty-Eighth-That subdivision (h) of Section 28 of Article XIII thereof is repealed. 
{l:\j +Re ~ providsd fur b:y thls ssction sBall b8 assssssd b:y ~ £tats ~ g£ Equalii!:ation. 
Sixty-Ninth-That Section 1 of Article XIII A thereof is amended to read: 
SECTION 1. (a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed OnE! one percent 
(1%) of the full cash value of such property. The one percent (1%) tax tG shall be collected by the counties and 
apportioned according to law to the districts within the counties, except that a home rule community charter adopted 
pursuant to Article XI A may provide otherwise for the apportionment of the nonschool share of the proceeds of that tax. 
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem taxes or special assessments to 
pay the interest and redemption charges on (1) any indebtedness approved by the voters prior to July 1, 1978, or 
(2) any bonded indebtedness for the acquisition or improvement of real property approved on or after July 1, 1978, 
by two-thirds of the votes cast by the voters voting on the proposition. 
(c) The limitation provided in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem taxes imposed on real property in a unified school 
district for the support of the unified school district approved on or after January 1, 1997, by two-thirds of the votes cast by 
the voters voting on the proposition. However, the total amount of revenues proposed to be generated by the ad valorem taxes 
pursuant to this subdivision shall not exceed an amount equal to 10 percent of the total statewide average revenue limit per 
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unit of average school districts in the fiscal period prior to the fiscal in which the proposition 
is submitted to the voters the attendance of the school the 
Seventieth-That Section 4 of Article XIII thereof amended to read: 
SECTION 
SEC 4. wicciu•fw<•c 11.'lrf:lr1Ylf1hna in home rule Cn111m'U111W Charter adc>ptt~d 
by a two-thirds vote of the 4'-""-'H<c:u electors of such 
1m1oo~;e "'"""·"u taxes on such except ad valorem taxes on real nrrw'"'',..~"" 
,..,.,".,"'"h' within SY4 County the city, county, or district. 
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision commencing 1997-98 fiscal year and each fiscal year thereafter, a county, by 
a majority vote of the voters voting on the proposition, may impose a transactions and use tax in the county not to exceed 
the rate of 1/2 percent, for the purpose of making disbursements for the support of school districts within the county in an 
equal amount per in enrollment in each such school district. 
Seventy-First-That Section 1 of Article XIII B thereof is amended to read: 
SECTION 1. (a) The total annual appropriations subject to limitation of the State and of each local government 
shall not exceed the appropriations limit of the entity of government for the prior year adjusted for the change in 
the cost of living and the change in population, except as otherwise provided in this article. 
(b) This section shall not apply to any fiscal period commencing on or after July 1, 2001. This section shall remain in effect 
only until July 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed. 
Seventy-Second-That Section 1 is added to Article XIII B thereof, to read: 
SECTION 1. (a) The total appropriations of the State for a two-year fiscal period, as specified in Section 12.1 of Article 
rv; that are subject to limitation shall not exceed the appropriations limit of the State for the prior two-year fiscal period adjusted 
for the change in the cost of living and the change in population, except as otherwise provided in this article. 
(b) The total annual appropriations subject to limitation of each local government shall not exceed the appropriations limit 
of the entity of government for the prior year adjusted for the change in the cost of living and the change in population, except 
as otherwise provided in this article. 
(c) This section shall apply only to fiscal periods commencing on or after July 1, 2001. 
Sev~nty-Third-That Section 2 of Article XIII B thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 2. (a) (1) Fifty percent of all revenues received by the State in a fiscal year and in the fiscal year immediately 
following it in excess of the amount ~ that may be appropriated by the State in compliance with this article 
during that fiscal year and the fiscal year immediately following it shall be transferred and allocated, from a fund 
established for that purpose, pursuant to Section 8.5 of Article XVI. 
(2) Fifty percent of all revenues received by the State in a fiscal year and in the fiscal year immediately following 
it in excess of the amount ~ that may be appropriated by the State in compliance with this article during that 
fiscal year and the fiscal year immediately following it shall be returned by a revision of tax rates or fee schedules 
within the next two subsequent fiscal years. 
(b) All revenues received by an entity of government, other than the State, in a fiscal year and in the fiscal year 
immediately following it in excess of the amount wl:H4 that may be appropriated by the entity in compliance with 
this article during that fiscal year and the fiscal year immediately following it shall be returned by a revision of 
tax rates or fee schedules within the next two subsequent fiscal years. 
(c) This section shall not apply to any fiscal period commencing on or after July 1, 2001. This section shall remain in effect 
only until July 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed. 
Seventy-Fourth-That Section 2 is added to Article XIII B thereof, to read: 
SEC. 2. (a) (1) Fifty percent of all revenues received by the State in a two-year fiscal period in excess of the amount that 
may be appropriated by the State in compliance with this article during that period shall be transferred and allocated, from 
a fund established for that purpose, pursuant to Section 8.5 of Article XVI. 
(2) Fifty percent of all revenues received by the State in a two-year fiscal period in excess of the amount that may be appropriated 
by the State in compliance with this article during that period shall be returned by a revision of tax rates or fee schedules within 
the next fiscal period. 
(b) All revenues received by an entity of government, other than the State, in a fiscal year and in the fiscal year immediately 
following it in excess of the amount that may be appropriated by the entity in compliance with this article during that fiscal 
year and the fiscal year immediately following it shall be returned by a revision of tax rates or fee schedules within the next 
two subsequent fiscal years. 
(c) This section shall apply only to fiscal periods commencing on or after July 1, 2001. 
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Seventy-Fifth-That Section 3 of Article XIII B thereof is amended to read: 
SEC 3. The appropriations limit for any fiscal year to £ee,. Section 1 shall be adjusted as follows: 
In the event that the financial responsibility of providing services is in whole or in whether 
by or otherwise, from one entity of government to for the year in which 
&Y4 the transfer becomes effective, the appropriations limit of the transferee entity shall be increased by such reasonable 
amount as the saki affected entities shall mutually agree and the appropriations limit of the transferor entity shall 
be decreased by the same amount. 
(b) In the event that the financial responsibility of providing services is transferred, in whole or in part, from an 
entity of government to a private entity, or the financial source for the provision of services is transferred, in whole 
or in part, from other revenues of an entity of government, to regulatory licenses, user charges or user fees, then, 
for the year of ~ that transfer, the appropriations limit of ~ the affected entity of government shall be decreased 
accordingly. 
(c) (1) In the event an emergency is declared by the legislative body of an entity of government, the appropriations 
limit of the affected entity of government may be exceeded, provided that the appropriations limits in the following 
three years are reduced accordingly to prevent an aggregate increase in appropriations resulting from the emergency. 
(2) In the event an emergency is declared by the Governor, appropriations approved by a two-thirds vote of the 
legislative body of an affected entity of government to an emergency account for expenditures relating to that emergency 
shall not constitute appropriations subject to limitation. As used in this paragraph, "emergency" means the existence, 
as declared by the Governor, of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within 
the State, or parts thereof, caused by such conditions as attack or probable or imminent attack by an enemy of the 
United States, fire, flood, drought, storm, civil disorder, earthquake, or volcanic eruption. 
(d) This section shall not apply to any fiscal period commencing on or after July 1, 2001. This section shall remain in effect 
only until July 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed. 
Seventy-Sixth-That Section 3 is added to Article XIII B thereof, to read: 
SEC. 3. The appropriations limit for any two-year fiscal period, in the case of the State, or for one fiscal year, in the case 
of local government, pursuant to Section 1 shall be adjusted as follows: 
(a) In the event that the financial responsibility of providing services is transferred, in whole or in part, whether by annexation, 
incorporation or otherwise, from one entity of government to another, then, for the period in which the transfer becomes effective, 
the appropriations limit of the transferee entity shall be increased by such reasonable amount as the affected entities mutually 
shall agree and the appropriations limit of the transferor entity shall be decreased by the same amount. 
(b) In the event that the financial responsibility of providing services is transferred, in whole or in part, from an entity of 
government to a private entity, or the financial source for the provision of services is transferred, in whole or in part, from 
other revenues of an entity of government, to regulatory licenses, user charges or user fees, then, for the year of that transfer, 
the appropriations limit of the affected entity of government shall be decreased accordingly. 
(c) (1) In the event an emergency is declared by the legislative body of an entity of government, the appropriations limit 
of the affected entity of government may be exceeded, provided that the appropriations limits in the following two fiscal periods, 
in the case of the State, or three fiscal years, in the case of local government, are reduced accordingly to prevent an aggregate 
increase in appropriations resulting from the emergency. 
(2) In the event an emergency is declared by the Governor, appropriations approved by a two-thirds vote of the legislative 
body of an affected entity of government to an emergency account for expenditures relating to that emergency shall not constitute 
appropriations subject to limitation. As used in this paragraph, "emergency" means the existence, as declared by the Governor, 
of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the State, or parts thereof; caused by 
such conditions as attack or probable or imminent attack by an enemy of the United States, fire, flood, drought, storm, civil 
disorder, earthquake, or volcanic eruption. 
This section shall apply only to fiscal periods commencing on or after July 1, 2001. 
Seventy-Seventh-That Section 5.5 of Article XIII B thereof is repealed. 
~ ~ Prudent £tat@ Reserve. ~ Legislature shall establish a prudent statE! reserve frm4 in ~ amount 
as it shall~ reasonable an4 necessary. Contributions to;. an4 'Nithdrawals ~the frm4 shall~~ w the 
provisions G£ Section ~ G£ this Article. 
Seventy-Eighth-That Section 8 of Article XIII B thereof is amended to read: 
SEC 8. As used in this article and except as otherwise expressly provided herein: 
(a) "Appropriations subject to limitation" of the State means any authorization to expend during a fiscal year 
the proceeds of taxes levied by or for the State, exclusive of Stat@ state subventions for the use and operation of local 
government (other than subventions made pursuant to Section 6) and further exclusive of refunds of taxes, benefit 
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payments from retirement, unemployment insurance, and disability insurance funds. 
(b) "Appropriations subject to limitation" of an entity of local means any authorization to <>YT,Pn.n 
a fiscal year the of taxes levied by or for that and the of £tate state ""'"'"''n" 
to that (other than subventions made pursuant to Section 6) exclusive of refunds of taxes. 
(c) "Proceeds of taxes" shall include, but not be restricted to, all tax revenues and the proceeds to an entity of 
government, from (1) regulatory licenses, user charges, and user fees to the extent that those proceeds exceed the 
costs reasonably borne by that entity in providing the regulation, product, or service, and (2) the investment of tax 
revenues. With respect to any local government, "proceeds of taxes" shall include subventions received from the 
State, other than pursuant to Section 6, and, with respect to the State, proceeds of taxes shall exclude 8Y4 these 
subventions. 
(d) "Local government" means any city, county, city and county, school district, special district, authority, or other 
political subdivision of or within the State. 
(e) (1) "Change in the cost of living" for the State, a school district, or a community college district means the 
percentage change in California per capita personal income from the preceding year. 
(2) "Change in the cost of living" for an entity of local government, other than a school district or a community 
college district, shall be either (A) the percentage change in California per capita personal income from the preceding 
year, or (B) the percentage change in the local assessment roll from the preceding year for the jurisdiction due to 
the addition of local nonresidential new construction. Each entity of local government shall select its change in the 
cost of living pursuant to this paragraph annually by a recorded vote of the entity's governing body. 
(f) "Change in population" of any entity of government, other than the State, a school district, or a community 
college district, shall be determined by a method prescribed by the Legislature. 
"Change in population" of a school district or a community college district shall be the percentage change in the 
average daily attendance of the school district or the number of full-time equivalent students of the community college 
district from the preceding fiscal year, as determined by a method prescribed by the Legislature. 
"Change in population" of the State shall be determined by adding (1) the percentage change in the State's population 
multiplied by the percentage of the State's budget in the prior fiscal year that is expended for other than educational 
purposes for kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the community colleges, and (2) the percentage change 
in the total statewide average daily attendance in kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the number of 
full-time equivalent students in the community colleges, multiplied by the percentage of the State's budget in the prior 
fiscal year that is expended for educational purposes for kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the 
community colleges. 
Any determination of population pursuant to this subdivision, other than that measured by average daily attendance 
or the number of full-time equivalent students , shall be revised, as necessary, to reflect the periodic census conducted 
by the United States Department of Commerce, or successor department. 
(g) "Debt service" means appropriations required to pay the cost of interest and redemption charges, including 
the funding of any reserve or sinking fund required in connection therewith, on indebtedness existing or legally 
authorized as of January 1, 1979, or on bonded indebtedness thereafter approved according to law by a vote of the 
electors of the issuing entity voting in an election for that purpose. 
(h) The "appropriations limit" of each entity of government for each fiscal year is that amount~ that total 
annual appropriations subject to limitation may not exceed under Sections 1 and 3. However, the "appropriations 
limit" of each entity of government for the 1978-79 fiscal year 1978/79 is the total of the appropriations subject to 
limitation of the entity for that fiscal year. For the 1978-79 fiscal year 1978/79, £tate state subventions to local 
governments, exclusive of federal grants, are deemed to have been derived from the proceeds of £tate state taxes. 
(i) Except as otherwise provided in Section 5, "appropriations subject to limitation" do not include local agency 
loan funds or indebtedness funds, or investment (or authorizations to invest) funds of the State, or of an entity of 
local government in accounts at banks or savings and loan associations or in liquid securities. 
This section shall not apply to any fiscal period commencing on or after July 1, 2001. This section shall remain in effect 
only until July 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed. 
Seventy-Ninth-That Section 8 is added to Article XIII B thereof, to read: 
SEC. 8. As used in this article, and except as otherwise expressly provided herein: 
(a) "Appropriations subject to limitation" of the State means any authorization to expend during a two-year fiscal period 
the proceeds of taxes levied by or for the State, exclusive of state subventions for the use and operation of local government 
(other than subventions made pursuant to Section 6) and further exclusive of refunds of taxes, benefit payments from retirement, 
unemployment insurance, and disability insurance funds. 
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am·,,..,,m,Pnf means any authorization to expend during one 
subventions to that than subventions 
of taxes. 
but not be restricted all tax revenues and the nrnro"''" 
to the extent that those ~~n~~rl,•~ 
"'"'"'n 11 .~' or and (2) the investment tax revenues. With respect to 
shall include subventions received from the State, other than to Section 6, and, with 
nrt1f"t>•>r1<::. of taxes shall exclude these subventions. 
(d) "Local government" means any city and county, school district, special district, authority, or other political 
subdivision of or within the State. 
(1) "Change in the cost the State, a school district, or a community college district means the percentage 
change in California per capita personal the preceding two-year fiscal period, in the case of the or one fiscal 
year, in the case of a school district or community college district. 
(2) "Change in the cost living" for an entity of local government, other than a school district or a community college 
district, shall be either (A) the percentage change in California per capita personal income from the preceding year, or (B) the 
percentage change in the local assessment roll from the preceding year for the jurisdiction due to the addition of local nonresidential 
new construction. Each entity of local government shall select its change in the cost of living pursuant to this paragraph annually 
by a recorded vote of the entity's governing body. 
(j) "Change in population" of any entity of government, other than the State, a school district, or a community college district, 
shall be determined by a method prescribed by the Legislature. 
"Change in population" of a school district or a community college district shall be the percentage change in the average 
daily attendance of the school district or the number of full-time equivalent students of the community college district from 
the preceding fiscal year, as determined by a method prescribed by the Legislature. 
"Change in population" of the State shall be determined by adding (1) the percentage change in the State's population multiplied 
by the percentage of the State's budget in the prior two-year fiscal period that is expended for other than educational purposes 
for kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the community colleges, and (2) the percentage change in the total statewide 
average daily attendance in kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the number of full-time equivalent students in 
the community colleges, multiplied by the percentage of the State's budget in the prior two-year fiscal period that is expended 
for educational purposes for kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the community colleges. 
Any determination of population pursuant to this subdivision, other than that measured by average daily attendance or the 
number of full-time equivalent students, shall be revised, as necessary, to reflect the periodic census conducted by the United 
States Department of Commerce, or successor department. 
(g) "Debt service" means appropriations required to pay the cost of interest and redemption charges, including the funding 
of any reserve or sinking fund required in connection therewith, on indebtedness existing or legally authorized as of January 
1, 1979, or on bonded indebtedness thereafter approved according to law by a vote of the electors of the issuing entity voting 
in an election for that purpose. 
(h) The "appropriations limit" of each entity of government for each fiscal period, as appropriate, is that amount that total 
appropriations subject to limitation may not exceed under Sections 1 and 3. However, the "appropriations limit" of each entity 
of government for the 1978-79 fiscal year is the total of the appropriations subject to limitation of the entity for that fiscal 
year. For the 1978-79 fiscal year, state subventions to local governments, exclusive of federal grants, are deemed to have been 
derived from the proceeds of state taxes. 
(i) Except as otherwise provided in Section 5, "appropriations subject to limitation" do not include local agency loan funds 
or indebtedness funds, or investment (or authorizations to invest) funds of the State, or of an entity of local government in 
accounts at banks or savings and loan associations or in liquid securities. 
This section shall apply only to fiscal periods commencing on or after July 1, 2001. 
Eightieth-that Section 10.5 of Article XIII B thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 10.5. (a) For fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 1990, the appropriations limit of each entity of government 
shall be the appropriations limit for the 1986-87 fiscal year, adjusted for the changes made from that fiscal year pursuant 
to this article, as amended by the measure adding this section, adjusted for the changes required by Section 3. 
(b) In the case of the State, beginning with the two-year fiscal period commencing on July 1, 2001, the appropriations limit 
shall be the appropriations limit for the 2000-2001 fiscal year, adjusted for the changes made from that fiscal year pursuant 
to this article and adjusted for the changes required by Section 3. 
Eighty-First-That Section 1.2 is added to Article XVI thereof, to read: 
SEC. 1.2. Except as to any indebtedness approved by the voters pursuant to Section 1, during any fiscal period for which 
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a budget bill is to be, or has been, enacted pursuant to Section 12 or 12.1, as applicable, of Article IV, the Legislature shall 
not in any manner create any debt or debts, or liability or liabilities, unless the debt or debts, or liability or liabilities, are repaid 
during that same fiscal period. For purposes of this section, "debt or debts, or liability or liabilities" includes an obligation for 
which an appropriation is made from anticipated funds, but does not include borrowing between state funds. 
Eighty-Second-That Section 8 of Article XVI thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 8. (a) From all state revenues there shall first be set apart the moneys to be applied by the State for support 
of the ~ ~ system aA4 ~ instit:Htions ~ ~ ed1:1cation Public School System. 
(b) Commencing with the 1990-91 fiscal year, the moneys to be applied by the State for the support of~ 
districts aA4 comnumity college districts the Public School System for any fiscal year shall be not less than the greater 
of the following amounts: 
(1) The amount~ that, as a percentage of General Fund revenues whicll that may be appropriated pursuant 
to Article XIII B, equals the percentage of General Fund revenues appropriated for~ districts and community 
college districts, respectively, the Public School System in the 1986-87 fiscal year 1936/87. 
(2) The amount required to ensure that the total allocations to ~ districts aA4 community oollege districts 
the Public School System from General Fund proceeds of taxes appropriated pursuant to Article XIII B and allocated 
local proceeds of taxes shall not be less than the total amount from these sources in the prior fiscal year, excluding 
any revenues allocated pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 8.5, adjusted for changes in enrollment and adjusted 
for the change in the cost of living pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 8 of Article XIII B. This 
paragraph shall be operative only in a fiscal year in which the percentage growth in California per capita personal 
income is less than or equal to the percentage growth in per capita General Fund revenues plus ~ AaU one-half 
of one percent. 
(3) (A) The amount required to ensure that the total allocations to~ districts nn4 community~ districts 
the Public School System from General Fund proceeds of taxes appropriated pursuant to Article XIII B and allocated 
local proceeds of taxes shall equal the total amount from these sources in the prior fiscal year, excluding any revenues 
allocated pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 8.5, adjusted for changes in enrollment and adjusted for the change 
in per capita General Fund revenues. 
(B) In addition, an amount equal to one-half of one percent times the prior year total allocations to school districts 
-tm4 commYnity colleges from General Fund proceeds of taxes appropriated pursuant to Article XIII B and allocated 
local proceeds of taxes, excluding any revenues allocated pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 8.5, adjusted for 
changes in enrollment. 
(C) ::t:Ws pa,r:agraph Paragraph (3) shall be operative only in a fiscal year in which the percentage growth in California 
per capita personal income in a ~ year is greater than the percentage growth in per capita General Fund revenues 
plus ~ AaU one-half of one percent. 
(c) In any fiscal year, if the amount computed pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) exceeds the amount 
computed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) by a difference that exceeds one and one-half percent of General 
Fund revenues, the amount in excess of one and one-half percent of General Fund revenues shall not be considered 
allocations to ~ districts nn4 commYnity colleges the Public School System for purposes of computing the amount 
of state aid pursuant to paragraph (2) or ~ (3) of subdivision (b) in the subsequent fiscal year. 
(d) In any fiscal year in which scOOol districts nn4 comml:lnity ~districts are the Public School System is allocated 
funding pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) or pursuant to subdivision W (g), tAey the Public School System 
shall be entitled to a maintenance factor, equal to the difference between (1) the amount of General Fund moneys 
~ that would have been appropriated pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) if that paragraph had been 
operative or the amount of General Fund moneys ~ that would have been appropriated pursuant to subdivision 
(b) had subdivision (b) not been suspended, and (2) the amount of General Fund moneys actually appropriated 
to ~ districts aA4 comnumity college districts the Public School System in that fiscal year. 
(e) The maintenance factor for ~ districts aA4 cOIIltn.'IIDity CGilege districts the Public School System determined 
pursuant to subdivision (d) shall be adjusted annually for changes in enrollment, and adjusted for the change in 
the cost of living pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 8 of Article XIII B, until it has been allocated 
in full. The maintenance factor shall be allocated in a manner determined by the Legislature in each fiscal year in 
which the percentage growth in per capita General Fund revenues exceeds the percentage growth in California per 
capita personal income. The maintenance factor shall be reduced each fiscal year by the amount allocated by the 
Legislature in that fiscal year. The minimum maintenance factor amount to be allocated in a fiscal year shall be equal 
to the product of General Fund revenues from proceeds of taxes and one-half of the difference between the percentage 
growth in per capita General Fund revenues from proceeds of taxes and in California per capita personal income, 
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not to exceed the total dollar amount of the maintenance factor. 
(f) For purposes of this section, "changes in enrollment" shall be measured by the percentage change in average 
daily attendance. However, in any fiscal year, there shall be no adjustment for decreases in enrollment between the 
prior fiscal year and the current fiscal year unless there have been decreases in enrollment between the second prior 
fiscal year and the prior fiscal year and between the third prior fiscal year and the second prior fiscal year. 
w 
(g) Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) may be suspended for one fiscal year only when made 
part of or included within any bill enacted pursuant to Section 12 of Article IV. All other provisions of subdivision 
(b) may be suspended for one fiscal year by the enactment of an urgency statute pursuant to Section 8 of Article 
N, provided that the urgency statute may not be made part of or included within any bill enacted pursuant to Section 
12 of Article IV. 
(h) For the purposes of this section, "allocated local proceeds of taxes" does not include any tax imposed pursuant to Section 
5 of Article XI, any ad valorem real property tax imposed pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 1 of Article XIIIA, or any 
tax imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 4 of Article XIII A. 
(i) Commencing with the 1997-98 fiscal year, and each fiscal year thereafter, for the purpose of making computations pursuant 
to paragraphs (2) and (3) of subdivision (b), any amount appropriated for the support of the Public School System from General 
Fund revenues that may be appropriated pursuant to Article XIII B in the prior fiscal year that exceeds the amount that was 
required to be appropriated from those revenues for that prior fiscal year pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), 
as applicable, shall be included within the amounts appropriated for the support of the Public School System from General Fund 
revenues that may be appropriated pursuant to Article XIII B in that prior fiscal year only if the Legislature specifically so 
provides. 
(j) For the fiscal period commencing July 1, 2001, and for each subsequent fiscal period, "fiscal year," as used in this section, 
shall be deemed to refer to one of the two 12-month periods from July 1 to June 30, inclusive, that comprise collectively the 
two-year fiscal period described in subdivision (a) of Section 12.1 of Article IV. The Legislature shall identify, in the budget 
act for each of those fiscal periods, the amount of the appropriations made by that budget act that apply for the support of the 
Public School System for purposes of this section for each of the two fiscal years within that fiscal period. Additional state funding 
determined to be required under this section for the second fiscal year of a fiscal period may be appropriated in the budget rebalancing 
bill or other appropriate statute. 
Eighty-Third-That Section 8.5 of Article XVI thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 8.5. (a) In addition to the amount required to be applied for the support of~ districts nn4 community 
college districts the Public School System pursuant to Section 8, .tl:\@ CootroUsr BhaJ1 during each fiscal ~ period the 
Controller shall transfer and allocate all revenues available pursuant to paragraph 1 of subdivision (a) of Section 2 
of Article XIII B to that portion of the State School Fund restricted for elementary and high school purpose~ ~ 
w .tl:\at portion Gf .tl:\@ ~ ~ I4m4 fli!StrictE!d £ol: community college purposE!s, rE!spE~cti.vE~ly, in proportion w 
~ E!nroll-IRE~nt in ~ districts ~ community coUE!ge districts rli!SpE!ctivE~ly. 
fJ,j Witk rli!Spect w £un4> allocated w taat portioo Gf .tl:\@ ~ ~ I4m4 restricted £ol: elementary ~ Aigh 
~purposes, no 
(b) No transfer or allocation of funds pursuant to this section shall be required at any time that the Director of 
Finance and the Superintendent of Public Instruction mutually determine that current annual expenditures per student 
equal or exceed the average annual expenditure per student of the 10 states with the highest annual expenditures 
per student for elementary and high schools, and that average class size equals or is less than the average class size 
of the 10 states with the lowest class size for elementary and high schools. 
~ With respect w £unGs allocated w tRat portioo ef thE! £tate~ Iiund fli!Stricted fur community colleg9 purposes, 
no transfer Gr allocatioo ef £un4> pursuant w thls 69ctinn BhaJ1 bE! rE~quifli!d at any tim@ tRat thE! Director Gf FinancE! 
and ~ ChancE!Uor Gf .tl:\@ California Community CollegE!s muwally dE!tE!rminE! that currE!nt annual E!XpE!ndiW.fli!s 
pEl~' studE!nt fui: community collegE~s in thls StatE! equal Gr ~ thE! av9ragE! annual E!XpE!nditufE! per studE!nt Gf .tl:\@ 
W stat9s with .tl:\@ highE!st annual 9XpE!ndituf9s pEl~' studE!nt £ol: community collE~gE!s. 
{Pj 
(c) Notwithstanding .tl:\@ provisions ef Article XIII B, funds allocated pursuant to this section shall not constitute 
appropriations subject to limitation. 
w 
(d) From any funds transferred to the State School Fund pursuant to subdivision (a), the Controller shall, each 
~fiscal period, allocate to each school district ~ community collE~gE! district an equal amount per enrollment 
in the school districts district from the amount in that portion of the State School Fund restricted for elementary and 
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high school purposes aH4 nn ~ amount ~ enrollment m community college districts £rom tHat portion Gf .fu.@ 
State ~ Ilun4 restricted fur community college purposes. 
w 
(e) All revenues allocated pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be expended solely for the purposes of instructional 
improvement and accountability as required by law. 
w 
(j) Any school district maintaining an elementary or secondary school shall develop and cause to be prepared 
an annual audit accounting for sucll ~ revenue received pursw:mt to this section, and shall adopt a School Accountability 
Report Card for each school. 
Eighty-Fourth-That Section 10 of Article XVI thereof is amended to read: 
SEC 10. Whenever the United States government or any officer or agency thereof shall provide pensions or other 
aid for the aged, co-operation by the State therewith and therein is hereby authorized in such manner and to such 
extent as may be provided by law. 
The money expended by any county, city and county, municipality, district or other political subdivision of this 
State made available under the provisions of this section shall not be considered as a part of the base for determining 
the maximum expenditure for any given year permissible under Section 20 of Article Xl of this Constitution independent 
of the vote of the electors or authorization by the £tate ~ Gf Equalization state government entity designated by 
the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of Article XIII . 
Eighty-Fifth-That Section 18 of Article XVI thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 18. We (a) Except in the case of general obligation bond indebtedness incurred by a local government agency included 
in a home rule community charter adopted pursuant to Article XI A, no county, city, town, township, .ooard e£ education7 
or school district7 shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in year 
the income and revenue provided for such that year, without the unless both of the following conditions are met: 
(1) The indebtedness or liability receives the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof, voting at an election 
to be held for that purpose, except that with respect to ;;my; such, for any public entity which that is authorized to 
incur indebtedness for public school purposes, any proposition for the incurrence of indebtedness in the form of 
general obligation bonds for the purpose of constructing, repairing, or public school 
d€ltermined, m .fu.€! manner prescribed ~ w be structurally ~ fui: ~ ~ be 
approval of a majority of the qualified electors of the on the orcmc,sitton 
HGF~~. 
(2) Before or at the time of incurring sucll the indebtedness, ~ be is made for the collection of an annual 
tax sufficient to pay the interest on such the indebtedness as it falls and &lGG to constitute provide for 
a sinking fund for the payment of the principal thereof, on or before maturity, which shall not exceed forty years 
from the time of contracting the ~ provided, however, anything to the ~ when 
indebtedness. 
(b) When two or more propositions for incurring any indebtedness or liability are submitted at the same election, 
the votes cast for and against each proposition shall be counted separately, and when two-thirds or a majority of 
the qualified electors, as the case may be, voting on any one of such the propositions, vote in favor thereof, such 
the proposition shall be deemed adopted. 
Eighty-Sixth-That Section 1 of Article XVIII thereof is amended to read: 
SECTION 1. (a) The Legislature, by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership of each 
house concurring, may propose an amendment or revision of the Constitution and in the same manner may amend 
or withdraw its proposal. Each amendment shall be so prepared and submitted that it can be voted on separately. 
(b) (1) An amendment to this Constitution proposed by the Legislature shall be submitted to the electors at an election held 
throughout the State on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of an even-numbered year. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an amendment to this Constitution proposed by the Legislature may be submitted to 
the electors at a statewide election scheduled to be held on a date other than that specified in paragraph (1) if the Legislature 
specifies in a section of the measure the date of the election and the Governor, by executive order, authorizes the placement of 
the proposed measure on the ballot at that election. If the Governor does not grant that authorization, the proposal shall be 
submitted to the voters pursuant to paragraph (1). 
Eighty-Seventh-That Section 7 of Article XX thereof is amended to read: 
SEC. 7. ~(a) Except as otherwise specified by this section, the limitations on the number of terms prescribed by 
Section 2 of Article IV as amended November 6, 1990, Sections 2 and 11 of Article V, Section 2 of Article IX, and Section 
17 of Article XIII apply only to terms to which persons are elected or appointed on or after November 6, 1990, except 
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that an incumbent Senator whose office is not on the ballot for the general election on that date may serve only 
one additional term. ~ limitatiGBs 
(b) The limitations on the number of terms prescribed by Section 2.1 of Article IV as added November 5, 1996, apply to 
any term of office as a Senator or member of the Assembly that commences on or after January 6, 2003. For purposes of the 
limitations prescribed by that section, terms of office include those terms of office as a Senator or member of the Assembly to 
which persons are elected or appointed on or after November 6, 1990, except that a person who has served more than two years, 
but not more than six years, as a member of the Assembly between November 6, 1990, and January 2, 2005, is deemed to have 
thereby served one term in the Assembly, and a person who has served more than six years as a member of the Assembly between 
November 6, 1990, and January 2, 2005, is deemed to have thereby served two terms in the Assembly. 
(c) The seats of the 40 members of the Assembly elected on November 5, 2002, from odd-numbered districts shall be vacated 
at the expiration of the second year, so that one-half of the terms of office of the Assembly begin every two years. 
(d) Except as otherwise provided by subdivision (b), the term limitations identified in subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not 
apply to any unexpired term to which a person is elected or appointed if the remainder of the term is less than half 
of the full term. 
Eighty~Eighth-That Section 7.5 is added to Article XX thereof, to read: 
SEC. 7.5. (a) Notwithstanding Section 9 of Article IX, the Regents of the University of California include the Superintendent 
of Public Instruction, as an ex officio member, and 14 appointive members appointed by the Governor and approved by the 
Senate, a majority of the membership concurring. 
(b) This section shall remain in effect only until January 4, 1999, and as of that date is repealed. 
Eighty-Ninth-That Section 8 is added to Article XX thereof, to read: 
SEC. 8. (a) The amendments to Section 2 of Article VII that took effect November 6, 1996, shall not be deemed to reduce 
the term of office as a member of the Personnel Board of any person who was a member of that board as of November 5, 1996. 
(b) The amendments to Section 9 of Article IX that took effect November 6, 1996, including those set forth in Section 7.5 
of this article, shall not be deemed to reduce the term of office as a Regent of the University of California of any person who 
was a regent as of November 5, 1996. 
Ninetieth-that the tenth paragraph of Section 22 of Article XX thereof is amended to read: 
The ~ ~ Q{ EqualizatiGB state government entity designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of Article 
XIII shall assess and collect such excise taxes as are or may be imposed by the Legislature on account of the manufacture, 
importation, and sale of alcoholic beverages in this State. 
Ninety-First-That the heading of Article XXI thereof is amended to read: 
ARTICLE XXI 
REAPPORTIONMENT OF SENATE, ASSEMBLY, AND 
CONGRESSIONAL; AN9 BOARD eF EQUALIZATION DISTRICTS 
Ninety-Second-That Section 1 of Article XXI thereof is amended to read: 
SECTION 1. In the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of Congress 
at the beginning of each decade, the Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines of the Senatorial, Assembly, and 
Congressional1 nn4 ~ Q{ Equalization districts in conformance with the following standards: 
(a) Each member of the Senate, Assembly, and Congress, nn4 tRe ~ Q{ Equalization shall be elected from a 
single-member district. 
(b) The population of all districts of a particular type shall be reasonably equal. 
(c) Every district shall be contiguous. 
(d) Districts of each type shall be numbered consecutively commencing at the northern boundary of the state 
and ending at the southern boundary. 
(e) The geographical integrity of any city, county, or city and county, or of any geographical region shall be respected 
to the extent possible without violating the requirements of any other subdivision of this section. 
And be it further resolved, That the revisions to the California Constitution made by this measure shall become operative 
on January 1, 1997, except as otherwise specified by the provisions being revised, and except as follows: 
(a) Section 9.5 of Article V, as proposed to be added, shall become operative January 1, 1998, to apply to terms 
of office to which persons are elected or appointed on or after November 3, 1998. 
(b) The following shall become operative January 4, 1999: 
(1) The proposed amendments to subdivision (b) of Section 14 of Article II; subdivision (l) of Section 8 of Article 
III; Section 18 of Article IV; subdivision (b) of Section 5 of, Sections 10.5, 11, and 12 of, and subdivision (f) of Section 
14 of, Article V; subdivision (i) of Section 4 of, and subdivision (a) of Section 10 of, Article VII; subdivision G) of 
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Section 3 of, subdivision of Section 11 
tenth of Section 22 of Article 
The pn)pC)Sed a'uunun 
The PfCIPOSed 
and Sections 16, 
and the 
Article XIII. 
and 
Sections 8 and 9 of Article 
of this measure shall become 
DfCIDOS€d to be added 
1, 2001. 
Section 2.1 of Article IV, as Df<)D<)S€'d 
the twelfth and fourteenth 
1, 2002. 
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